Polyvalent Verbs by Vogel, Ralf
Polyvalent Verbs
D I S S E R T A T I O N
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
doctor philosophiae
(dr. phil.)






geboren am 04.06.1965 in Giessen
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin:
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hans Meyer
Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät II:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Hock
Gutachter:
1. Prof. Dr. Manfred Bierwisch
2. Priv.-Doz. Dr. Wolfgang Sternefeld
3. Priv.-Doz. Dr. Reinhard Blutner
eingereicht am: 6. Februar 1998
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 13. Juli 1998
Abstract
Polyvalent verbs can be combined with different sets of complements. The
variation concerns both number and type of the complements. In most gram-
mar theoretical frameworks, verbs are of crucial importance for the syntactic
structure and semantic interpretation of clauses. They determine via sub-
categorization frames how many complements of which type are realized.
Polyvalence is therefore an unexpected phenomenon. A discussion of several
approaches in generative grammar results in the claim that subcategorization
is not very useful for the explanation of polyvalence. In the second chapter,
a model for the conceptual-semantic interpretation of verbs and clauses is
developed that takes polyvalence into account: the conceptual-semantic in-
terpretation of clauses with polyvalent verbs is determined by the verb and
complements together. Thematic interpretation is viewed as an inferential
process that is embedded within the general conceptual-semantic interpreta-
tion processes, not their prerequisite.
Keywords:
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Zusammenfassung
Polyvalente Verben können mit unterschiedlichen Konstituentenmengen
kombiniert sein, wobei deren Zahl und Art variieren. In den meisten Gram-
matikschulen sind Verben zentral für syntaktische Gestalt und semantische
Interpretation von Sätzen. Sie bestimmen über ihre Subkategorisierungsrah-
men, wieviele Komplemente welchen Typs im Satz realisiert werden. Daher
ist Polyvalenz ein unerwartetes Phänomen. Eine Diskussion verschiedener
Ansätze der generativen Grammatik ergibt, daß Subkategorisierung für die
Erklärung von Polyvalenz ungeeignet ist. Im zweiten Kapitel wird ein Mo-
dell für die konzeptuell-semantische Interpretation von Verben und Sätzen
entwickelt, das dem Rechnung trägt: In Sätzen mit polyvalenten Verben be-
dingen die Komplemente des Verbs zusammen mit dem Verb die konzeptuell-
semantische Interpretation. Die thematische Interpretation wird als inferen-
tieller Prozeß angesehen, der keinen Spezialfall allgemeiner konzeptuell-se-
mantischer Interpretationsprozesse darstellt, sondern vielmehr in diese ein-
gebunden ist.
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hard Blutner; and: Hans-Martin Gärtner, Markus Steinbach, Tolja Strigin,
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Introduction
The topic of this dissertation is the phenomenon of polyvalent verbs in Ger-
man. Sometimes also the term (variable) polyadicity of verbs is used. I will
use the first notion without implying thereby that I place my work into
the theoretical framework the notion polyvalence stems from. During my
research I found that all contemporary models of grammar face relatively se-
rious problems, when dealing with the phenomenon. However, the tradition I
am most familiar with is generative grammar, and most of the discussion will
be related to theories developed within this framework. In the presentation
of the phenomena I will use the terminology that is common in generative
grammar.
A polyvalent verb is a verb that can be combined with different sets of
constituents – where the notion ‘constituent’ for now does not reflect lexi-
cal content of the constituents, but rather exclusively their morphosyntactic
features like syntactic category, inflection, case etc. We will later see that
it is not unproblematic to abstract from the lexical-semantic content of a
constituent.
A good example of a polyvalent verb is the German verb rollen. An in-
complete sample of valence possibilities is listed below (on the right hand
side the respective sets of constituents):2
(1) a. Der Ball rollte nom
The ball rolled
b. Der Ball rollte unter den Tisch nom;dir-PP
The ball rolled under the table
c. Maria rollte den Ball unter den Tisch nom;acc;dir-PP
Maria rolled the ball under the table
d. Josef rollte eine Wurst nom;acc
Josef rolled a sausage
e. Kaspar rollte die Wurst rund nom;acc;AP
Kaspar rolled the sausage round
2
nom = nominative, acc = accusative, dir-PP = directional prepositional phrase, AP
= adjectival phrase. The classification of constituents follows standard methods.
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f. Mir rollte der Wagen weg dat;nom;particle
me-dat rolled the trolley away
‘I had the trolley roll away on me’
In generative grammar, and also most other frameworks, lexical heads, es-
pecially verbs, are assumed to determine the number and morpho-syntactic
features of their complements by a specific lexical entry, here called subcate-
gorization frame (this notion was originally introduced in Chomsky (1965).
Subcategorization frames of verbs usually leave out the subject, and indi-
cate optionality with round brackets. The subcategorization frame for rollen
might look like this (the ‘ ’ indicates the position of the verb):3
(2) rollen: (acc) (dat) (PP) (particle) (AP)
So we have many different options. The only case form that cannot be com-
bined with rollen is the genitive. It is also impossible to have complement
clauses. Compare this with the German verb gedenken (‘commemorate’) that










One theoretical problem I want to address in this thesis is: How legitimate is
it to apply the conception of subcategorization to polyvalent verbs like rollen
in the same way as we do in the case of such ‘inflexible’ verbs like gedenken?
I will propose a methodological distinction between these two types of
verbs and claim that assuming subcategorization frames makes sense only
for verbs like gedenken, but not for verbs like rollen. The principles that
govern the possibilities of complementation in the case of polyvalent verbs are
not lexeme-specific, but more general in nature. These principles regulate the
possibilities of complementation, e.g., with accusative objects, for all verbs in
the same way, though their application domain is restricted to verbs without
subcategorization frames.4
3The notation follows the conventions introduced in Chomsky (1965).
4There is an analogy to the phenomenon of ‘regular’ vs. ‘irregular’ inflection of verbs.
Verbs that are regularly inflected obey rules that hold of all regular verbs in the same way,
while those that inflect irregularly follow their own rules and ignore the aforementioned
default rules. In the same way, we might speak of rules of ‘regular complementation’ in
the case of polyvalent verbs, and ‘irregular’ or idiosyncratic rules of complementation in
the case of verbs with subcategorization frames. The difference is, however, that irregular
inflection can be detected from the surface form. But a certain pattern of complementaion,
e.g., nominative plus verb plus accusative, might either result from the general default
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I assume that these principles are conceptual-semantic in nature. The
overall ratio is that a verb-complement combination is licensed, if it has a
plausible conceptual-semantic interpretation, i.e. if it does not yield ‘non-
sense’. Thus, an important part of the theory to be developed here concerns
the semantics of case forms and constructions, a topic that was rarely dis-
cussed in generative grammar until the occurence of construction grammmar
(see Goldberg (1995) for an overview). In construction grammar case forms
and construction types (like ‘transitive construction’, ‘resultative construc-
tion’, ‘dative construction’ etc.) are treated on a par with lexemes. The com-
positional semantics can apply in the usual way, though with different kinds
of entities.
The reason why this thesis is not based on construction grammar lies in
another empirical phenomenon that can be observed with polyvalent verbs.
It has to do with what Dowty (1986,1989,1991) called individual theta roles.
Dowty claims that the notions of universal theta roles that are mostly used
in theories of thematic interpretation (like ‘agent’, ‘patient’, ‘theme’ ‘goal’
etc.) only make sense, if we consider them as ‘abstractions’ over the concrete
thematic roles provided by individual lexical items, e.g., the verb rollen in
our example has one ‘individual’ role to assign, that of the entity that rolls,
call it R.
A theory of thematic interpretation has to show in the end, how the indi-
vidual roles are assigned. Universal roles are ‘intermediate’ categories without
independent foundation. It now turns out that the assignment of individual
roles of polyvalent verbs can still vary, when they are combined with the
same construction type. Consider the following examples of resultative con-
structions with rollen – the right column indicates the ‘linking’ of the role R
is indicated:
(4) a. Die Kugel rollte die Kegel um R=SUBJECT
The shot rolled the pins down
b. Josef rollte die Kugel um R=OBJECT
Josef rolled the shot away
c. Er rollte die Kegel mit der Kugel um R=OBLIQUE
He rolled the pins with the shot down
rules, or from an idiosyncratic lexical entry. Whether a verb is classified as polyvalent
or not, depends on its flexibility with respect to complementation. A verb that can only
occur in a transitive clause, should be treated as idiosyncratic. A verb that can occur
in transitive and several other patterns of complementation is polyvalent. Some verbs
are more flexible than others. So polyvalence could be considered as a gradient property.
However, I will propose that the variable flexibility of polyvalent verbs results from the
general complementation rules to be explored.
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d. Josef rollte den Teig aus R=∅
Josef rolled the dough out
If the only entities we deal with were constructions and verbs, we would
expect that the linking pattern for R did not vary that much. Examples like
these convinced me that the relation between syntactic complements and
semantic arguments is much more indirect than traditional theories assume.
Even in construction grammar this dimension of the problem is not reflected.
I view thematic interpretation as an inferential process that takes into
account the clause as a whole, and is thus embedded in the more general
processes of conceptual-semantic interpretation. Earlier generative accounts
of thematic interpretation assume thematic interpretation to be ‘prior’ to
these processes, and they often connect the issue of thematic role assignment
very closely with syntactic processes. In Chomsky’s influential “Lectures on
Government and Binding” (Chomsky 1981) the Theta Criterion – which
stated that each verbal complement has to be assigned a thematic role by
the verb and that each thematic role of the verb has to be assigned – is
introduced as a constraint on the syntactic well-formedness of a clause, not
just as a semantic constraint. In principle, this view is still held by most
generative grammarians. It entails a specific view on the relation between
the ‘syntactic arity’ and the ‘semantic arity’ of a verb that, as I see it, faces
big problems when applied to phenomena of polyvalence.
For all these reasons I tried to develop a different proposal on thematic
interpretation as a general inferential process of conceptual-semantic inter-
pretation. This proposal is the topic of the second chapter.
The first chapter discusses two types of theories of subcategorization and
thematic interpretation – the two most widely used theoretical strategies in
contemporary generative grammar. Of main interest will be how they deal,
or might be able to deal, with polyvalence and which kinds of problems





and Thematic Interpretation. A
Critical Overview
Dowty (1989) sorted the currently debated theories of the relation between
the semantic and syntactic arguments of predicates (first of all verbs) into
two types. The first type Dowty called ordered argument theories. Theories
of this type assume a homomorphism between the sets of semantic and syn-
tactic arguments of a predicate, or at least a well-defined mapping algorithm
between them. Without it, there could not be any mode of semantic inter-
pretation. The best elaborated theory of this type is Categorial Grammar,
combined with Montague Semantics. But also Head Driven Phrase Structure
Grammar (HPSG) is of this sort, and Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG).
Likewise, all theories developed in the realm of generative syntax inspired by
the work of Chomsky are of this sort.
The second type of theories can do well without such mapping algo-
rithms. Dowty called them ‘Neo-Davidsonian’ theories of thematic relations.
The main proponent of this type is Parsons (1980, a.o.).
The central problem for the analysis of polyvalence in ordered-argument
theories is, how to keep the mapping algorithm between syntactic and seman-
tic arguments flexible enough to capture polyvalence, and restrictive enough
to capture the restrictions that occur with other verbs.
Neo-Davidsonian theories may not have problems to explain the semantics
of polyvalence phenomena. But they depend on a sufficiently well elaborated
and restricted set of universal thematic relations that take the place of the
mapping algorithm here. This is problematic for several reasons, first of all
because the conception of universal thematic roles is very questionable. We
will come to this class of theories in section 1.2. I want to start with ordered-
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argument theories, which are also more traditional.
1.1 Ordered-Argument Theories of Thematic
Relations
Dowty (1989, 73f) gives the following by and large self-explanatory descrip-
tion of how he understands the term ‘ordered-argument theory’:
[. . . ] An ordered-argument system treats a verb as an unsaturated
predicate wanting a particular fixed number of arguments to form
a formula. Semantically, a verb denotes an n-place relation, and
when the denotations of the proper number of arguments are
combined with the relation in an appropriate way, then a truth
value is denoted, a proposition is expressed, or a situation is de-
scribed (depending on which semantic theory you use); if too few
argument denotations are made available, then no truth value (or
proposition or situation) can result.
In this system, it is important that the syntactic and semantic
rules be constructed to combine the argument-denotations with
the verb denotation in a fixed arrangement determined by the
syntactic arrangement (i.e. by the grammatical relations the argu-
ments bear in the sentence in question), though that semantic ar-
rangement is, in a sense, ultimately arbitrary. Arbitrary, because
the choice of relations to be denoted by verbs is likewise open in
this theory. The inverse of a two-place relation can carry infor-
mation equivalent to that of the original relation (think about,
e.g., like versus please), and similarly each of the permutations
of an n-place relation can carry the same information. It doesn’t
matter which permutation we chose for a verb’s denotation, as
long as the compositional semantic rules match each syntactic
argument of each verb with its appropriate semantic “slot” in the
interpretation of that verb. (Since we want compositional rules to
apply systematically to all verbs, our choice of permutation for
one verb will of course fix the choice of permutation for all other
verbs of equal or smaller adicity.)
In talking about an ordered-argument theory, I do not distinguish
between syntactic analyses which combine a verb with all of its
arguments “all at once” (as in the syntax of most formal logics)
or one at a time (as in categorial grammars and many versions
of Montague Grammar), thus treating the denotations of verbs
10
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as function-valued functions (so-called “furried” functions), both
are ordered-argument theories. [. . . ]
Three claims made by ordered-argument theories are especially important
for the following discussion:
1. Verbs are unsaturated predicates of a specific fixed arity.
2. Syntactic and semantic rules combine argument and verbs
in a fixed arrangement.
3. This arrangement is chosen arbitrarily.
The analysis of polyvalence phenomena poses problems for these three
claims:
ad 1. Polyvalent verbs can vary drastically in their syntactic arity.
ad 2. Polyvalent verbs can vary in the way they combine with their
arguments.
ad 3. For many complement types (i.e. NPs with a specific case,
complement clauses of a specific type) we can observe a sys-
tematicity in their mode of semantic interpretation that is
independent of the verb.
The subsequent sections will give examples for each of these problems,
and discuss their theoretical consequences and implications.
In this discussion, I will mainly use the example of Two-Level-Semantics,
as developed by Manfred Bierwisch and his colleagues during the 1980s.1 This
theory has an interesting restriction that other ordered argument theories
lack, namely, it is not allowed to proliferate lexical entries arbitrarily. If we
assumed for each clause in (1) in the introduction that a different verb rollen
is used and that all these verbs only quasi accidentally have the same phonetic
form, then there would not be any problem. Polyvalence would perhaps not
even exist for such a theory.
But a theory like this could hardly predict, let alone explain the semantic
relations between these sentences. In all the events described by the sentences
in (1) in the introduction there is some rolling going on. This can only fol-
low from the verb used. But if the verbs in these sentences have a uniform
semantic contribution to the meaning of the clause they occur in, then we
have some semantic evidence that we might be dealing with the same verb
here, not with six different ones. Two-Level Semantics, in principle, tries to
take this evidence serious.2 But before we turn to the details, I need to give
a brief introduction to a central concept of ordered-argument theories.
1Bierwisch (1983), Bierwisch (1986), Bierwisch & Lang (1987).
2At least under one interpretation. Cf. the discussion below.
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1.1.1 Subcategorization
The problem that ordered-argument theories have with polyvalence is con-
nected with the notion subcategorization: Since Chomsky’s influential ‘As-
pects of the Theory of Syntax’ (Chomsky 1965), where this notion was in-
vented, lexical items are usually held to be the core of syntactic expressions,
such that it lies in their responsibility, whether a phrase is grammatically
well-formed. The fundamental observation that led to this claim was that
very often lexical items have co-occurrence requirements. E.g., a determiner
always requires a noun phrase complement to constitute a determiner phrase:
DP → D NP
This is a phrase structure rule in the fashion of structuralist syntax.
Phrase Structure rules have been part of syntactic descriptions in generative
syntax up to the early 1970s. They have recently been revived by Generalized
Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG, Gazdar, Klein, Pullum & Sag 1985) and
Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG, Pollard & Sag 1994).
Subcategorization was introduced to distinguish between category spe-
cific and lexeme specific phrase structure rules. The DP rule given above is
a category specific rule because it holds likewise for all determiners. Lexeme
specific rules subdivide a syntactic category into subcategories. To give one
example, elements belonging to the syntactic category VERB are known to
differ in the number of complements they require. Some take one, some two,
some even more complements. Another important factor is the morphological
marking of the complements. German prepositions usually take one comple-
ment, but they are subcategorized into a group that requires accusative case
on the complement, another group that requires dative, a third group that
allows for both, and a group that requires genitive.
Subcategorization rules in the first formulation of the theory (Chomsky
1965) only made sense in combination with a set of phrase structure rules
that created the environments in question. If a verb had a subcategorization
frame ‘ Y Z’, the phrase structure rule component of the grammar had
to have a rule ‘VP → V Y Z’ to generate the environment the verb could
be inserted in. Though descriptively satisfactory, this was too powerful a
mechanism, and there was the redundancy of writing down each rule twice.
More specifically, there was no constraint on possible phrase structures.
The situation in natural language syntax seems to be different. Phrases nor-
mally are headed, and from the character of the head many morpho-syntactic
properties of the phrase follow. In former phrase structure grammar, a noun
phrase structure could look like this: ‘NP→ A P’. Such structures never have
been found. A noun phrase is called a noun phrase, simply because there is a
12
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noun in it, and this noun is the central element of the phrase that determines
its morphological and syntactic properties. Noun phrases are thus assumed
to be ‘headed’ by nouns, verb phrases by verbs etc.
In generative syntax work of the early seventies the phrase structure rules
component was simplified by a constraint that required that phrases are
headed and that they are projections of their lexical head. Phrases are as-
sumed to be projections of a certain level, i.e. the maximal level. E.g., VP
is the maximal projection of V. In the first versions of these reformulations,
there was no upper boundary for the number of levels, V projects to V′, V′
projects to V′′, V′′ projects to V′′′, and so forth (cf. Chomsky 1970). Chomsky
(1986) reduced this number to two levels above the V0 level, so phrases of
an arbitrary syntactic category X are now uniformly projected as follows:
XP → YP* X′; X′ → X0 ZP*,
where YP* and ZP* stand for 0 or more occurrences of maximal projec-
tions.
The task of the subcategorization rules now is determining which kinds of
phrases are required in the positions of YP* and ZP*. The transitive verb to
love requires a subject and an object, and hence the subcategorization rule
for this verb could look like this:
love: VP → NP NP
It has become usual to say that “the verb ‘to love’ subcategorizes a direct
object”. This is a somewhat different usage of the term ‘subcategorize’. The
correct formulation would be ‘requires qua subcategorization frame’.
Polyvalent verbs can be seen as having multiple subcategorization frames
– or no subcategorization frame at all, because listing all the frames it can
occur in would equal listing all possibilities there are as such. The fewest
verbs have such freedom, but many come quite close to it, and the list for a
verb like rollen in our introductory example is terribly long.
Before I turn to this in more detail, I want to discuss subject selection,
which is a special subcategorization property of verbs. This kind of subcat-
egorization does not depend on the individual lexeme in German (as well
as many other languages): whenever a verb is finite, there has to appear a
subject in the clause, whenever the verb is non-finite, there must not be a
nominative marked subject. But this, as I said, is a property of the whole
syntactic category V. Nonetheless, we have an instance of subcategorization
here. The syntactic category V is subcategorized into morphologically dif-
ferent forms – finite vs. infinite –, which differ in whether they require or
13
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prohibit the presence of a complement in the nominative.3
As subject selection is correlated with the morphological feature [+finite],
which in European languages often is expressed by an auxiliary and not by the
matrix verb itself, it has become usual in generative grammar to distinguish
the syntactic category V from its inflectional features that are now treated
as a syntactic category of their own, called INFL, with its own maximal
projection, IP. A finite INFL selects a subject. Likewise, INFL always selects
a VP, independent of its finiteness. So the subject is no longer part of the
subcategorization frame of V. But note that this is only so because of a
methodological decision: we are treating a verb and its morphological features
as two separate syntactic entities.4
This move has, as I alluded, something artificial: INFL cannot seriously
be called independent of V; there is no INFL without V, but there might be







‘eating beans is fun’
Though the bracketed VP functions as the subject of the clause, and thus
should be nominal, the V-head of VP is still able to assign accusative which
would be impossible, if the verb was of category N. There is no evidence,
though, that V is accompanied by an INFL here.
Be this as it may, selection of the subject and other constituents have to be
kept separate. Subjects are subcategorized by finite verbs, other complements
are subcategorized by individual lexical items.
The subcategorization frame for a transitive verb like ‘to love’ now is:
‘love: NP’. The occurrence of the subject is regulated by INFL.
Up to now, polyvalent verbs only pose the problem of having lots of dif-
ferent subcategorization frames with the same verb. A more serious problem
arises with another standard assumption about verbs: it is mostly assumed
that the subcategorization frame of a verb depends on its meaning. A stan-
dard assumption is that the number of semantic arguments – the semantic
3An exception are impersonal passive constructions that do not even allow an expletive









4The obvious advantage of this decision is that the morphological difference between
periphrastic and synthetic forms is irrelevant for syntactic representations. This is useful
because they do not differ in their syntactic properties, e.g., third person forms like ‘went’
and ‘have gone’ both represent a finite verb.
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arity – of a verb corresponds with the number of its syntactic arguments –
the syntactic arity. One meaning of a verb is assumed to correspond with
one subcategorization frame. The only variation that might occur, should
result from omission of constituents. We saw that this is not everything that
polyvalence is about.
As far as I can see, this problem is inherited from earlier linguistic tradi-
tions. When for example Frege (1891a) proposed that a verb can be treated
as a function, he did not wonder whether this holds both for syntax and se-
mantics or not. It was silently assumed that there is no need to distinguish a
semantic notion of arity from a syntactic one. This assumption is formulated
in its clearest form in Categorial Grammar, and its semantic correlate, Mon-
tague Semantics. But it was always part of several stages of the Chomskian
version of generative grammar. It is essential both for LFG and HPSG.5
Nearly all grammar theories assume that whenever a verb requires the
presence of a complement with a certain morphological marking, the same
verb is also responsible for the semantic, or better: thematic interpretation
of the complement.6
This background assumption can be made explicit in the following way
(ignoring the possibility of several syntactic arguments being composed into
one semantic argument, see footnote 5):
I. A lexical entry of a verb ‘p’ consists a.o. of a semantic rep-
resentation including a set of semantic arguments A, and a
subcategorization frame represented by a set of constituents
C, including information about the morphological marking
of each c ∈ C.
5Though all of these theories allow the arities to differ in some restricted cases, as long
as the mapping between syntax and semantics is ‘complete’, so to speak, and predictable.
Examples in case are ECM-verbs that allow the subject of an embedded infinitive to be
case-marked by the matrix verb. For example, the verb ‘to believe’ is semantically a 2–place
relation in ‘Mary believes John to win a prize’. The two semantic arguments are ‘Mary’
and ‘John wins a prize’. Syntactically, though, we have three complements of the verb ‘to
believe’: the subject ‘Mary’, the direct object ‘John’, and the infinitival complement ‘to
win a prize’. A lexeme- or/and construction specific mapping algorithm tells how three
syntactic arguments are conflated into the two semantic arguments of the verb. Such an
algorithm is then assumed to hold for these constructions in general. The divergencies that
can be found with polyvalent verbs are much more ‘irregular’. For example, there might
be different linking patterns with one verb within the same construction, depending on
the lexemes used as complements.
6The notions ‘thematic interpretation’ and ‘thematic role’ will play a crucial role
throughout this thesis. To give an example, the verb ‘to love’ stands for a relation be-
tween a lover and a loved and the thematic interpretation is that the subcategorized
direct object has the role of the loved, and the subject that of the lover.
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II. The cardinalities of A and C are equal: |A| = |C|
III. The reason for II. is that A and C are related by a) an
interpretation function I by means of which each element
of C is paired with just one element of A, and b) a linking
function L, by means of which each element of A is paired
with exactly one element of C. Both I and L are thus one-to-
one functions. Furthermore, I and L are the inverse functions
of each other, because for any ci ∈ C and for any ai ∈ A the
following holds: I〈ci,ai〉 ⇐⇒ L〈ai,ci〉.
For the discussion, let us take the example of the German two-place noun
Schwester (sister). Nobody ever proposed that the two semantic arguments
of this predicate have to be realized in a sentence, and that the way these
arguments have to be realized is determined by an extra subcategorization
frame in the lexical entry of the noun. It is easy to see that any such attempt
could not be defended. Let us take a look at the following sentences. In










































































































CHAPTER 1 1.1 Ordered-Argument Theories of Thematic Relations
Let us assume for the semantics of Schwester a two-place relation between a
female person f and another person x: f is the sister of x iff a) f is female
and b) f and x have the same parents. How are f and x linked in (2)? In
(2–a), x is the genitive attribute of the predicative nominal, hence part of
the phrase built by the semantic predicate ‘sister’. f is realized outside of the
phrase as matrix subject.
In (2–b), both x and f are realized ‘outside’. But in all the other cases
the noun ‘sister’ is not used predicatively but rather as referent of its own
argument f . So f cannot be realized syntactically any more (it is already,
one might say). Are there any constraints to observe on the morpho-syntactic
properties of x?
As we can see, x can be realized as nominative, accusative, dative, PP.
It can also even be a simple discourse referent, mentioned in the discourse
preceding the actual sentence (2–g). This is the clearest indication that there
is only a semantic constraint on the use of the predicate ‘sister’: it is useless
to speak of a ‘sister’, without telling, whose sister she is. To get an inter-
pretation, we need the actual value of x, but this is not guaranteed by a
mapping algorithm, it is a genuine semantic condition. We see that from
the fact that this condition can be fulfilled by non-syntactic interpretative
inferences alone.
Theorists rarely propose subcategorization rules for nouns, but in the
case of verbs they are the standard. What are the arguments in favour of
this different treatment? First of all, the argument is empirical in nature.
Consider that a verb like gedenken (‘to commemorate’) in German requires
a genitive object. Genitive objects are very rare in German, so this is quite





This may have the same semantic reasons as in the case of ‘Schwester’ above.
Telling that someone commemorates without telling whom she commemo-
rates is not very informative, one might say. But whenever the argument is
realized, it has to be realized in the genitive case.
This is different from the noun case. However, this is only a single datum,
there are many more of this kind, but the question remains, whether this is
sufficient evidence for the claim that verbs in general must have subcatego-
rization frames.
It is not surprising that many verbs like ‘gedenken’ exist, if one considers
the enormous amount of idioms in languages (my ‘Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary’ is proud of presenting “12.720 idioms and phrasal verbs”). If
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we leave out the semantics and just look at the surface form, idioms differ
from verbs with subcategorization frames only in one respect: they not only
determine the morpho-syntactic properties of the complements – as verbs
with subcategorization frames do –, they also determine the lexical items the
verb has to be accompanied by, e.g., as in:
(4) Maria macht sich aus dem Staub
“Maria makes herself out of the dust” = M. leaves
Noone ever claimed that all linguistic expressions are idioms. But everybody
agrees that idioms exist. Likewise, we can agree that verbs with subcategori-
zation frames exist, without claiming that all verbs necessarily have subcate-
gorization frames. I will call verbs with subcategorization frames semi-idioms.
Like idioms, semi-idioms can be seen as clusters of a verb and one or more
constituents. As in idioms, the morphological marking of the verb’s comple-
ments is fixed. Unlike idioms, in semi-idioms the lexical items that can be
introduced in the place of the complements are not fixed, though choice of
complement is never really arbitrary. We thus have a tripartite classification
of verb-complement relations, distinguished by the degree of fixation of the
properties of the verb’s complements:
Type complement morphology complement lexeme
1. idioms fixed fixed
2. semi-idioms fixed free
3. ‘free’ verbs free free
Theories of subcategorization are basically theories of semi-idioms. The
possibility of the existence of ‘free’ verbs and its theoretical consequences
are not discussed in these theories. All verbs are treated as semi-idioms.
Naturally, those verbs that impose the most problems for the concept of
subcategorization are polyvalent verbs, which should belong to type 3 in the
above classification.
German prepositions as one example for the co-existence of semi-
idiomatic and ‘free’ lexemes
Most German prepositions assign either accusative or dative. Many of them
can assign both cases. Accusative case is used when the PP expresses a



























This holds for a couple of German locative prepositions, e.g., an, in auf, vor,
hinter, über (‘at’, ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘in front of’, ‘behind’, ‘above’). Thus, there is a
meta-lexical generalization that holds for German prepositions:
(6) P+dative: position
P+accusative: direction
However, there are other prepositions in German that take only one case.
The prepositions zu, bei, mit, aus (‘to’, ‘at’, ‘with’, ‘off/out’) take dative,
while durch, für and um (through’, ‘for’, ‘around’) take accusative. Here the
above generalisation no longer holds, zu, e.g., is a directional preposition that
takes the (otherwise positional) dative case.
On the one hand we have a set of prepositions that obey a general (or de-
fault) rule, and on the other hand we have a set of more or less idiosyncratic
(or ‘semi-idiomatic’) prepositions. The prepositions all require an NP com-
plement. This is a category specific rule. But the individual lexemes differ in
whether they determine the case of their complement. If they do, then the
semantics of the P+NP combination is also determined individually. But if
they do not, then both case and semantics are subject to the category specific
generalisation expressed in (6).
It is interesting and important for the introduced distinction between
semi-idiomatic and ‘free’ lexemes, that we do not find a set of prepositions
that show the opposite pattern of (6). The conception of subcategorization
does not exclude per se the possibility of a preposition that is used with both
the positional and the directional interpretation and takes the dative for the
direction and the accusative for the position. This theoretical/typological
overgeneration can be seen as a hint that we need a more restrictive model
than the conception of subcategorization can provide.
My proposal is the following:
(7) a. If the morphological marking of a head’s lexical complement
is fixed, then this may be determined by the head. The head-
complement relation is semi-idiomatic or idiomatic.
b. If the morphological marking of a head’s complement is not fixed,
then the choice of morphological marking is based on rules that
hold for the whole lexical category the head belongs to. The head-
complement relation is ‘free’.
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What is prohibited by this model, is that a verb (or any lexical head) has
its own ‘private case system’, so to speak. Case systems cannot be defined
globally, but have to be defined at least category wise anyway: the accusative
used by prepositions has different semantic and syntactic properties than
those used for verb complements; the genitive used for NP complements is a
structural case, while the genitive used for verbal complements is an oblique
or inherent case etc. But case systems should not be definable lexeme wise.
Let me now turn into a more detailed discussion of the concept of sub-
categorization and the properties of theories based on it. To show the kinds
of problems that occur I want to discuss one subcategorization based theory,
the approach founded by Manfred Bierwisch in various papers beginning with
Bierwisch (1983), popular under the name ‘Two-level semantics’ (henceforth
TLS). The problems that arise in this approach also arise in other variants
of strongly lexicalist theories of grammar, like LFG and HPSG. A short in-
troduction into the technology, as far as we need it for the discussion, will be
given first, and the possible ways of dealing with polyvalence are discussed.
1.1.2 Lexicalist Theories of Grammar: The case of
Two-level Semantics
Bierwisch (1983) treats lexical items as triples 〈P,MS,SEM〉. P is the pho-
netic and SEM the semantic representation. MS lists the morpho-syntactic
properties of the lexeme: its syntactic category, inflectional characteristics,
and, most important for our discussion, the subcategorization frame.
SEM is an underspecified semantic representation. The underspecifica-
tion makes it possible that the same lexeme can be interpreted differently
in differing contexts without assuming different lexical entries. Bierwisch’s











Bierwisch shows that this sentence has at least three readings:
(9) i Faulkner’s actions are hard to understand
ii Faulkner’s books are hard to understand
iii Faulkner’s articulation is hard to understand
Bierwisch lists three questions that come up when looking at these examples
(Bierwisch 1983, 76):
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I.1 How does the name Faulkner receive the three
different interpretations?
I.2 How does the verb verstehen receive its three
different interpretations?
I.3 How is the connection between the variants of
Faulkner and verstehen established?
Bierwisch calls the phenomenon touched by I.1 conceptual shift: Faulkner
stands for different properties of the person in question. We also have different
interpretations of the verb verstehen. This phenomenon is called conceptual
specification by Bierwisch. The difference between shift and specification is
that shift is a relation between two senses, while specification is basically pre-
cisification of the concept invoked here by the verb. Its meaning or reference
is not changed, it rather gets ‘completed’ by the interpretative process.7
7Here is the respective passage from Bierwisch (1983, 76f):
[. . . ] Drei Probleme sollen an diesem Beispiel erläutert werden.
(I.1) Wie kommt der Eigenname ”Faulkner“ zu den verschiedenen in [(9)]
angegebenen Interpretationen?
(I.2) Wie kommt ”verstehen“ zu den verschiedenen Interpretationen, die in
[(9)] zwar nicht durch verschiedene Paraphrasen wiedergegeben sind,
die aber begrifflich deutlich unterschieden werden können.
(I.3) Wie kommt der Zusammenhang zwischen den Varianten von ”Faulk-
ner“ und ”verstehen“ zustande?
Das Problem (I.1) will ich provisorisch das der konzeptuellen Verschiebung
nennen und damit andeuten, daß zwischen den verschiedenen Varianten in
verschiedene begriffliche Bereiche verschobene Interpretationen eines sprach-
lichen Ausdrucks auftreten. Zwei triviale Antworten auf dieses Problem sollen
im vorhinein ausgeschieden werden.
Erstens: Die verschiedenen Interpretationen von ”Faulkner“ in [(8)] sind nicht
reguläre oder akzidentelle Ellipsen, d.h. [(8)] hat nicht verschiedene zugrunde
liegende syntaktische Strukturen, die etwa den Sätzen [(9)] entsprechen. Der
Grund: eine solche Erklärung würde erstens eine völlig unbestimmte und
zudem ganz unmotivierte Mehrdeutigkeit (und zwar syntaktischer Art) für
[(8)] postulieren müssen, und zweitens die Syntaxtheorie durch ganz und gar
unmotivierte Tilgungsregeln aufweichen.
Zweitens: ”Faulkner“ ist nicht semantisch ambig dergestalt, daß seine Lexi-
koneintragung alles das als alternativ semantische Repräsentationen enthält,
was in der Ellipse-Version die semantische Repräsentation der ,zugrunde lie-
genden‘ Strukturen wäre. Der Grund sollte hinreichend deutlich sein: Eigen-
namen (und nicht nur die) würden unbestimmt mehrdeutig, was nicht nur
die Theorie des Lexikons amorph machen würde, sondern auch offensichtlich
den Fakten widerspricht.
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The semantic ‘sphere’ is subdivided by Bierwisch into two subcompo-
nents: the Semantic Form SF and the conceptual structure CS. This makes
an implementation of conceptual shift and specification possible. SF is an
abstract or underspecified semantic representation both for the lexical mean-
ing and for the lexically determined meaning parts of a clause. SF typically
contains those semantic aspects of a lexeme that are linguistically relevant,
first of all its arity. Many aspects, especially those that can be subject to
conceptual shift and specification, are underspecified at SF and need to be
(contextually) specified at the level of CS. The conceptual interpretation of
a lexeme or a clause can be seen as a contextually specified/enriched version
of the SF representation. Conceptual shift and specification are CS phenom-
ena. From the assumption that grammatically relevant semantic information
is encoded in SF follows the proposal that conceptual shift and specifica-
tion do not affect subcategorization properties of a verb. This is the crucial
prediction that will turn out to be problematic in the subsequent discussion.
Eine auf den ersten Blick weniger triviale Antwort wäre die Annahme, daß
”Faulkner“ einen unscharfen Begriff repräsentiert, dessen Kern die Person
ist und dessen Peripherie verschiedene Aktivitäten, Attribute etc. der Per-
son umfaßt. Soweit diese Überlegung in der Substanz plausibel ist, läßt sie
sich jedoch nicht in den Rahmen der unscharfen Begriffe bringen, für den
etwa der Vagheitsspielraum bei Farbwörtern oder bei Dimensionsadjektiven
wie ”klein“, ”dick“ etc. einschlägige Beispiele sind. Die Unterscheidungen
zwischen [(9–i)] und [(9–iii)] sind nicht unscharf, sondern durchaus genau
bestimmbar.
Das Problem (I.2) will ich, ebenfalls provisorisch, das der konzeptuellen Dif-
ferenzierung nennen. Gemeint ist damit, daß die verschiedenen Varianten
von ”verstehen“ in [(9)] nur unterschiedlich differenziert sind, aber – in ei-
nem hinreichend einleuchtenden Sinn – unter den gleichen ,Oberbegriff‘ fal-
len. Die Erklärung durch syntaktische und semantische Mehrdeutigkeit (im
Sinne von ”akustisch verstehen“, ”intellektuell verstehen“, ”moralisch verste-
hen“ etwa) soll hier ebenfalls im vorhinein ausgeschlossen werden, aus den
gleichen Gründen. Die Deutung als unscharfer Begriff liegt hier etwas näher,
trifft aber das eigentliche Problem ebenfalls nicht: die verschiedenen Bezüge,
die für die Varianten von ”verstehen“ relevant sind, lassen sich (anders als
unterschiedliche Nuancen von rot oder orange) beliebig scharf unterscheiden
und gehen nicht allmählich ineinander über.
Das Problem (I.3) schließlich, das provisorisch das der Selektion heißen soll,
ist eindeutig ein Nachfolgeproblem zu (I.1) und/oder (I.2). Da ich bereits
angenommen habe, daß Verschiebung und Differenzierung nicht zur semanti-
schen Repräsentation gehören, kann auch das Selektionsproblem nicht durch
semantische (oder gar syntaktische) Selektionsbeschränkungen erfaßt wer-
den. Es muß vielmehr auf der konzeptuellen Ebene als Folge der Interpreta-
tion von sem in bezug auf den jeweils unterschiedlichen Kontext ct erklärt
werden. [. . . ]
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According to TLS a lexical entry has three parts. Let us take an illus-
trative example (from Bierwisch 1986, 13), the entry for the verb rollen, ‘to
roll’:
(10) /roll/; V,[ (PP2)] ; 〈x1x2〉 [(DO x1) [ROLL x1x2]]
The first part of the lexical entry is a phonetic string. After the first semi-
colon comes the subcategorization frame that tells which syntactic categories
have to appear with the verb. In this case it is a PP. ‘PP2’ is in round brackets
which means that it need not necessarily be realized, thus a clause of the form
‘x rolls’ is also licensed by this entry. The subject is not mentioned in the
subcategorization frame because its appearance is governed by the verb’s
finiteness feature, as discussed above.
The third entry – after the second semi-colon – is the SF template that
consists of two parts, indicated by different kinds of brackets. The square
brackets encapsulate a predicate logic formula representing the meaning of
rollen, and the angled brackets mark the theta-grid or argument structure of
the verb: the theta-grid is always a subset of the variables in the semantic
formula. The order of the variables in the theta grid mirrors the hierarchical
order of the arguments in the clause. The connection between variables in the
semantic representation and syntactic complements of the verb is guaranteed
by indices at the variables.
The bracketed DO-prime in (10) indicates optionality of volitional ac-
tion: A rolling can be performed accidentally, as, e.g., by a stone, but also
volitionally, as, e.g., by a person:
(11) a. John rolled down the hill
b. The stone rolled down the hill
This representation appears problematic to me. It makes sense to allow op-
tionality in subcategorization frames – but, I think, only because the meaning
of the lexical item remains constant. E.g., the object of ‘to eat’ can be omit-
ted, but the interpretation is kept that something is eaten in such a case (cf. ‘I
am eating’). The bracket notation is here an abbreviation for two alternative
syntactic structures.
If parts of the semantic representation are left out, we have a different
meaning: [DO x1 [Roll x1x2]] is different from [Roll x1x2]. But remember
that we also can have different conceptual interpretations, as achieved by
conceptual shift or specification. So we now have the problem to decide for
the same lexical item, whether we are dealing with a semantic or a conceptual
meaning variation. And we are left quite alone with the problem to find
criteria for our decision between these two possibilities in a concrete case.
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Why, e.g., should we not treat the volitional rolling of persons as a conceptual
specification? In fact, I think this is the better choice. If we want to keep the
distinction between two semantic levels, then it is better to keep SF constant
and put all variation into CS.
In two-level semantic literature one can find two different strategies for
the differentiation of the two levels:
(12) Two strategies of level differentiation
Strategy A: Underspecified word meaning and its
contextual specification
Level 1: literal meaning
Level 2: meaning of a word, when it is used
Strategy B: Grammaticalization as a heuristics for the
two levels
Level 1 : grammatically relevant aspects of word meaning
Level 2: further aspects of word meaning
The first strategy is often illustrated with nouns, as, e.g., with Faulkner in (8).
A division like this has also been argued for by Searle (1983). He claims that
though the clauses in (13) describe totally different events, it is no accident
that the same verb is used, and that we are well-advised to assume that the
verb ‘to open’ has one genuine meaning – otherwise we might perhaps be
forced to propose infinitely many lexical entries for ‘to open’, one for each
use (Searle 1983, 145):
(13) a. Tom opened the door
b. Sally opened her eyes
c. The carpenters opened the wall
d. Sam opened his book to page 37
e. The surgeon opened the wound
So the first strategy has an independent justification. This is not the case for
the second one. We are only given a heuristics: If a certain semantic aspect
of a verb is grammatically relevant, then it is part of its SF. This strategy is
often used to determine the SF representation of verbs.8 However, it is quite
conceivable to do the same within a ‘one-level-semantics’. We do not have to
separate grammatically relevant meaning aspects on different levels in order
to show how grammatical properties follow from them.9
8It can be found practised in several papers by Dieter Wunderlich and his colleagues.
9This argument has also been put forward by Taylor (1994).
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The difference between meaning of a word as such and its meaning in
a specific use can be related to the difference between word meaning and
sentence meaning. Though the contribution of the verb ‘open’ to each of
the sentences in (13) might be the same, these sentences differ in how they
‘conceptualize’ it. As also Bierwisch (1983) put it: It makes not much sense
to view the different interpretations of open in (13) and likewise verstehen in
(8) as parts of the lexical meanings of these words, even in a broad sense. It
is better to see them as an effect of the word’s use, and thus as a property
of the clause.
From the SF-CS division, as drawn by TLS, follows an important proposal
about subcategorization that will be the main topic of the discussion in the
subsequent parts of this section:
(14) Two-level semantic conjecture on the relation between the
CS and the subcategorization frame of a verb
Properties of CS, especially conceptual shift or specification, should
not affect the subcategorization properties of a verb.
In TLS, conceptual aspects of a lexical item are not represented in its lexical
entry. The lexical entry can only restrict the range of variation in conceptual
interpretation. It does not replace it.
I want to discuss six phenomena of German that should or have to be
treated as cases of conceptual shift or specification, and do affect subcatego-
rization properties. All of these are polyvalence phenomena.
1.1.3 Problem 1: Conceptual shift may affect a verb’s
valence
The first phenomenon looks like a case of conceptual shift of a verb. The
verb schlagen (‘to beat/hit/strike’) can either be used to refer to the physical
action of beating/hitting, or to the sound evoked by this action. As a verb























When the object is omitted, we get an interpretation of an arbitrary implicit
argument for the object:
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is only acceptable in a context, where speaker and hearer know, what or who
is beaten by Peter, and how.
Sound-emission schlagen, on the other hand, is fine as an intransitive verb,

































These sentences are all well-formed, even when uttered ‘out of the blue’,
and without arbitrary or habitual/generic interpretations. Sound-emission
schlagen behaves like a typical intransitive verb. Like many intransitive verbs,
















































10Cognate objects are semantically not really arguments of the verb. Rather, they only
seem to describe the event more precisely.
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Schlagen parallels Bierwisch’s Faulkner example quite well. We have one and
the same entity, i.e. a schlagen event, but it can be viewed under different
perspectives, e.g., sound-emission or physical action. For both interpreta-
tions of schlagen it is true that there is some ‘schlagen’ going on. There is
no basis for claiming that we have two different verbs in the sense of TLS
à la Bierwisch (1983), under this interpretation. But the subcategorization
facts are also clear: sound-emission schlagen behaves like an intransitive verb,
physical-action schlagen like a transitive one.11
I can see no other way to solve the problem than giving up the idea
that subcategorization properties are unrelated to specifics of the conceptual
interpretation of the verb – at least in this case.
1.1.4 Problem 2: Conceptual Specification may affect
a verb’s valence
The second example can be seen as an instance of conceptual specification.
We are dealing with the verb glauben (‘to believe’).
Let us assume for the semantics of glauben that it describes a two-place
relation between, say, a believer (a conscious living being) and a belief (ar-
guably a proposition). We mostly have more details about the nature and/or
origin of the believed proposition – this is very often even necessary to get
a meaningful interpretation –, but this additional information would have to
be considered as conceptual specification. As it turns out, such details affect






daß Gerda froh sein wird





Gerda wird froh sein







11The notion ‘transitive’ is used in a broad sense here: requiring two complements, but














































Our interest lies in (20–a) and (20–b). A V2-complement clause as in (20–b)
seems to be odd, if the belief argument expressed by the complement clause
is subject to presuppositions or certain conversational implicatures. It is nei-
ther possible, when the matrix verb is negated, nor when it is accompanied
by a dative object. The corresponding sentences with a daß -introduced sub-





























































The presupposition attached to (21–b) is that Peter told Maria before that
Gerda will be happy. The interpretation of the sentence is thus: “Maria be-
lieves what Peter told her, namely, that Gerda will be happy”. That we are
dealing with something that looks like a presupposition in (21–a), too, is not
as easy to argue for. Nonetheless, it is clear that the effect is induced by
the negation, and I suspect that it is the pragmatics of the negation that
is important here. The debate about these effects has a long history and is
connected with the question of the very nature of presuppositions. I do not
want to review the whole debate. The central observation is the following:
When Frege (1891b) introduced the notion ‘presupposition’ he assumed that
in a sentence like
(22) The king of France is bald
in order to determine whether this sentence is true or false it must be the
case that there actually exists a king of France. If this was not the case,
the sentence could not be assigned a truth value. Thus, ‘the king of France
exists’ is a presupposition of ‘the king of France is bald’. One tool to test,
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whether a proposition is a presupposition, is its behavior under negation.
Presuppositions hold likewise for a proposition and its negation. Frege claims
that this is the case here:
(23) The king of France is not bald
According to Frege, sentence (23) also has the presupposition that there is
a king of France. Russell (1905) considered this view to be simply false.
For him sentence (22) has a truth value, even if there is no present king of
France, i.e. it is false. And sentence (23) has two readings, one under which
it is true, and another one under which it is false. The two readings are:
‘there is a king of France and he is bald’ (false) and ‘the king of France is
not bald, because there is no king of France’ (true). This second reading
should be impossible, if the existence of the king was presupposed, because
the apparent presupposition is within the scope of the sentence negation.
This is essentially what the debate is about. It is still continuing. The
development of linguistic pragmatics in the 1970s added many additional
facts about presuppositions, several different solutions were proposed. A very
interesting pragmatic account is Grice (1981). I again do not want to go into
the details of this acount here, but its essentials are that the utterance of a
negated clause must have some conversational importance, the utterance of
“¬p” is comparable to a previous utterance of “p”. Uttering “¬p” out of the
blue would be pragmatically strange, because there are many things that do
not hold in the world. There must be something about p within the present
context such that uttering ¬p introduces new and relevant information. This
effect can be illustrated very clearly with wh-clauses:
(24) What did Mary believe?
This question has two readings: a) a ‘weak’ reading that just implicates that
Mary believed something, but it could be anything; b) a ‘strong’ reading that
could be understood as ‘Which of the things she had been told before did
Mary believe?’. However, if we negate the question, only the strong reading
is possible:
(25) What did Mary not believe?
When we ignore echo questions, the only possible reading is ‘Which of the
things she had been told before did Mary not believe?’. Corresponding to
the weak reading would be an answer like “Mary did not believe that god
is a horse” or something else out of the terribly large set of propositions for
which hold that Mary did not believe them. It is very unlikely that someone
asks for this set of propositions. It is not informative to know anything that
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someone does not believe. There must be something specific in the current
discourse about which it is helpful to know whether someone believes it or
not. The same facts hold for the German translation ‘Was hat Maria (nicht)
geglaubt?’. Although Russell might be right in that even the negated clause
is ambiguous from a logical point of view, it is clear that the pragmatics of
utterances sorts out the weak reading for the reason of being uninformative
or ‘absurd’.
So we can conclude that the sentence negation has the property of trig-
gering existential presuppositions. I assume that this property is responsible
for the change in the subcategorization properties of glauben.
Sentence (21-a) has in common with (21-b) that the proposition repre-
sented by the complement clause carries the implication that it has previously
been introduced into the discourse. The only difference is that the person who
has introduced it is not explicitly mentioned in (21-a).
Under the assumption that V2-complement clauses can only be used to in-
troduce new information the data come out quite naturally without recourse
to the subcategorization frame of glauben. Thus, we have a candidate for a
lexeme independent rule governing the realization possibilities of complement
clauses as V2-clauses. We do not need to mention it in the subcategorization
frame of glauben. Reductions of this kind are the main strategy in making
subcategorization frames obsolete.12
12It would be nice, if the facts were always that clear. Unfortunately, V2-complement
clauses are very frequent in reported speech. Even a verb like bedauern (‘regret’) which
is a typical presuppositional verb that never allows for V2-complement clauses in written
German, can appear with them in ordinary speech: “Ich bedaure, ich kann nicht kommen”
(‘I regret, I cannot come’). It is also hard to decide in reported speech, whether we have a
sequence of a main clause and a subordinate clause, separated by a comma, or a sequence
of two main clauses, separated by a colon: ‘Sie sagt(,/:) er kann nicht kommen’ (She
says(,/:) he cannot come). Many apparent counterexamples against the proposed treatment
of V2-complement clauses in fact result from such intervening stylistic factors. E.g., the























One line of reasoning to explain (ii) would be the claim that we are dealing with ‘reported
thought’ here. (ii) does in fact sound very narrative.
The ‘un-familiarity condition’ also holds in the following nice little dialog containing
bedauern (‘regret’) (many thanks to Hans-Martin Gärtner (p.c.) for this example):
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I am again assuming that serious TLS theorists would not propose that
there are two different verbs glauben, one of which is presuppositional and the
other is not. A serious TLS theorist thus would have to admit that conceptual
specification changes the subcategorization properties of the verb.
A second subcategorization problem connected with the discussed data
is the occurrence of the dative object in (20-b). Again we have to say that it
is possible that one can believe something that she has been told by some-
one else. But as this is not necessary for a believe relation to hold we are
again forced to treat this as conceptual variation in the interpretation of the
verb. We might say, in TLS terms, that this is another instance of conceptual
specification. But then we once more have to state that a subcategorization
property (i.e. the occurrence of the dative object) is licensed by an interpre-
tative effect beyond the level of semantic form.
It would also be ad hoc to propose that the dative object has to be selected
by the verb in this case. The phenomenon of so-called ‘free dative objects’
is well-known in German, and requires an independent treatment anyway. It
could possibly cover this case.
Another way of putting the problem would be the inclusion of selectional
restrictions in lexical entries and letting them be crucial for the realization
as V2 clause. But the belief argument of believe can be presuppositional or
not, so this should be left open or underspecified at the SF level, and only
be specified at CS. But this would repeat my point: CS decisions are crucial
for what was usually assumed to be subcategorization.
The overall ratio of my argumentation on the last few pages is that there
is not only a systematicity in how verbs combine with constituents, but
that very often there is also a systematicity in how constituents with cer-
tain morpho-syntactic properties are used. This second systematicity can be
exploited to explain the behavior of polyvalent verbs. Polyvalent verbs, from
this point of view, can be seen as verbs that have no subcategorization frames.
The TLS approach does not exclude that SF templates of verbs are com-
bined with SF-templates of other constituents (in fact, Bierwisch (1988) has
proposed this for prepositional phrases). This leaves open the possibility that
constituents in general occur with their own SF-templates. If this happens
(iii) A: Mein Kanarienvogel ist tot (‘My canary is dead’)
B: *Ich bedaure sehr, er ist tot (‘I regret very much, it is dead’)
B′: Ich bedaure sehr, daß er tot ist (‘I regret very much that it is dead’)
The oddity of answer B can again be explained with the assumption that V2 subordinate
clauses have to introduce new material into the discourse. Whether this assumption can be
justified, would have to be shown by a detailed empirical study that lies beyond the scope
of what I intend to do here. I only want to point at the possibility of a lexeme independent
rule here and try to give some empirical arguments in its favor.
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to be reasonable, and I will argue here that it does in the case of polyvalent
verbs, then the need for verbal subcategorization frames is no longer given
for the verbs in question, because the complements can ‘decide’ themselves,
so to speak, whether they are licensed in a given environment, or not, and
the polyvalent behavior of the verbs in question is predicted. This also makes
clear, I hope, that I am not attacking the framework of TLS as such (or any
other framework), but only the unrestricted use of subcategorization frames
that this framework shares with many others. Subcategorization is not at all
essential for these frameworks and most of what I am postulating here might
be fairly compatible with most frameworks.
1.1.5 Problem 3: Pragmatically licensed implicit argu-
ments
The third phenomenon that I want to discuss here is the problem of implicit
arguments. As is well-known, some verbs allow (some of) their complements
to be left out in a sentence. The verb ‘to eat’ is the classical example. Though
it is semantically a two-place relation between an eater and a food argument,
the food argument can be omitted. ‘Mary is eating’ is a well-formed English
sentence (likewise ‘Maria ißt’ in German). Not all transitive verbs allow for
this. E.g., the verb ‘to swallow’ is transitive, too, but it is quite odd to say ‘I
am swallowing’ (or ‘ich verschlucke’ in German), though this verb describes a
relation that is closely related to ‘eat’. For this reason the standard assump-
tion about implicit arguments is that they are licensed lexeme-specifically.
The licensing condition is part of the verb’s subcategorization frame. This
holds not only for TLS, but for most current grammar theories.
Whether an argument can be omitted in a sentence is indicated by round
brackets in the subcategorization frame. The lexical entries for the two verbs
in question might look, in the SF format, as follows:
(26) a. eat: V,[ (NP2)] ; 〈x1x2〉 [DO x1 [EAT x1x2]]
b. swallow: V,[ NP2] ; 〈x1x2〉 [DO x1 [SWALLOW x1x2]]
That an argument can be omitted syntactically does not imply that it is also
missing from the semantic representation. In the case of ‘to eat’, we see in
the argument structure or theta-grid, written in angled brackets, that the
two arguments are always there, whether they are realized syntactically or
not.
The phenomenon of implicit arguments requires a complication in the
models of subcategorization. As already noted, it has become usual practice
to distinguish subject subcategorization from subcategorization of other con-
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stituents, because they illustrate two different ways of dividing the syntactic
category VERB into subcategories. While objects and other constituents are
assumed to be selected by individual lexemes, subjects are assumed to be se-
lected by specific morphological realizations of verbs. With the phenomenon
of implicit arguments another difference comes into play. Subjects cannot be
optional. Whenever a subject is omitted, though required, or realized, though
forbidden, the sentence is ill-formed. This raises the doubt whether the two
phenomena are of the same type. To be more explicit, it is an open question
whether the sentence
(27) I am swallowing
is both grammatically and semantically odd or only semantically. There is
no violation of the Subject Selection Constraint imposed by the finite verb.
The word order is also correct. The verbs are correctly inflected, so is the
pronoun. If this is all syntax is about, then the sentence is well-formed.
The question is: what counts as a morpho-syntactic constraint? We would
be well-guided, if we considered morpho-syntactic constraints to be ‘hard con-
straints’: whenever a supposed syntactic constraint can be violated optionally,
we may use this as an indication that it in fact is no morpho-syntactic con-
straint. The computational theories of syntax that currently are prominent
in the field would certainly do better with such a strict conception.
Lexeme specific subcategorization would then have to be seen differently.
In the opening of this chapter I suggested that subcategorizing verbs can be
treated on a par with idioms, this might be an alternative to explore. Idioms
like ‘to kick the bucket’ are treated as one morpho-syntactic unit. The object
‘the bucket’ is not subcategorized by ‘to kick’. The whole unit constitutes
one single lexical entry. The same view might be possible for ‘to swallow
+ accusative’. Thus, ‘swallow’ would be an instance of a ‘semi-idiom’, as
introduced on pages 18ff.
Under this perspective, then, optionality of an argument is a hint that
there is no subcategorization going on, but rather something different that
should be given a different name. This appears just to be an exercise in
terminological clarification. But once we accept that optionality of rules is not
a property of morpho-syntax, we are forced to find a non-morpho-syntactic
explanation of implicit arguments. I will give a brief sketch of such an attempt
in section 2.5.1. In the present section I will discuss the analyses given by
ordered-argument theories, and discuss some problems they face.
The crucial task that has to be done by the theories under discussion,
among them as only one example TLS, is to guarantee the equivalence of the
semantic and syntactic arity of verbs allowing for implicit arguments. This
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equivalence is one fundamental assumption of these theories that is more or
less constitutive for their mode of construing the relation between syntax and
semantics.13
Since the first proposal by Katz & Postal (1964) the treatment of the
problem has basically remained the same. Katz and Postal elaborated on the
idea of a syntactic deep structure that both feeds semantic interpretation and
serves as the starting point for the derivation of a syntactic surface structure.
Because it has a semantic interpretation paraphrasable as ‘something’, the
implicit object has to be present at deep structure. A syntactic transforma-
tion rule called “something deletion” then yields the surface structure output
by performing what the name suggests – deletion of ‘something’.
Dowty (1978, 1989) and Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981) elaborated some-
thing equivalent for categorial grammar and Montague semantics. Here a
syntactically invisible operator O was introduced that reduces an n-place
predicate to an n–1-place predicate. The application of O is restricted to
cases where the reduced argument can be existentially quantified over. This
way, the appropriate semantics and syntax are guaranteed.
Both solutions look quite ad hoc. They are ways of dealing with the prob-
lem technically. Both add a special device to the devices already present in
the approach. The same holds for TLS: What is ‘something deletion’ in Katz
& Postal (1964) and the operator O in Montague semantics, are the round
brackets in the subcategorization frame of the verb, as illustrated in (26-a).
An additional semantic rule called ‘unspecified argument rule’ guarantees
that arguments that are omitted syntactically are existentially quantified
over in the semantic representation (cf. Bierwisch 1987, 97f).
None of these implementations addresses the question why it is the case
that the technical device in question can be applied with ‘eat’, but not with
‘swallow’. The application domains for the rules thus have to be stipulated
as lexical idiosyncrasies of the verbs. Being a possibility in principle, this way
of dealing with the problem can be interpreted as the admittance that the
phenomenon is not really understood – implicating further, perhaps, that
there is nothing to understand.
13Conceptual theories usually deal with a higher number of arguments in conceptual
representations – this is the case in TLS, as well as in Jackendoff’s model. For example,
according to Jackendoff (1990b), the ‘lexical conceptual structure’ of ‘to drink’ includes
the drinker’s mouth as an argument. The verbs ‘to buy’ and ‘to sell’ include a ‘money
argument’ in their concepts that likewise need not be realized syntactically. However, these
models have a mode of indicating which of the arguments have to be realized syntactically.
In TLS, this is the function of the theta grid. And the relation between theta grid and
syntactic complements normally is a one-to-one relation, with the exception of the special
case of implicit arguments, and, of course, subjects.
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However, as Fillmore (1986) pointed out, there is another class of verbs
allowing for object omission, but under totally different conditions. With
this second class of verbs the object can only be omitted, if it has previously
been mentioned in the discourse. Its semantics is not an arbitrary indefinite
interpretation as for the omitted object of ‘to eat’, but rather equivalent to
an anaphor. Fillmore calls these omitted objects definite null complements
(DNC), those of verbs of the ‘eat’-class indefinite null complements (INC).
He describes these two types of null complements as follows:
[. . . ] With definite null complements the missing element must
be retrieved from something given in the context; with indefinite
null complements the referent’s identity is unknown or a matter
of indifference. One test for the INC/DNC distinction has to do
with determining whether it would sound odd for a speaker to
admit ignorance of the identity of the referent of the missing
phrase. It’s not odd to say things like, “He was eating; I wonder
what he was eating”; but it is odd to say things like “They found
out; I wonder what they found out” The missing object of the
surface-intransitive verb EAT is indefinite; the missing object of
the surface-intransitive verb FIND OUT is definite. The point is
that one does not wonder about what one already knows. [. . . ]
Fillmore shows that even with closely related verbs, there are differences
in whether they allow for DNCs or not. He gives the example of the verb ‘to
insist’. A possible reply to ‘Why did you marry her?’ could be (28–a), but
not (28–b) or (28–c) (cf. Fillmore 1986, 98):
(28) a. Because Mother insisted
b. *Because mother required
c. *Because mother demanded
DNCs pose a special problem for subcategorization based theories. It lies in
the fact that DNCs are licensed by the discourse. Subcategorization frames
are syntactic well-formedness conditions for sentences. These well-formedness
conditions are placed in an encapsulated and purely linguistic ‘zone’ – call it
a mental module or faculty. The licensing factor for DNCs, on the other hand,
clearly lies outside of this module. We need access to discourse referents, and
representations of the previous discourse in order to tell whether the DNC
is correctly chosen or not. However, the way out would be treating DNCs
like pronouns. Whatever the model has to say about them, would have to
be carried over to DNCs. Nonetheless, two separate rules of complement
omission have to be stipulated, distinguished by two different semantic rules,
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one rule as ad hoc as the other. But note that under this treatment the
subcategorization frame for DNCs strictly speaking does no longer decide
about the well-formedness of the construction. From a syntactic point of view,
for those verbs which allow for DNCs (which would be lexeme-individually
specified) all sentences with DNCs are well-formed.
Another problem of DNCs, also illustrated by Fillmore (1986), has to do
with polysemy and might be more closely related to the issues under debate
in TLS. Fillmore notes that certain verbs only allow for DNCs under certain
interpretations or meanings. His examples are the verbs ‘to win’ and ‘to
lose’. The direct object of ‘to win’ can either stand for a competition or for
a reward:
(29) a. He won the election / the race / the game
b. He won the first prize / the gold medal / the blue ribbon
Only in the competition case DNCs are possible, i.e.,
(30) He won
implies that he took part in a competition. The same holds for the verb
‘to lose’. Fillmore gives many additional examples. He takes the differing
subcategorization properties (i.e. allowing for a DNC or not) as evidence for
two different verb senses: we are dealing with two different verbal lexemes
that, strictly speaking, only accidentally have the same phonetic form. I doubt
whether this can or should be taken over for these cases in TLS.
What is more, there is another possibility with ‘to win’ that Fillmore
might have overlooked – at least with the German corrolar ‘gewinnen’ the













This sentence does not imply that she won the first prize, but rather that she
won something. So here we have a case with an INC. Following Fillmore’s
ratio, we now have three different verbs ‘to win’ with three different senses,
i.e. winning in a competition (29-a), winning in a lottery (31), and winning
some prize (29-b).14 The question is, whether the third case, winning some
prize, is really semantically or conceptually distinguishable from the first
14Carlson (1984) gave another example for interpreting implicit arguments. He argues
that at least under one reading the sentence
i. Mary was left alone
is interpreted as ‘Mary was left alone by everybody’. Here the implicit argument is
universally quantified.
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two cases. One can only win, if one takes part in some social event which
is especially created for winning, e.g. competitions and lotteries. The latter
are only special cases of the former – from a semantic point of view. So they
are good candidates for conceptual specification, but not for different verbs
in TLS. Else we face the danger of creating different lexical entries for only
different uses of the same verb. We again have an instance of conceptual
specification of a verb that affects its subcategorization properties.
It is the main advantage of the TLS view, that it addresses the problem
of explaining why, e.g., in all our three cases the verb ‘to win’ is used.
It might be important to make my position clear at this point: I do not
want to claim that the two-level approach as such is wrong. The main thesis
that words have basic meanings and a range of different possible conceptu-
alizations and uses is, I am sure, correct. I only try to show that these con-
ceptualizations affect what are assumed to be subcategorization properties.
It is the concept of lexeme-specific subcategorization that I am attacking,
at least for many cases, and only insofar as the TLS approach, or any other
approach, relies on it, I am also attacking these.
1.1.6 Problem 4: Causatives and Resultatives – Lexical
or Conceptual Variation?
If we accept the fundamental TLS claim about uniform lexical meanings and
conceptual variations on their basis, we get the general problem of deciding
when we are dealing with a single lexeme and when with different ones.
In the case of verbs one important heuristic tool we are given by TLS are
differing subcategorization patterns. These patterns, as I already showed,
can sometimes be very unreliable candidates for this task. Thus, we had
better look for another empirical criterion. The other plausible candidate
is a semantic criterion, already introduced in my discussion of Bierwisch’s
(1983) original proposal on page 20f and in the discussion of Searle’s (1983)
comments on the issue on page 24f. This criterion can be phrased as follows:
Consider the different sentences with the polyvalent German
verb rollen illustrated in the opening of this chapter, repeated
here for convenience:
(32) a. Der Ball rollte
The ball rolled
b. Der Ball rollte unter den Tisch
The ball rolled under the table
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c. Maria rollte den Ball unter den Tisch
Maria rolled the ball under the table
d. Josef rollte eine Wurst
Josef rolled a sausage
e. Kaspar rollte die Wurst rund
Kaspar rolled the sausage round
f. Mir rollte der Wagen weg
me-dat rolled the trolley away
‘I had the trolley roll away on me’
These sentences all describe events, and the described events all
have something in common, namely: there is some rolling going
on in them. The only word in these sentences that can cause
this interpretation is the verb rollen. Hence, the verb has one
constant semantic contribution to all the sentences. We shall use
this semantic commonality of the sentences as an indication that
one and the same verb with one and the same meaning is used.
This interpretational strategy has an important consequence: causative
and resultative variants of one verb are no longer treated as different lex-
emes, as is the case in standard lexicalist theories. They must be treated as
conceptual variations now.
Standard lexicalist treatments stipulate extra operations of template ma-
nipulation in the lexicon to derive causatives and resultatives. Normally this
is done by the assumption of a (possibly abstract) causative morpheme that
can be combined with nouns, adjectives and verbs quite freely, and carries
with it the appropriate semantics. The lexicon thus does not only consist of
items, but also of combination rules. This makes sense for true morphological
causativizations, where we really have two different lexemes. However, Wun-
derlich (1992, 1997) tries to extend his semantic treatment of morphological
causativization to cases of ‘non-morphological causativization’ like (32-c),
and resultative constructions.
Causative alternating verbs are treated as single, but polysemous words,
the meanings of which are systematically related. Wunderlich (1992, 25),
dealing quite extensively with the problem within the TLS framework, gives
the following SF representations for the verbs schmelzen (‘to melt’) and rol-
len:15
15In Wunderlich (1997) the following slightly different notation for ‘schmelzen’ is given.
The analysis, however, remains the same:
schmelzen: {λpλxcause(x, p)}(λybecome(liquid(y)))(s)
Wunderlich (1997) is a modified and abridged version of Wunderlich (1992). Especially the
38
CHAPTER 1 1.1 Ordered-Argument Theories of Thematic Relations
(33) a. schmelzen: { CAUSE(x,} BECOME(LIQUID(y)) {)} (s)
b. rollen: { CAUSE(x,} ROLL(y) {)} (s)
These formulae are meant to derive the possible transitive or causative al-
ternations with the two verbs, cf.:
(34) a. Das Eis schmilzt (‘The ice melts’)
b. Sie schmilzt das Eis (‘She melts the ice’)
c. Der Ball rollt (‘The ball rolls’)
d. Sie rollt den Ball (‘She rolls the ball’)
The braces around the CAUSE prime in (33-a) indicate optionality. But
we are dealing with semantic optionality here. Thus, realizing the verb in-
transitively means realizing it non-causatively. But this is a variation in the
semantic form, not a conceptual variation. The problem is that we now have
variation at both CS and SF, without clear criteria how to distinguish SF
and CS. To view a causative alternation of a verb as a conceptual variant is
perfectly compatible with TLS. This would keep the central idea untouched:
a solid lexical meaning paired with several conceptual variations.
But Wunderlich wants to express with his SF representations that schmel-
zen and rollen can be causativized, and so he does it this way.
Not all verbs can be causativized. So it would not help to posit a general
device like: ‘All intransitive verbs can be used transitively by changing their
meaning to that of a causative verb’. But this may have conceptual reasons.
An intransitive verb like ‘to roll’ can be causativized, because a rolling mo-
tion can be caused by an external force. This is not possible for some animate
motion verbs like ‘to crawl’. Under certain circumstances, though, such con-
structions are possible, as in ‘The officer marched the soldiers’ or ‘I’m walking
the dog’, but in these cases there is a reasonable external force responsible
for the performance of the motions of soldiers and dog, respectively.
So there is hope that the possibility of causativization might be pre-
dictable by the conceptual implications of a predicate. And we might well rely
on the assumption of a simple general causativization rule. We thus might
arrive at a similar problem as in the previous chapter: ordered-argument
theories have to stipulate a subcategorization frame, and in this case even a
special semantics in the lexical entry of the verb, and thereby de facto create
a new lexical item, but whether this causativization frame is licensed or not
follows from conceptual properties that are ‘invisible’ at SF.
analysis of resultative constructions given in Wunderlich (1992) does not fully show up in
Wunderlich (1997). Because this analysis is quite important for the present discussion, I
will refer to Wunderlich (1992) here. The other claims that I cite from this paper can also
be found in Wunderlich (1997).
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A rule of the general form discussed above for causatives has been pro-
posed by Wunderlich for resultative constructions, like:
(35) a. Sie aß den Teller leer (‘She ate the plate empty’)
b. Sie zog das Kleid glatt (‘She pulled the dress smooth’)
c. Sie schlug die Tür zu (‘She slammed the door shut’)
Wunderlich formulates the rule in the following way (Wunderlich 1992, 45):
[. . . ] For every verb stem (of a certain class) with the phonological
matrix /verb/ and the SF verb(s) there is a verb stem with the
same phonological matrix /verb/ and the SF template:
verb(s) & CAUSE-1 (s, BECOME(P(u)))
where P ranges over static predicates [. . . ]
Though Wunderlich makes some refinements of this claim later on, the
basic idea remains the same and I will use it in my discussion.16 Wunder-
lich gives the following informal representations of what he postulates how
causatives and resultatives are construed with a given verb (Wunderlich 1992,
45, ‘adj’ stands for ‘adjective’, ‘pt’ for ‘particle’):
(36) a. causative CAUSE(u, verb)
b. resultative CAUSE(verb, BECOME(adj/pt(u)))
When construing an SF template for the causativization of a verb, we have to
determine, how exactly the semantics of the verb gets extended. Wunderlich
makes a specific claim. A transitive construction with the verb rollen should
either mean ‘x causes y to roll’ (causative) or ‘the rolling of x causes some
property P of y’ (resultative).
Note that these are already two different causativization templates. In
principle, whenever we find the verb rollen used transitively, we have to decide
whether the ‘cause to roll’-variant is relevant here, or the ‘cause by rolling’-
variant. We cannot simply state that the resultative construction needs an
additional adjective or particle, because of examples like the following from









16‘CAUSE-1’ denotes a specific logical type of causative relations in Wunderlich’s ap-
proach, the details of which can be ignored here.
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Here we have a ‘cause by rolling’-event: Josef rolls some stuff until it has the












(e.g., mit einer Kugel)
(e.g., with a ball)
can only be explained by assuming recursivity. First we apply the causative
template and yield ‘Kaspar rolls something ’, then we apply the resultative
template and yield ‘Kaspar’s rolling something caused the skittles to fall
down’. If this is possible, why can we not causativize the causative construc-
tion again? Or resultativize the resultative construction? Wunderlich’s rules
are of the form ‘V → VCAUS’. But VCAUS is itself of category V and thus
should be insertable in the V slot again. The rule should be recursive. The
same should hold in principle of resultatives, though this looks more compli-
cated because of the additional result predicate that often accompanies the
verb there.







with the interpretation that Hans made Maria roll something:
(40) ∃x(CAUSE(Hans, CAUSE(Maria, ROLL(x))))
But this is impossible. Likewise, we cannot express double resultatives:
(41) ?Hans rollte den Ball kaputt müde
with the interpretation that Hans got tired from rolling the ball broken:
(42) CAUSE(CAUSE(CAUSE(Hans, ROLL(ball)),
BROKEN(ball)), TIRED(Hans))
Thus, the apparent recursivity in the case of (38) remains curious. In fact, we
can only apply the causative and the resultative template once. As long as
we consider the theory as a morphological theory, this is no surprise, because
most verbal affixes can only be attached to a verbal stem, not to a verb that
is already pre- or suffixed. The crucial problem is the assumption of ‘invisible’
causative morphology in the case of causative versions of verbs like schmelzen
and rollen.
If we treated causativization as an instance of conceptual specification,
we would not expect any recursivity. To speak in TLS terms, conceptual
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specification then is a translation from the level SF to the level CS. This
translation operation applies to SF objects and translates them into CS ob-
jects. Because it can only apply to SF objects, it cannot be applied to the
result of a previous application of itself. Hence, recursivity is excluded.
On the other hand, we now would have to explain, how causativization
and resultativization can be applied one after the other in (38). I will give a
detailed answer to the whole problem in chapter 2. To give a short answer
here: it is not clear that we are really dealing with only two rules here.
And it is also unclear whether we need such specific rules at all, if we view
resultativization and causativization as SF-CS translations. We can allow
for a lot more variation in how such structures get interpreted. The whole
translation mechanism has to be considered as having much more freedom
than the SF rules proposed by Wunderlich allow. In the solution that I will
propose in the sections 2.3.7 and 2.4, the variation is captured by a set
of optional interpretative rules, yielding a set of possible interpretations.
The actual interpretation is the ‘optimal’ one with respect to criteria like
possibility and plausibility a.o.
I want to give one empirical datum to underpin this proposal. German
has a few verbs that can be considered as morphological causativizations of
simple intransitives. The intransitives are sitzen, stehen and liegen (‘to sit’,
‘to stand’ and ‘to lie’). The respective causatives are setzen, stellen and legen.
Following Wunderlich, the causatives would have to have the meanings ‘cause









































Wunderlich would propose that it is impossible to find examples with these
verbs that are interpreted as ‘cause by sit-/stand-/lying’. But there are ex-
amples like this. When we have things or people standing around in front of


























CHAPTER 1 1.1 Ordered-Argument Theories of Thematic Relations
The verbs in these sentences clearly have a ‘cause by standing’ interpretation.
It is interesting that we have to use different verbs for animate and inanimate


























‘The people cause the entrance to be closed by putting some-
thing there’ or ‘the people intentionally place themselves in front
of the entrance to make it closed’
When we have an inanimate subject, we have to use the causative verb even


























These examples are hard to explain anyway, but they show that the assump-
tion of one fixed SF template for the causative verbs is too rigid. A conceptual
treatment does not rely on such rigidity, and hence may have less problems
with these data, but I do not have a conceptual explanation at hand right
now.17
17A possible solution might be expressable in terms of markedness. The idea is that the
‘marked’ form (i.e. the ‘causativized’ verb) goes along with the ‘marked interpretation’
(i.e. the causative interpretation) and the unmarked form (i.e. the ‘simple’ verb) with the
unmarked interpretation (i.e. non-causative). This explains the data with inanimate sub-
jects. The problem with animate subjects occurs, because there are two different ways of
causation by animates, intentional and non-intentional causation. Under the assumption
that non-intentional causation is the simpler concept, we again predict that the marked
form, the morphologically causative verb, goes along with intentional causation, as exem-
plified by (45–b). Perhaps in order to make an overt distinction between intentional and
non-intentional causation, the simple verb form is chosen for non-intentional causation,
as in (44-b). The distinction between causative and non-causative use of the simple verb
form might be neglectable, because usually the causative interpretation goes along with a
transitivization of the otherwise intransitive verb, thus this distinction can be read from
the surface irrespective of the verb form.
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1.1.7 Problem 5: The linking of individual roles varies
According to Dowty (1986, 1989, 1991) the talk about universal thematic
roles like agent, patient, goal etc. only makes sense if we treat them
as abstractions over the concrete thematic roles assigned by verbs. E.g., the
verb ‘to sing’ has a singer and a sound-argument. These are the individual
roles assigned by this verb. Universal roles are sets of individual roles with
certain characteristics: the role singer belongs to the universal role agent,
because it describes the sentient and volitional performer of an action.
So the real thematic roles we are dealing with are the individual roles.
Whether universal roles are necessary, depends on how helpful they are in
explaining linguistic facts. Their existence is not taken for granted, as is
the existence of individual roles (cf. also Ladusaw & Dowty (1988) for an
argument in point).
The concept of subcategorization thus requires that individual roles are
always assigned in the same way. This is not the case with many polyvalent
verbs. Consider the following examples with the verb rollen. One role that
this verb at least assigns is that of a rolling entity, call it R. We see that in
the four examples the assignment of R varies:
(47) a. Die Kugel rollte die Kegel um R=SUBJECT
The shot rolled the pins down
b. Josef rollte die Kugel um R=OBJECT
Josef rolled the shot away
c. Er rollte die Kegel mit der Kugel um R=OBLIQUE
He rolled the pins with the shot down
d. Josef rollte die Kegel um R=∅
Josef rolled the pins down
Nonetheless, these are all resultative structures. If we assume that resultatives
and causatives are derived in a fixed manner from simple verbs, as suggested
by Wunderlich (1992, 1997), then the role R would have to be realized with
the same case uniformly in these sentences.
Let us have a look at the semantically two-place verb schlagen (‘to beat/
hit/strike’ etc.). Let us assume that it has at least two roles to assign: a
moving entity M, and a still standing entity or target S: M moves towards
and finally hits against S in the act of schlagen. The following four sentences
all have the same sets of verbal complements: subject, object and directional























































































The role M is realized as the object in (48–c) and as the subject in (48–d,e).
It is not realized in (48–a,b). The role S is the object in (48–a) and the PP in
(48–b-e). How do we arrive at the correct role assignments here? We certainly
cannot assume that the assignments are fixed qua lexical entry. Too much
variation is possible. It is obvious that conceptual knowledge about the used
nouns plays a certain role: holes cannot move and cannot be hit either, so
they cannot play a role in a schlagen-event, except as a result, of course, as
in our example.
On the other hand, if we use universal role names for the roles in these
sentences, then we arrive for the subject at agent in (48–a-c) and instru-
ment in (48–d,e), theme for the object, and goal for the PP in all five
examples. There is a mismatch between universal and individual roles here
that raises doubts about the concept of universal thematic roles.
We see that polyvalent verbs not only occur in sentences with differing
constituent sets, but also in sentences with equal constituent sets, but dif-
fering linking patterns. It is hard to see how to deal with these variations in
any template based account.
Whenever we assume a certain template, we have to fix the correlation
between syntactic constituents and semantic arguments in one or the other
way. Thus we have to decide for a certain linking pattern. This is the heart
of ordered argument theories. It is this unavoidable force for a certain linking
decision that causes the problems. The data in (48) and (47) display the core
phenomena that will be dealt with in chapter 2.
I want to mention two further phenomena that call into question the
assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between syntactic and semantic
arguments. The first has to do with schlagen as emission of sound verb, as
introduced in section 1.1.3:
With Glocke (‘bell’) as subject, this verb can be used intransitively, like-





















Let us again assume for the conceptual structure of schlagen that it entails at
least a relation between a moving entity M and a still standing entity S. If M
moves towards S with a sufficiently high speed, and finally contacts it, then
the moment of contact is what schlagen describes. One natural question is
then, how the two arguments M and S are ‘linked’ to syntactic complements
here. One explanation for (49–c) could be that we get no interpretation for
S, if we identify the broom with M. If the broom is S, the interpretation
seems to be even less possible. In (49–b) the door can be identified with M,
and we very easily get a denotation for S, e.g., the door frame or the wall
surrounding the door. But in (49–a) things are different: the two arguments
of the schlagen concept are built into the bell: M is the bell’s clapper, and
S is the bell’s side. If this is the correct interpretation, then two semantic
arguments are conflated into one syntactic argument. This should never be
allowed in a traditional conception of arity, because we then never could
predict, which syntactic arity a predicate has to have. Sometimes it can be
one argument, sometimes it have to be two arguments, it depends on the
lexeme we choose for the subject.
The opposite case – where one semantic argument is split into two syn-



















The one-place predicate Doppel requires an argument consisting of two in-
dividuals. The subject ‘Jana Novotna’ alone is only one. But if we combine
her with the individual in the mit-phrase, we get a two-membered individ-
ual. This is what obviously happens here. In order to achieve a correct result
we first have to rearrange and recompose the arguments, prior to the actual
process of assigning thematic roles. Argument linking in this case under no
circumstances can be seen as a one-to-one correspondence between the syn-
tactic complements and (a subset of) the semantic argument places of the
verb; it must be mediated by a conceptual-semantic reanalysis.
These data will be at issue again in section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
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1.1.8 Problem 6: Oblique Marking specific for a Con-
ceptual Domain
Very often verbs ‘take’ a certain preposition to mark one of their comple-
ments obliquely. The standard assumption is that the choice of preposition is
arbitrary, and hence has to be listed in the subcategorization frame of each
verb. For example, the verb sprechen (‘to speak’) takes the preposition über
(‘about’) to mark the complement that expresses the ‘content’ of a talk.
Ordered-argument theories predict that similar verbs can use different
prepositions to express an equivalent argument. However, the preposition
über can be found quite often as marker of a complement that expresses the
‘content’ or ‘topic’ of a conversation, or of some information storage (process),



























































The generalization may be: “The oblique marker of the topic argument of
predicates that involve a topic is the preposition über or ‘about’, respec-
tively”.18
The problem for TLS is that predicates cannot be grouped, as far as I
can see, at SF. Let us call a domain like ‘the set of predicates that involve a
topic’ the conceptual domain of topic-related predicates. Because the choice
of the preposition can only be determined by SF, not CS, TLS would have
18We can also observe a certain productivity. The verb arbeiten (‘to work’), for instance,
can be specified to denote all kinds of activities, among them, of course, scientific work.
Under this conceptual specification, it is possible to say:
(i) Chomsky arbeitet über Pragmatik
C. works about pragmatics
But it would be an erroneous over-generalization to state that arbeiten subcategorizes an
über -PP. Under most other conceptual specifications, such a complement is impossible.
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to formulate the empirical generalization at SF, too. But the generalization
clearly is about a conceptual domain. The preposition has the function in
question only in this domain. But distinctions between such domains have













with the interpretation that the new book by Chomsky is about pragmatics.
But, as we saw in the beginning of this section, the use of the name ‘Chomsky’
here is an instance of conceptual shift. It could also be used as referent for the
person (e.g., ‘Chomsky works in Massachusetts’), or a theoretical framework
(e.g., ‘I’ve been teaching Chomsky to my students for years’). But only under
the ‘book’ interpretation is it possible to use a prepositional phrase with the
preposition ‘über’ or ‘about’ in the topic sense. In TLS, we have the choice
either to miss this generalization, to place the apparent conceptual shift into
the level of SF for certain cases by an ad hoc stipulation, or to admit that
subcategorization can be affected by conceptual properties.
The first two alternatives would weaken the power of the theory or make
its basic notions unclear. The third alternative, on the other hand, once more
shows that subcategorization is the wrong theoretical conception to account
for the phenomena at hand.
1.1.9 Summary
In the introductory parts of this chapter I listed the following three important
features of ordered-argument theories, as defined by Dowty (1989):
1. Verbs are unsaturated predicates of a specific fixed arity.
2. Syntactic and semantic rules combine arguments and verbs
in a fixed arrangement.
3. This arrangement is chosen arbitrarily.
I further claimed that the analysis of polyvalence phenomena poses the
following problems for these three claims:
ad 1. Polyvalent verbs can vary drastically in their syntactic arity.
ad 2. Polyvalent verbs can vary in the way they combine with their
arguments.
ad 3. For many complement types (i.e. NPs with a specific case,
complement clauses of a specific type) we can observe a sys-
tematicity in their mode of semantic interpretation that is
independent of the verb.
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The examples discussed in the sections above illustrate various of these
problems. Section 1.1.3 shows that the syntactic arity of the same verb can
vary with different conceptual interpretations. Section 1.1.4 shows that the
options for the morphological marking of a complement of the same verb can
vary with different conceptual interpretations. Section 1.1.5 shows that the
licensing conditions for the syntactic omission of an argument can be prag-
matically based. Thus, a system that solely relies on syntactic and lexical-
semantic conditions (i.e. an ordered-argument theory) cannot predict well-
formedness in these cases. Section 1.1.7 shows that once we take a close look
at what Dowty called the individual thematic roles of a verb, we find that
the way how the same syntactic argument is interpreted semantically and
how its semantic representation is combined with the verb’s semantic repre-
sentation, can vary. Section 1.1.6 showed that even the extension of a verb
into a causative verb can proceed in more than just one or two ways. This
again makes it very difficult to stipulate a lexical entry or a general lexi-
cal causativization rule. Section 1.1.8 gives some examples of meta-lexical
semantic conditions for morphological complement marking. One other ex-
ample was also discussed in section 1.1.4.
The discussion of the use of the concept of subcategorization in this sec-
tion focused on the example of Two-Level Semantics. But TLS is only one
example out of a whole range of theoretical frameworks that are equivalent
in their mode of construing verb-complement dependencies. Nearly all con-
cepts common in generative grammar fall into this class, most prominently
among them Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1982b), Head Driven
Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard & Sag 1994) and Jackendoff’s Seman-
tic Structures (Jackendoff 1990b). Other concepts with the same properties,
but perhaps less elaborated, are those of Rappaport and Levin (1988, Levin
& Rappaport Hovav 1991, 1995, Levin & Rapoport 1988, Levin 1993), Hale
& Keyser (1991, 1993), Grimshaw (1990) and Tenny (1994). But not much
has changed in the way how subcategorization is designed since 1965 (when
Chomsky’s ‘Aspects ’ appeared). I want to emphasize that TLS is a richer
framework than those just mentioned in that it at least addresses the prob-
lem of distinguishing the ‘literal’ meaning of a lexical item from its contextu-
ally enriched meaning when it is used. All the other frameworks I mentioned
here do not even provide the tools to express this difference.
The aim to explain polyvalence by subcategorization frames leads to ad-
ditional ‘machinery’ in all discussed frameworks. The easiest way to handle
them is perhaps proliferation of lexical entries. But this is also the ‘ugliest’
way, because a syntactic variation is not paired with a semantic variation.
We would have different lexemes that differ only in their subcategorization
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frames.
Four conceptual problems have been mentioned in this section that occur
in all subcategorization based frameworks:
i. Lexeme specific und category specific subcategorization are
treated as different instances of the same rule type, rather
than different rule types.
ii. It is impossible, for this reason, to explain why category
specific subcategorization rules can never be violated, but
lexeme specific rules can.
iii. The often quite extreme empirical differences between semi-
idiomatic and polyvalent verbs are not reflected in ordered-
argument theories.
iv. The (non-)occurrence of many complement types can be pre-
dicted to a certain extent. Subcategorization based theories
tend to view the requiring category as the only source of
restrictions concerning the occurrence of complement types.
Complement types have no independent status – in spite of
the empirical evidence.
While it is clear that category specific subcategorization rules are not
determined or influenced by semantic, conceptual or contextual factors, the
facts are far less obvious in the case of the lexeme specific rules assumed
for verbs. I gave several examples that showed that the (so-called) subcat-
egorization behavior changes with different conceptualizations of the same
verb.
On the other hand, not all verbs pose such problems. Many verbs deter-
mine both the morpho-syntactic properties of their complements and their
semantic interpretation exactly in the way described by ordered-argument
theories. I proposed the following three-fold classification of head-complement
relations:
Type complement morphology complement lexeme
1. idiomatic fixed fixed
2. semi-idiomatic fixed free
3. free free free
The following explanation of the difference between ‘semi-idiomatic’ and
‘free’ was given:
(53) 1. If the morphological marking of a head’s complement is fixed,
then this may be determined by the head. The head-complement
relation is semi-idiomatic or idiomatic.
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2. If the morphological marking of a head’s complement is not fixed,
then the choice of morphological marking is based on rules that
hold for the whole lexical category the head belongs to. The
head-complement relation is ‘free’.
Treating ‘free’ verb-complement relations as an instance of polysemy could
potentially result in producing lexical entries for each concrete use of a verb.
Strictly speaking (as Searle (1983) put it), the interpretations of ‘to cut’ in
‘to cut a bread’ and ‘to cut a branch from a tree’ are not equal. But if we
assumed two different lexical entries for the verb here, we would have to do
so whenever we use the verb ‘to cut’ with a different direct object. At least,
we would have no criteria, when to assume two entries and when not.
I tried to show that in the crucial cases of polyvalence the distinction
between conceptual structure and semantic form, as it is drawn in TLS, faces
the same criticism. Different uses of the same verb may result in different
‘subcategorization frames’; and it is common practice in TLS, as well as
most other ordered argument theories, to pair a different subcategorization
frame with a different semantic representation of the same lexeme (with the
exception of implicit arguments and, depending on the approach, certain
‘regular’ alternation phenomena). But taking this as evidence for different
lexemes with differing semantic forms could potentially result in mixing up
the literal meaning of a verb and its interpretation in a specific environment.
In practice, we might often get into situations where it is hard to decide,
whether a complement type is subcategorized or occurs for independent rea-
sons. But I already gave two main criteria that could help in making this
decision. If the following questions can be answered with “yes”, then we
should consider the verb in question as polyvalent:
a. Is there a semantic/thematic systematicity in the use of the
complement type in question? Are there other verbs/predicates,
where the same complement type is used for the same or a very
similar (individual) thematic role?
b. Is the verb in question ‘flexible’? I.e., can the linking of the same
individual thematic role of the same verb vary between different
complement types?
Is the classification as ‘semi-idiomatic’ or ‘free’ according to the definitions
above a classification of verbs or of verb-complement relations? The empirical
difference between these options lies in the following problem: if a verb as
such is considered as semi-idiomatic, then it ‘links’ all its arguments via
subcategorization frame, but if only one specific relation is considered as
semi-idiomatic, then a verb might fix the linking of one argument and still
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leave the other free. The latter view is more liberal than the former and I
think, it is closer to the truth. One hint might lie in the fact that idioms can
be accompanied by other elements. Consider the following German example
















It is possible to accompany this idiom with a dative object. The so-called ‘free
dative’, having roughly a benefactive or malefactive interpretation, seems to



















≈ ‘the surgeon had a patient die on him’
The fact that there is an idiom regulating its verb-complement relations
idiosyncratically does not block the addition of a non-subcategorized com-
plement. So I suspect that the same should be possible with semi-idioms. But
I admit that it is quite hard to find examples of 3-place verbs that subcate-
gorize one ‘internal’ argument and let the other vary. One example might be
the German verb stechen (‘stitch’). Under the assumption that the direction
argument of this verb has to be realized as directional PP, the locatum can



































The central direction of my argument is that the concept of subcategorization
is useless for the various instances of polyvalence that I discussed. Whether
a verb can be combined with a certain constituent or not, may depend on
the verb, but not only on the verb. Rather, the conceptualizations of the
verb and its complements in the given contextual environment have to be
taken into account. Thus, this kind of ‘subcategorization’ cannot be viewed
as a morpho-syntactic property of the verb. If the latter were the case, sub-
categorization would be a context- and even semantics-independent property.
An alternative explanation is therefore required. This alternative should take
a more holistic perspective on the clause with the verb as only one among
several relevant factors. Before starting this enterprise, I want to discuss an
alternative theoretical account that is not necessarily based on subcategori-
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zation. It is the so-called ‘Neo-Davidsonian’ theory of thematic relations, as
developed by Terence Parsons and others. It will be the topic of the next
section.
1.2 The Neo-Davidsonian Theory of The-
matic Relations
This section focuses on a specific semantic account that assumes that the
reference of a clause, at least of an action sentence, is an event. Events are
assumed to be individuals like the referents of ‘teacher’ or ‘child’. This al-
lows for a parallel treatment of event nouns like ‘fight’ and nouns denoting
things or persons. The event variable as reference of the clause was originally
proposed by Reichenbach (1947). His conception was revised and also ‘revi-
talized’ by Davidson (1967b). Parsons (1980, 1985, 1990) revised Davidson’s
conception again and applied this revision to issues of thematic interpretation
(especially in Parsons 1995).
Although the latter approach is the most relevant for the discussion in
this chapter, I want to spend some time discussing the conceptions of events
used by all three authors. The main reason for this is that the alternative
account that I will develop in chapter 2 is formulated in Discourse represen-
tation theory (DRT), and DRT makes crucial use of events. However, the
discussion will show that the original Reichenbachian conception of events is
the best choice, at least for the solution of the problems at hand. The three
conceptions have rarely been compared in detail, but most current work that
makes use of events refers either to Parsons or to Davidson. This has some
problematic consequences that I want to point at.
1.2.1 From the Reichenbachian via the Davidsonian to
Neo-Davidsonian logical forms
The Neo-Davidsonian theory of thematic relations is a modification of David-
son’s (1967b) way of representing the logical form of action sentences. David-
son introduced into the logical form of action sentences a referential variable
for the event described or denoted by the sentence. This helped him to divide
the arguments and adverbs of a sentence in its logical form. (57–a) has the
Davidsonian logical form (57–b):
(57) a. Jones buttered his bread in the bathroom
b. ∃x[butter(jones, bread, x)& in(bathroom, x)]
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From this logical form can directly be derived that (57–a) necessarily entails
(58) Jones buttered his bread
Davidson saw this as the major advantage of his representation. With Kenny
(1963) he claimed that one fundamental task of theories of logical form should
be providing the ground for deductions of this kind. For the given example
a traditional representation would look like this:
(59) butter(jones, bread, in-bathroom)
The addition of the event variable allows for the desired separation of ar-
guments of the verb and adverbs of the clause within the logical form.19
Davidson borrowed the idea of the event variable from Reichenbach (1947).
But Reichenbach used it in a different way and also, I suspect, in a different
sense. The variable also appears as referential argument of the whole clause
there, but not inside the formula, but rather as its argument:
(60) [butter(jones, bread, in-bathroom)]*(x)
The clause is a predicate, or better: “description” of an event or fact. In
Reichenbach’s system (59) and (60) are logically equivalent. The two formulae
are two ways of representing the same thing. Reichenbach speaks of thing-
splitting (as illustrated in (59)) and event- or fact-splitting20 (as illustrated in
(60)). The logical equivalence, though, holds between the whole terms only,
not between parts of them.
Davidson considers the treatment exemplified in (60) as “radically defec-
tive”. His argument is that it is impossible to construe the inference from
(61) I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star
to
(62) I flew my spaceship to the Evening Star
19This question arises only within the debate about ‘logical form’. In ordered argument
theories, adverbs have a status that is totally different from arguments. In a Montague style
notation, arguments like nouns are of type 〈e〉 and adverbs of type 〈t, t〉. One empirical
problem that comes up here is that of ‘detecting’ the categorial status of syntactic elements
that can be of both types, like prepositional phrases and complement clauses – this has
to be stipulated case wise, e.g., by subcategorization frames. The really problematic cases
are again polyvalent verbs, of course: the only way of dealing with them is stipulating
lexical entries for each different pattern of complementation – a solution that cannot be
motivated independently and looks very ad hoc.
20Reichenbach uses the terms ‘event’ and ‘fact’ synonymously.
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without deriving the totally vacuous statement that all events are identi-
cal. Davidson reconstructs the formula in (60) as an oblique or referentially
opaque context. Oblique contexts are known to prohibit substitution of ex-
tensionally equivalent, but intensionally different terms.21
I will not give the details of the proof here, assuming that Davidson’s
deductions are correct. But I have three objections to make concerning the
validity of the argument and Davidson’s interpretation of (60).
The first is a fundamental criticism of the argumentation. Barwise &
Perry (1983) call Davidson’s reasoning here – a “historically important piece
of reasoning” – “the slingshot”. Their criticism is that in order to accept it,
one has to make two critical assumptions: “[. . .] first, that logically equivalent
sentences have the same reference and second, that the reference of a sentence
does not change if a component singular term is replaced by another with the
same reference. [. . . ]” (Barwise & Perry 1983, 24, emphasis as given there).
They argue that we have good reason to accept neither of these critical
assumptions for the semantics of natural languages.
The first assumption states that, e.g., ‘Joe is eating’ and ‘Joe is eating and
Sarah is sleeping or Sarah isn’t sleeping’ have the same reference. Barwise and
Perry do not accept this. They introduce situations as reference of sentences.
The difference that turns out for the two examples here is that the first
sentence is about Joe, while the second is about Joe and Sarah. Thus, we
have situations either with only Joe or with both Joe and Sarah. If this is a
reasonable way of thinking about natural language, then we are well-advised
not to apply the concept of logical equivalence to the logical forms of natural
language expressions.22
21A well-known example from Quine (1960) is the following:
i. Nine is greater than four
ii. The number of planets in our solar system is greater than four
‘Nine’ and ‘the number of planets in our solar system’ are extensionally equivalent
and can be substituted for each other here without changing the truth value. A modal
operator like ‘necessarily’ creates an intensional context. Now the substitution does no
longer preserve the meaning of the clause:
iii. Necessarily, nine is greater than four
iv. Necessarily, the number of planets in our solar system is greater than four
22In Reichenbach’s system, the referents of sentences are facts or events, conceived as en-
tities which are as real as tables and stones. Davidson’s argumentation relies on a Fregean
treatment of sentences, where the reference of a sentence is the true or the false, respec-
tively. Because of this treatment, all true sentences have the same reference, and all false
sentences, too, and thus can be substituted for each other. This is a prerequisite for the
‘slingshot’ argumentation to work. Reichenbach is not explicit about this, but if I under-
stand his use of the event variable correctly, he, like Barwise and Perry, rejects the Fregean
proposal. Likewise, he would reject Davidson’s argument as irrelevant.
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Barwise and Perry argue similarly against the second critical assumption.
This second assumption is about the problem of substituting, e.g., ‘Morning
Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ for each other. Rejecting this assumption means
that we expect that natural language sentences regularly constitute oblique
contexts, and only a special kind of sentences, perhaps those expressing eter-
nal truths, have the feature that one can substitute referentially equivalent
terms.
I share Barwise and Perry’s critical attitude towards the way how in
classical semantics features of formal logic and formal languages have been
transposed to natural language semantics, and want to add two further crit-
ical comments on Davidson’s way of reasoning.
First, in Reichenbach’s system we are not forced to derive the deduction
on the basis of (60). As (59) is per definition logically equivalent to (60),
we can also choose (59) as basis for the deduction in question. This formula
has the advantage that there is no element in it that could be suspected as
creating an oblique context in the traditional sense. It is easy to see that
by starting with this formula no fallacy arises. The deduction proceeds as
follows. We have:
(63) a. flew(amundsen,spaceship,morning star)
b. morning star = evening star
From (63–b) follows that we can substitute in (63–a) and get
(64) flew(amundsen,spaceship,evening star)
Because of the logical equivalence of thing- and event-splitting we finally
arrive at
(65) [flew(amundsen,spaceship,evening star)]*(x)
which is the wanted result. So Davidson’s claim that it is impossible to derive
this deduction in Reichenbach’s account is false. Though he might be right,
from his point of view, that fact-splitting creates an oblique context.
My second objection is about Davidson’s interpretation of the asterisk in
formula (60). His interpretation is “consists in the fact that”, as illustrated in
his supposed Reichenbachian representation of (62) (Davidson 1967b, 117):
(66) (∃x)(x consists in the fact that I flew my spaceship to the Morning
Star)
This interpretation is not justified by Reichenbach. The use of the notion
‘fact’ in (66) presupposes that Davidson attributes to the asterisk the predi-
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cation ‘x is true’. Here is what Reichenbach himself said (Reichenbach 1947,
268):
[. . . ] Between the corresponding propositions we then have a tau-
tological equivalence (as to the accent [. . . ]):
f(x1)≡́g(v1)
where ‘v1’denotes the event, and g the event property.
This equivalence may be used to define an event and its prop-
erty in terms of a thing and its property. It is more convenient
to express this idea in the metalanguage, as a relation between
terms. We then say that an event-argument and its predicate can
be defined as a function of a thing and its predicate. Thus, if
‘f(x1)’ means ‘George VI is crowned’, ‘g’ is the predicate ‘coro-
nation of George VI’, which is a function of both the predicate
‘is crowned’ and the argument ‘George VI’. We shall use an as-
terisk for the indication of the transition to event-splitting and
write the function ‘g’ in the form ‘[f(x1)]*’. Then the expression
‘g(v1)’ can be replaced by ‘[f(x1)]*(v1). The argument ‘v1’ used
here is the name of the event which has the property [f(x1)]*
and which is determined if both the predicate ‘is crowned’ and
the argument ‘George VI’ are given. Usually v1 is denoted not by
a proper name, but by a description using the function ‘[f(x1)]*;
therefore the event-argument sign ‘v1’ can be written in the form
( ιv)[f(x1)]*(v)
The event is here indicated by a bound variable ‘v’. This mode
of expression, prevalent in conversational language, leads to the
use of such predicates as ‘takes place’ and ‘occurs’, which merely
express existence. Thus we say ‘The coronation of George VI took
place’. In symbolic language the last sentence is represented by a
bound variable and an existential operator, in the form
∃v[f(x1)]*(v)
[. . . ]
This quotation makes one thing obvious: whether an event v exists, i.e.
is a fact, or not, is not expressed by the asterisk, but rather by the existen-
tial quantifier or the rotated iota operator.23 And this is the same in both
Davidson’s and Reichenbach’s model.
23The rotated iota operator is introduced as the operator for definite descriptions. It
can be read as “the x for which holds . . . ”.
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The asterisk can best be understood as a ‘type-shifter’. It turns a fully
saturated n-place predicate into an unsaturated one-place predicate of events.
Reichenbach’s interpretation of a term like Davidson’s ‘in(x,bathroom)’
would sound like this: “the fact x is in the bathroom”. This is simply non-
sense, facts have no places, they are not these kinds of objects. Rather, the
place ‘in the bathroom’ is part of the description of the fact. It is the place
where the buttering took place, but the described event is a buttering in the
bathroom, not the intersection of the events that took place in the bathroom
and were butterings. It is possible to relate adverbs to the event they hold
of in this system, but this looks different from Davidson’s version. As it is
nearly self-explanatory, I will again simply cite the respective passage from
Reichenbach (1947, 270f):
[. . . ] If the thing-function ‘f ’ has several arguments, fact-func-
tions can be constructed in different ways, according as we include
all arguments or only a part of them in the fact-function. Thus
the sentence ‘Amundsen flew to the North Pole in May 1926’,
symbolized in thing-splitting by
f(x1, y1, t1)
can be transformed into event-splitting in various ways. One is
to use the fact-function ‘Amundsen’s flight to the North Pole in
May 1926’, symbolized by ‘[f(x1, y1, t1)]*’; we then write
(∃v)[f(x1, y1, t1)]*(v)
In words this reads: ‘a flight by Amundsen to the North Pole in
May 1926 took place’. Another form obtains when we use the
fact-function ‘[f(x1, y1)]*’, and write:
(∃v)[f(x1, y1)]*(v, t1)
[footnote: The function ‘f(x1, y1)’ can be regarded as defined in
the form ‘(∃t)f(x1, y1, t)’.] This can be read as ‘a flight by Amund-
sen to the North Pole took place in May 1926’. [. . . ]
In Reichenbach’s system the adverbial can be a co-argument of the event
variable, but not a predicate of it. The relation between adverb and event
variable is created by the respective fact-function. If we take the formulae
more serious than their linguistic translations (which appear to me a bit
unfortunate), we might interpret the last fact-function in the above quotation
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– together with the remark in the footnote – as ‘t1 fills in the time slot in
the description of v’.
It is also easy to see how Davidson’s problem can be accounted for here.
Davidson wants to make explicit the deduction from ‘Amundsen flew to the
North Pole in May 1926’ to ‘Amundsen flew to the North Pole’. One way
to derive this is to simply assume that all events have a time of occurrence.
If this time is not explicitly given, it is existentially quantified over – the
footnote in the quotation from Reichenbach given above can be interpreted
this way. The same strategy should be applicable to the directional adverb.
The sentence ‘Amundsen flew’ entails that he flew some time somewhere.
So we only need to add two additional assumptions about the ontology
of events and flying-events to formulate the deduction that Davidson praised
to be the advantage of his system over Reichenbach’s. These assumptions
are a) events have a time, and b) flying-events have a direction. As these
assumptions are rather trivial, I do not suspect that anything dangerous
follows from them. We then can say that the sentence ‘Amundsen flew to the
North Pole in May 1926’ entails ‘Amundsen flew to the North Pole some time’
– which also is the interpretation of ‘Amundsen flew to the North Pole’.24
On the other hand, many things remain unclear in Reichenbach’s system
with respect to the arity of predicates. Reichenbach’s analyses are more or
less construed after the facts. It is impossible to formulate something like
“predicate x requires . . . ”. The domains of the arguments are also determined
post facto. We get no idea how in sentences with multiple adverbs these
adverbs come to occupy the correct positions. Whether a verb is a 3-, 4- or
n-place function depends on the sentence it appears in. Likewise, whether
position 3 in the ordered argument quadruple of a four-place verb in this
sense is of domain time, place, manner or whatever, also depends solely on
the actual sentence and our method of translating it into the logical language.
This does not seem to be a grammar that makes predictions about the
behavior of words. The main invention of Davidson’s paper was to introduce
a way to distinguish between the arguments of a predicate and its modifiers
in the syntax of logical forms. Such a division needs to be introduced into
Reichenbach’s system, it is not already there. Nonetheless, this is possible,
e.g., by restructuring the argument sets of predicates: Instead of assuming
that the argument set of a predicate is a single n-tuple of arguments and
modifiers, we can also say that the arguments of predicates are two sets: one
24This is a solution that has not been accepted by Kenny (1963). He remarks that there
could be infinitely many ‘invisible’ modifiers of the form ‘some x’ to add. Davidson is more
careful about this. In fact, the number of addable modifiers is not infinite. We will see later
that Davidson’s deduction is also possible with Reichenbach’s treatment of modification,
without the additional assumptions given here.
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set of arguments and one set of modifiers. We need a heuristics to determine
from the surface structure of a sentence which elements are the adverbs – but
Davidson does so, too, and whatever Davidson uses, can be applied here, too.
This heuristics is enough to derive the two sets correctly, when we translate
a natural language sentence into our logical language. So a sentence like
(67) Amundsen flew to the North pole in May 1926
could be represented as
(68) flew〈〈a〉, (n,m)〉
where a stands for ‘Amundsen’, n for ‘North Pole’ and m for ‘May 1926’. I
distinguished the two sets by different bracket types, indicating that they are
different types of sets. The angled brackets signal that we are dealing with
an ordered tuple, while the round brackets signal that the modifiers are not
ordered. This yields equivalence to Davidson’s treatment where the order of
the modifier conjuncts is also free, while the order of the arguments of the verb
is fixed. Questions about the way how the formulae have to be interpreted,
how the arguments get their interpretations and how the modifiers are related
appropriately to the rest of the sentence, still have to be answered in both
approaches. The modified Neo-Reichenbachian version of the logical form of
action sentences now has the following general form:
(69) The Neo-Reichenbachian logical form
thing-splitting: predicate〈A,M〉
event-splitting: [predicate〈A,M〉]*(v)
(where A is an ordered tuple of arguments of a fixed number, de-
termined by the lexeme that functions as predicate, and M is an
unordered tuple of modifiers that can have any number (including
0), and v is the event variable)
To make the formulae in (69) interpretable we need an algorithm to strip
off arguments and modifiers and rearrange them; we could, e.g., assume that
the following biconditional holds:
(70) p〈〈x, y〉, (m1,m2, . . . ,mn)〉 ⇔ p〈x, y〉 & m1(p〈x, y〉) &
m2(p〈x, y〉) & . . . & mn(p〈x, y〉)
Elaborating how an expression mi(p〈x, y〉) is to be interpreted is equivalent to
elaborating the appropriate semantics for mi(e) in Davidson’s approach. The
same holds for p〈x, y〉 and p〈e, x, y〉, respectively (e shall represent Davidson’s
event variable).
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The main reason for the exercise in the last paragraphs is that the event
variable as introduced by Davidson is by now widely accepted in linguistic
analyses. Nonetheless, there are some fallacies in this analysis that result
from the way how Davidson modified Reichenbach’s version of it, and from
his background assumptions. I see basically two fallacies which are connected.
First, Reichenbach’s treatment is located within a philosophical approach
that treats linguistic expressions as descriptions. So in p(x) the linguistic
predicate p functions as description of the thing, fact or event x. p might be
complex in itself, but this is only a matter of the predicate’s interior, having
nothing to do with the one thing described.
In Davidson’s view the interior of p matters insofar, as modifiers are
represented in separate conjuncts of the formula, such that a predicate might
have the form p(x) & q(x). This representation treats the reference of x as
the intersection of the set of things with property p and the set of things
with property q. As we will see, there are kinds of modifiers that cannot
be analysed in this extensional way, but should be as easy to handle as
other modifiers in the Neo-Reichenbachian view. For illustration, here the
extensional analysis of ‘brown cow’:
(71) λx[cow(x)& brown(x)]
The set of brown cows is considered to be the intersection of the set of cows
and the set of brown things. Not all adjectives can be treated like this, as is
well-known. One class of examples are scalar adjectives like ‘good’ in ‘good
piano-player’. The set of good piano-players is not the intersection of piano-
players and good people but rather it is the set of those piano-players who are
good at piano-playing. By formulating an underspecified, context-dependent
semantics of such adjectives, Bierwisch (1987, 112ff) tried to show a way out
of this problem, and thereby, as he claimed, keeping the extensional treatment
of adjectives. Very simplified, the result looks like this:
(72) λx[piano-player(x) & good-at-piano-playing(x)]
But there are many other examples where an extensional treatment unavoid-
ably yields contradictions, e.g., the famous ‘alleged communist’ or ‘the former
president of the US’. A representation along the given lines would yield the
following logical forms:
(73) a. λx[communist(x) & alleged-communist(x)]
b. λx[president(x) & former-president(x)]
Both of these formulae lead to logical contradictions, if we take into account
the entailments of the involved predicates. An alleged communist is someone
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who might be a communist, but who also might not be a communist. So at
least in some possible worlds formula (73–a) would entail the contradiction
‘communist(x) & ¬communist(x)’. The case of the ‘former president’ is
similar, though not that obvious, because we are dealing with a temporal
modifier here. The interpretation of a predicate like ‘president(x)’ mostly
is ‘actual president’. And if not the semantics, so at least the pragmatics of
the expression ‘former’ entails ‘¬actual’. Thus, formula (73–b) entails the
contradiction ‘actual-president(x) & ¬ actual-president(x)’.
The way out of this problem is generalizing ‘to the hardest case’ and
treating adjectives not extensionally, but intensionally: the semantic value of
an adjective is not an extension, but an intension. There is no such thing
as a set of brown things as the reference of the adjective ‘brown’ – which is
the basis of the extensional analysis.25 Instead, the extension of an adjective-
noun compositum is derived from the pre-composed expression. Composition
‘applies’ prior to extension, so to speak, not afterwards.26 The hypothetical
‘Neo-Reichenbachian’ theory construed earlier follows the intensional strat-
egy in all cases of modifiers. So there are no extra problems arising for it
here.
Reichenbach was already aware of these problems, but he made his de-
cisions pro or contra the extensional treatment casewise. E.g., the sentence
‘The Royal Hall is a red building’ is analysed by him as ‘Royal hall is a build-
ing’ and ‘Royal Hall is red’. Obviously he was not aware of the problems that
even an adjective like ‘red’ sometimes can evoke 27. For sentences like ‘John
is a slow driver’ Reichenbach states that “. . . we cannot divide the sentence
into two sentences ‘John is slow and John is a driver’. What is said is not
that John is slow in general but only that John is slow in his driving; thus the
word ‘slow’ [. . . ] operates as a modifier of drive. [. . . ] ” (Reichenbach 1947,
301)28
25By the way: Bierwisch’s proposal seems already to have given up this background
assumption. From a strictly logical point of view, the first conjunct in (72) is redundant. If
someone is a good piano player, then she necessarily is a piano player. The relation between
the two conjuncts is no longer only an intersection relation, but a subset relation. So it
might not be unfair to say that Bierwisch unintentionally already adopted the intensional
analysis, and that his keeping of the extensional analysis is only apparent.
26For further discussion of the issue and the details of this intensional solution, see, e.g.,
Kamp & Partee (1995).
27For discussion cf. Blutner (1997).
28One might wonder why this should not carry over to ‘red’. If something is a red
building, this is not supposed to mean that it is red ‘in general’, to use Reichenbach’s
words. E.g., a white building might have a red roof and still be a white, not a red building.
There is no fundamental difference in this respect between ‘red’ and ‘slow’, as far as I can
see.
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Adverbs are higher functions, properties of properties, and thus Reichen-
bach elaborates the following formulae for ‘move’ (m) and ‘move slowly’
(msl):
(74) a. m(x1) =Df (∃f)f(x1).µ(f)
b. msl(x1) =Df (∃f)f(x1).µ(f).σ(f)
where µ is a set of properties that hold when something is moving and σ is
the set of properties that hold when something is slow. This is an intersec-
tive analysis, but it is not an intersection of things, but an intersection of
properties that thus creates a new property. A genuine intensional treatment
of the problem.
Cases like ‘alleged communist’ can perhaps be treated differently. There
is no need to treat all modifiers intersectively. How modifiers apply has to
be fixed by meaning postulates for each lexical item. (On the other hand,
the intersective intensional analysis might not be as far from truth as the
intersective extensional one: “some property p holds of x, and p is an alleged
property and p is the communist property”.)
An analysis of adverbial modification looks like this in Reichenbach’s
approach (cf. Reichenbach 1947, 305) – the example to analyse is ‘Annette
dances beautifully’:29
(75) (∃f)f(x1).δ(f).β(f)
δ represents the dancing properties and β ‘beautiful’. This looks a little more
complicated than the Neo-Reichenbachian proposal I gave in (69). Nonethe-
less, the difference is merely notational, I suspect. Again, it is easy to see
how the deduction from ‘Annette dances beautifully’ to ‘Annette dances’
can proceed. Formula (75) says that Annette performs something that is
both a dancing and beautiful. So Davidson’s claim that it is impossible to
derive this deduction in Reichenbach’s framework is simply wrong. One crit-
icism, following Parsons (1990), might be that this way we also should be
able to derive for alleged-communist(x)’ that x is a communist. But this is
not the case, because this deduction would yield the contradiction that the
property in question is both being a communist and not being a communist.
The deduction is not valid. Under an intensional analysis the validity of the
deduction is dependent on the content of the modifiers, not only on their
syntax, and this is exactly what we want for these cases. This is the major
advantage of intensional treatments over extensional ones.
29This formula is still quite coarse-grained. Reichenbach (1947, 306ff) developed it fur-
ther to capture also the more subtle implications of modifiers. But intensionality is kept
throughout. We do not need to go into the details here.
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Cases similar to ‘alleged’ and ‘former’ can be construed with adverbs.
Good candidates might be modal adverbs like probably, possibly, presumably.
In fact, proponents of the extensional view never denied that these adverbs
require a different treatment. Their hope seems to be that the division be-
tween extensional and non-extensional adverbs mirrors that between sentence
and verb modifiers. It is hard to see how this carries over to ‘alleged commu-
nists’ and ‘former presidents’. So their approach lacks a mechanism when to
apply which treatment. They might perhaps stipulate lexical entries, but this
cannot help, because the extensional treatment requires a uniform syntax30
for adnominal modifiers. And this is an intersective structure. This structure
on the other hand, pre-determines how the semantics is supposed to work.
An intensional analysis has more space for syntactic variation in the logical
structures. This is the reason, why they work better in these cases.
Parsons, the inventor of the Neo-Davidsonian theory we will discuss in
the next paragraphs, overlooked the possibility of an intensional intersective
treatment à la Reichenbach, when he gave his reasons for adopting Davidson’s
view. He claims that the only possibility to represent multiple modifiers in-
tensionally is as operators with a form like m1(m2(x)). This wrongly predicts
that there are always scope effects between the modifiers (cf. Parsons 1990,
54ff). The formula in (75) makes no such predictions in spite of its represent-
ing an intensional treatment.
Before continuing I want to summarise the preceding discussion. We saw
that we are not forced to adopt Davidson’s modification of Reichenbach’s
theory of the logical form of action sentences. We could do quite well with
a slightly modified version of Reichenbach’s model to get all the properties
Davidson praised as advantages of his approach. Furthermore, Reichenbach’s
logical form has the advantage of being able to deal with intensional mod-
ifiers. The principal decision that has to be made is whether one wants to
adopt an extensional treatment of modification, perhaps à la Davidson, or an
intensional treatment, perhaps à la Reichenbach. I think, I gave good reasons
why an intensional treatment should be preferred. The subsequent discussion
of the Neo-Davidsonian theory (henceforth NDT) is based on Davidson’s ex-
tensional account, however.
To illustrate the differences and equivalences, consider the following logi-
cal forms for a clause with a transitive verb, subject, object and one modifier:
(76) Logical Form à la Davidson
∃e[verb(x, y, e) & mod(e)]
30‘Syntax’ does not refer to natural language syntax, but to the syntax of logical forms
here.
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(77) Logical Form à la Reichenbach
∃f [verb(f) & f(x, y)& mod(f)]
The Reichenbachian formula does well without an event variable. One might
also say that the event variable is an extensional interpretation of Reichen-
bach’s function variable f .
1.2.2 Thematic Roles in the Neo-Davidsonian
Logical Form
The Neo-Davidsonian approach was first advocated by Parsons (1980), fur-
ther explored by Carlson (1984), later revised by Parsons (1990) and Parsons
(1995). Several versions of it were also discussed by Dowty (1989). The differ-
ence between Davidson’s view and NDT is that in the latter the arguments
also occur each in a separate conjunct of the formula. The argument con-
juncts are two-place relations between the event and the argument. These
relations are called thematic relations. Thematic relations are the ‘roles’ a
verb assigns to its arguments. E.g., the subject of the verb ‘to sing’ receives
the role ‘singer’ from the verb. Thematic roles are often clustered together
into classes like ‘agent’, ‘patient’, ‘theme’, ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’. Though
these labels are not very well-defined, there appears to be a rough consensus
about what they mean – at least the advocates of thematic roles believe so.
In NDT sentence (78–a) has the logical form (78–b):
(78) a. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife
b. ∃e[stab(e) & agent(Brutus,e) & patient(Caesar,e) &
instrument(knife,e)]
A very nice and perhaps the most appealing feature of this representation is
that verbs now uniformly are treated as one-place predicates of events. This
makes it possible to treat them on a par with nouns, as denotations, labels
or ‘names’ for specific entities. The arity of a predicate is of no syntactic
consequences, neither for the morphosyntax of a verb, nor for the logical
form of a sentence. Rather, complementation requirements are treated as
entailments, e.g., for the verb ‘to kiss’ as follows:
(e)[kiss(e) → ∃x∃y[kisser(x, e) & kissed(y, e)]]
A similar case for a noun might be the example of ‘leg’: for all x that are
legs necessarily holds that x is a leg of some larger entity y. Such entailments
are important for the interpretation of sentences with the respective words,
but they are not seen as part of the specific linguistic knowledge of the words
in NDT.
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Parsons puts it like this: “Every stabbing requires an Agent, an Instru-
ment, and a Location, though not necessarily a Theme. And so on. Specifying
these generalizations is an enterprise in metaphysics, not in linguistics, for the
topic is not logical forms, it is metaphysical generalizations.” (Parsons 1995,
659). He further gives a philosophical argument for his point of view (ibid.):
[. . . ] Why take this route rather than building the meaning of
ate something into ate? Because we need to make sense of claims
in which necessity itself is at issue. The simplest illustration is a
claim like this:
Necessarily, whenever x eats, x eats something.
This makes a substantive point. The point is lost if the logical
form associated with the sentence contains an existentially quan-
tified direct object place in the antecedent clause. For then the
substantive principle has the force of
Necessarily, whenever x eats something, x eats something.
This just doesn’t say the same. If the former claim is true, then
the latter one is necessarily equivalent to it, but that does not
indicate that they mean the same. [. . . ]
This is reminiscent of the problem of distinguishing between linguistic
and non-linguistic lexical knowledge in Two-Level-semantics, as discussed in
the first section of this chapter. I will return to this important issue after
having discussed the concept of universal thematic roles which is crucial in
NDT, and also problematic in combination with polyvalence phenomena and
Parsons’ view on entailments.
Thematic roles are two-place predicates in NDT that relate “an event
(or state) and a thing. No event stands in one of these relations to more
than one thing; thus, each event possesses at most one Agent, at most one
Experiencer, and so on” (Parsons 1990, 74). It is important to note that this
uniqueness requirement is necessary. Without it, Parsons says, the theory
tends to fall into falsehood. He gives the example of a ditransitive verb like
‘to give’: if we labeled both objects of this verb as ‘theme’, we could not
prevent an interpretation of, e.g., ‘Peter gave Mary the book’ where Mary
was given to the book.
But note further that this forces us to be careful about our way of clas-
sifying thematic role types. They should not be designed in such a way that
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two roles of a verb fall into the same class. One such candidate might be the
verb ‘to feed’ that Parsons discusses (Parsons 1995, 641f):
[. . . ] For example, that a sentence entails that someone is an
Agent does not necessarily make that person an Agent of the
event specified by the verb of the sentence. One cannot argue as
follows:
In Mary fed her baby the baby has to eat; therefore, it
is an Agent of the feeding.
The question of Agenthood is not whether one may infer that the
baby is an Agent of something, but whether one may infer that
the baby is an Agent of the feeding. And this cannot be inferred.
[. . . ]
Obviously, the thematic role labels are not just ontological labels. But
the crucial problem is the notion ‘event’ here. Parsons’ use of it is different
from Davidson’s. For Davidson the feeding and the eating are one and the
same event. And the possibility to speak of one event as both a feeding
and an eating was a major motivation for his whole enterprise. If events are
real things in the world, they must be attributable with different predicates
without changing themselves – other real things like people or chairs have a
lot of different properties, but they are what they are.
Not allowing for an event to be given different ‘names’ would equal pos-
tulating that the expressions ‘Peter’ and ‘the man over there’ can necessarily
never refer to the same person.31
Parsons has to claim that an event could not be a feeding and an eating
at the same time, because then he would get two agents and a possible
interpretation where the baby feeds Mary. For this reason he has to reject
Davidson’s Reichenbachian event notion.
Parsons’ event variable is thus not a referential argument in the usual
sense and one may doubt whether it is a referential argument at all. An even
more conclusive example Parsons gives is that of a buying event that can also
be considered as a selling event, depending on the perspective one takes in
the desription of the event. Parsons states that in his framework the buying
and the selling are two different events (Parsons 1995, 643).
It is totally unclear to me how this event notion fits into the classical
semantic distinction of sense and reference. As it stands, Parsons seems to
31Dowty (1989) claims that the major advantage of NDT lies in its treatment of event
nominalizations: event nouns can be treated just like other nouns. The above discussion,
however, calls into question whether this is really the case.
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claim that the sense is also the reference here. He seems to deny that this
distinction exists for events. But how can one distinguish between a real
event of buying and a real event of selling without taking into account the
meanings of these two verbs? If we need the words to distinguish the two
events, then the event itself is a linguistic entity and not a ‘real’ entity out
there in the world, so to speak. Furthermore, as Parsons seems to deny that
there are real events (as he implicitly identifies reference with sense), how can
he even speak of linguistic events? How can he justify them? As it stands,
Parsons’ event notion is totally obscure.32
Remember that Parsons is forced to adapt this strange event notion only
because he makes use of universal thematic role labels. If he used individual
labels, things were different. E.g., one could claim that the verb ‘to feed’ has
two roles, a feeder and an eater, and the verb ‘to eat’ has an eater role and
a food role. Parsons’ problem of mixing up the roles of the verbs would not
occur here, and we even could keep the Davidsonian event notion.33
But Parsons cannot accept this solution without giving up other im-
portant properties of his approach. Individual roles, as illustrated above,
are entailments of the predicates and not part of the logical form. On the
other hand, Parsons is mixing the categories anyway. Cf. the following quote
(Parsons 1995, 659):
[. . . ] We then explain certain necessary consequences of sentences
in terms of the combinations of those sentences with certain well-
known general necessary truths. An example of such a general
truth is
Necessarily, in every eating something is eaten,
symbolically:
(e)[Eating(e) → (∃y)[Theme(e,y)]]
This principle then lets us infer the logical form of Something was
eaten from Someone ate. [. . . ]
32Parsons admits that philosophers might have problems with his event notion. He claims
to answer the question from the linguistic point of view: ’events are what we can identify
as events with linguistic methods’, so to speak. Whether this is acceptable, also depends
on the chosen methods. Parsons’ main linguistic tool are universal thematic roles. As these
turn out to be nearly as obscure as Parsons’ event notion, Parsons’ system remains very
unattractive.
33The same kind of solution to the problem has been proposed by Lombard (1985).
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When Parsons paraphrases the entailment ‘y is eaten’ with ‘Theme(e,y)’,
he mixes the real entailment and the thematic role concept. Metaphysics,
which is often referred to by Parsons, should be blind about thematic roles.
There is only the concrete relation of being the thing that gets eaten in the
event. Else Parsons would claim that Agent and Theme are real relations,
rather than abstractions over concrete relations such as, e.g., ‘eaten(e,y)’. He
never touches on the problem, how to get from the abstract or universal roles
to concrete or individual roles. But if this is not done, nothing can be said
about the meaning of the expression, and so we do not even have a semantic
theory.
To give a simple example that yields quite absurd consequences in Par-
sons’ system, look at the following resultative (from Wunderlich (1992), dis-











From Parsons’ heuristics we get that the plate is theme here, because the
‘eating-empty’ was ‘of the plate’ (see below). On the other hand, we know
that in every eating event there is a theme which is the thing eaten. But in
(79) it is not the plate that is consumed, but something else, located on the
plate. So, if the eating-empty event also was an eating event, we would have
two themes. For this reason, we have to state that no eating-empty event can
be an eating event:
(80) (e)[eating-empty(e)→ ¬eating(e)]
This is an absurd result. Under one interpretation, it is supposed to mean,
that in every event where someone eats something empty, there is no eating
going on. The entailments that hold for eating events also are no longer
derivable. Thus, we cannot derive ‘Something was eaten’ from ‘Someone ate
the plate empty’ – though this is not just true, but even necessarily true.
Universal roles such as ‘Theme’ are part of the logical form in NDT, but
they appear there not because they are part of a ‘metaphysical’ entailment
of the verb, but because they appear in the sentence, in the form of case
markings and/or prepositions. Parsons gives a clear heuristics about how
to detect thematic relations. For him, it is more than a heuristics, it is a
definition (Parsons 1995, 638f):
[. . . ] Suppose we accept the fact that thematic relations relate
events and/or states to things. Ignore states for the moment.
Then, most thematic relations can be defined as follows:
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Agent e is by x
Experiencer x experiences e
Theme e is of x
Source e is from x
Goal e is to x
Instrument e is with x [or ‘e is by means of x’]
Benefactive e is for x
We have to assume that the desired analyses may not exist, and
we may only have the accurate definitions given above. [. . . ]
The definitions are empirically based. If, e.g., the sentence ‘the verb-ing
is of x’ is an acceptable sentence of English, then x is in the Theme relation
to the described event. The following passages may help to clarify how the
use of the prepositions has to be understood:
[. . . ] After all, our test relies on understanding prepositions, and
prepositions are known to be ambiguous. But this is no more in-
tractable than other ambiguities that we live with all the time.
The ambiguity of prepositions is on a par with that of other com-
mon words, such as go. In practice, it is no more difficult to dis-
tinguish the senses of prepositions than it is to distinguish the
senses of verbs, and it is no more difficult to tell which senses
of the prepositions are intended in the definitions above. [. . . ]
(Parsons 1995, 640)
[. . . ] When I give the definitions of thematic relations, I use am-
biguous prepositions, I assume that my readers are conversant
with the prepositions’ various senses, and I only need to identify
which sense I intend. I can communicate this by various means,
such as the use of illustrative examples. I then rely on the reader
to know when an example uses the preposition in the same sense.
[. . . ] (Parsons 1995, 641)
The problem is obvious. Parsons reduces one fuzzy concept, universal the-
matic roles, to another, prepositions, and, what is more, he appellates on the
careful reader to find out what he means, without really defining what he
means. He suggests that this problem is not special for thematic relations,
but occurs always in language. The difference is: We know that there are
words, like prepositions and verbs, but we do not know whether there are
universal thematic roles. We know, on the other hand, that there are individ-
ual thematic roles. So, what Parsons does, is substituting the fairly clear and
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independently justified concept of individual thematic roles with the fairly
fuzzy and not independently justified concept of universal roles. So his ex-
cuse is not valid. This theory suffers from a serious methodological defect.
Furthermore, it is not clear that Parsons’ definition of ‘Theme’ covers some-
thing else than direct objects. If this suspicion turns out to be justified, then
we could simply rely on grammatical relations, and, of course, prepositions,
without any mention of universal thematic roles. But this would just make
even more obvious what I complained about before: the theory does not tell
us much about how we come to know what a sentence means. In order to do
so, Parsons has to address the connection between universal and individual
thematic relations. This will become very clear, when we turn to polyvalent
verbs.
1.2.3 Polyvalence and individual thematic roles in the
Neo-Davidsonian Theory of Thematic Roles










































































Parsons distinguishes between the ‘goal’ of a dative construction and the goal
of motion (Parsons 1995, 641, footnote 11). So let us assume that there is such
a specific goal role, ‘Goal-of-motion’. Then, all the directional prepositional
phrases in these examples should qualify as ‘Goal-of-motion’. Likewise, all
the direct objects pass the test for ‘Theme’, and the subjects pass the test
for ‘Agent’ (81-a-c) or ‘Instrument’ (81-d,e). Let us further assume, as we did
in the previous discussion of these examples, that the verb schlagen has two
individual roles, namely a moving entity M that moves towards and finally
hits against a still standing entity S in the act of schlagen. M is a typical
‘Theme’, and S a typical ‘Goal-of-motion’. So we would expect for the five
sentences in (81), that uniformly the object has role M and the noun within
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the PP has role S.
The facts, of course, are different: M is explicitly mentioned only in (81–c),
as object, and in (81–d), as subject. In all the other cases it is implicit. S
is realized as object in (81–a) and (81–e), and as PP in (81–b), (81–c) and
(81–d). So here we have one counterexample against NDT that illustrates my
complaint that it in fact is vague about the relation between universal roles
– which I suspect to be nothing more than grammatical relations in Parsons’
approach – and individual roles.
Problems like these are notorious in ordered argument theories, too. To


















































Assume that rollen has one individual role, that of a rolling entity R. R
is a good candidate for a ‘Theme’, so we can assume that Parsons would
classify it as ‘Theme’. In the sentences above, again the direct objects all pass
Parsons’ test for themes, but R is the object only in (82–b). In (82–a) it is the
subject, in (82–c) it is left out, and in (82–d) it is realized in a mit (‘with’)-
PP, thus passing the instrument test. To conclude: Parsons’ approach tells us
something about thematic interpretation, i.e. that the trolley is instrument
in (82–d), and that the subjects are agents (except perhaps in (82–a)), but
this is not all we need to know to do thematic interpretation.
These examples make clear that thematic interpretation consists of two
tasks (which are distinct, but often influence each other):
a) thematic interpretation of the constituents of a clause
b) determining the ‘role-bearers’ of verb and other predicates of the clause
The above discussion suggests that NDT gives us a rough heuristics about
task a), but has nothing to say about task b).
With respect to task b), there has been some discussion in NDT that
I mentioned earlier in this chapter. It concerns the treatment of implicit
arguments in cases of detransitivization. It has been claimed that NDT has
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an advantage over ordered argument theories in this case. Let me first repeat
the relevant proposal in ordered argument theories: whenever an argument
is omitted, these theories need an extra mechanism. Cf. the pair
(83) a. John ate a sandwich
b. John ate
If we want to treat the verb ‘to eat’ the same way in both sentences in
ordered argument theories we have to propose that it has the same number
of arguments in both. But this is not the case here, at least not on the surface.
The way out of this problem that has been shown by Dowty (1978, 1979),
Dowty et al. (1981) and Bresnan (1982a), is assuming a lexical operation
on the verb ‘to eat’ that reduces the number of arguments a verb takes. An
example is the operator O defined as follows (cf. Dowty 1989, 88):
(84) a. syntax: If δ is an n-place predicate, then O(δ) is an n–1 place
predicate.
b. semantics: If δ denotes an n-place relation d, then O(δ) denotes
that n–1 place relation R such that for any n–1 place sequence
of individuals 〈xi, . . . , xn−1〉 ∈ R iff there is some individual y
such that 〈x1, . . . , xn−1, y〉 ∈ d.
O is to be interpreted as a quantifier that “existentially quantifies” one ar-
gument position of a predicate. The problem with this device is that it could
be applied anywhere and any time. The class of verbs and circumstances,
however, under which implicit arguments are possible, is restricted and the
nature of these restrictions still remains in the dark under this treatment.
In NDT, as pointed out first by Carlson (1984), the interpretation of the
existentially quantified implicit object follows from the entailments of the
verb. It follows from the meaning of the verb ‘to eat’ that in every eating
event there is some entity or stuff that is eaten:
∀e[eating(e)→ ∃xAgent(x, e) & ∃yPatient(y, e)]
Carlson claims that this treatment of detransitivization is one major ad-
vantage of NDT over ordered argument theories. He further gives examples of
different kinds of detransitivizations where ordered argument theories would
have to assume different types of operators to get the syntax and semantics
correctly (Carlson 1984, 264):
(85) a. The mule kicked something
b. The mule kicked
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The verb ‘kick’ has no entailments about further arguments besides the
‘kicker’. So there is no existential quantification and the two sentences are
correctly predicted not to be paraphrases.
Existential quantification often occurs in passives:
(86) a. Someone touched the vase
b. The vase was touched
But also in passives there are cases where the existential quantification is not
recommended, because of specific entailments of the verb, cf.:
(87) a. Martha was left alone
b. Someone left Martha alone
Under one interpretation, (87–a) is not paraphrased by (87–b). In this read-
ing, Martha is not just left alone by someone, but there is in fact nobody,
who bothers her. The quantification in this case is not existential, but rather
universal.
These might be arguments in favor of an NDT treatment of thematic re-
lations, but not necessarily in favor of the specific NDT versions Carlson and
Parsons have in mind. The theory would work even better without universal
thematic roles, but this would cause serious problems with the way thematic
interpretation has to be conceived. Nonetheless, I suspect that it would not
cause these problems, but rather just make them obvious. The problems are
already there: when we rely on individual thematic roles, the generalizations
about how to translate syntactic constituents into semantic arguments get
lost, and should perhaps be stipulated casewise. But this would result in for-
mulating just another ordered argument theory – which would face all the
problems discussed in section 1.1.
Let me make one final remark on the claim of Parsons’ that a theory of
logical form should make necessary truths of the following kind expressable:
(88) Whenever x eats, x eats something
I suspect that the problem formulated here results again from mixing up
syntactic and semantic arity. (88) is just ‘loose talk’ for the following:
(89) Even if eat is used with the syntactic arity 1, eat ′ nevertheless always
has to be interpreted as a semantic predicate with arity 2.
Thus, we are shifting into a ‘meta-language’. Consider the following:
(90) Whenever Peter says that Mary is eating, he says that she is eating
something
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This is not contradictory, because in the premise of this conditional the verb
‘say’ is used for ‘speaking’, and in the conclusion for ‘expressing’. Things get
different, when we use the verb ‘express’:
(91) ?Whenever Peter expresses that Mary is eating, he expresses that she
is eating something
This seems a bit strange to me. Either it is contradictory, or it is tautological
– depending on whether we assume that ‘Mary is eating’ and ‘Mary is eating
something’ mean the same or not. So there is an effect, and thus we have
to take care to predict this effect in our semantics. If I understand Parsons
correctly, then his position is that no such effect should occur here, as is the
case in (88). If the above observation is correct, then Parsons must be wrong
again.
1.2.4 Summary
The Neo-Davidsonian theory has fundamental problems that make it very
unattractive:
 The event notion used by Parsons is obscure. He would do better with
Reichenbach’s original version, at least from a philosophical point of
view.
 The syntax of Davidsonian logical forms combined with Davidson’s
rigid extensional semantics makes it impossible to account for higher
order predicates like many modifiers. Reichenbach’s original proposal
should be preferred.
 NDT has no theory about the relation between universal and individual
thematic roles.
 The heuristic ‘definition’ of universal thematic roles given by Parsons
is too fuzzy. Because of this and the previous feature, NDT turns out
not to yield semantic interpretations of sentences.
 It would not help to replace universal thematic roles by individual
roles, because then we would have to stipulate which argument is re-
alized with which morphosyntactic properties, and the result would be
another version of ordered argument theories.
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1.3 Outline
The most important result of section 1.1 is that we have to distinguish be-
tween what I called ‘semi-idiomatic’ and ‘free’ verbs. While subcategorization
based theories, and ordered argument theories in general, perform well on
semi-idioms, they can hardly explain the polyvalent behavior of ‘free’ verbs.
An alternative is therefore in order, but it should not be based on universal
thematic roles, as demonstrated in section 1.2.
A different treatment is therefore necessary and I will develop such a
treatment in the next chapter. It will have the following four major features:
1. In the discussion of Two Level Semantics in section 1.1 I showed that
the ‘conceptual level’ is sometimes important to explain polyvalent be-
havior. It therefore does not make sense to me to distinguish two se-
mantic levels. Likewise, as the relevant conceptual factors can be of
very different kinds, usage of conceptual primes like cause, become,
be etc. will not be very helpful, and I will avoid it.
2. An important background assumption is that complement types, i.e.,
NPs with specific cases, PPs with specific prepositions (and cases),
and complement clauses of specific kinds, have their own independent
semantic contributions that come into play especially in combination
with polyvalent or ‘free’ verbs. So the central ‘machinery’ that the
approach has to provide is one that regulates how verb meaning and
complement meaning are combined to yield the meaning of the clause.
Once we got rid of subcategorization frames and universal thematic
roles, this issue is totally open.
3. The perspective on clause meaning is holistic in nature. We thus do not
expect that relations within the syntactic representation of the clause
are mapped homomorphically into relations within the semantic rep-
resentation. We expect, however, that there could be global conditions
and restrictions for the conceptual-semantic interpretation of clauses.
4. We also expect that a sentence might have several alternative concept-
ual-semantic interpretations. The theory to be developed has to provide






As I concluded in the first chapter, thematic interpretation consists of two
independent, but interrelated tasks:
 Find the role bearers of the predicates in the clause
 Find out the ‘roles’ played by each non-predicative constituent of the
clause
Semi-idiomatic verbs regulate these tasks qua subcategorization frames
in their lexical entries. Polyvalent or ‘free’ verbs have no subcategorization
frames, and so it is totally open, how thematic interpretation works with this
class of verbs.
In this chapter, I will elaborate an alternative model for thematic in-
terpretation with polyvalent verbs. I will take into account the following
background assumptions:
 The verb does not totally determine what the sentence describes, or
better: it does not necessarily do so. It is a partial description of the
event described by the sentence, and only in trivial cases the event is
described by the verb in toto. This holds especially for the thematic
interpretation of verbal complements: case and other morphosyntactic
features of complements play an independent role in determining the-
matic roles. Specific case+verb configurations, like, e.g., the transitive
construction, are also important.
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 For polyvalent verbs, it is not fixed, how they contribute to the meaning
of the clause. We usually have several options. A main task of the model
to be developed is to provide this freedom without allowing anything.
 The thematic interpretation of a constituent may result from its own
morphological and semantic properties, from several attributes given
by the predicates in the clause, as well as from plausibility inference
(e.g., if we know in order for y to have property P , it must be in state
S, and if our interpretation of the clause tells that y has property P ,
then y is assumed to be in state S).
 We should not expect that the role bearers of a predicate can always
be found among the clausal constituents. An argument can be omitted,
or even only partially omitted – leaving full determination open for
thematic inference based on lexical and contextual information, as well
as world knowledge.
In this chapter, I will do the following:
1. I will develop a theory of ‘flexible’ argument linking that makes crucial
use of the following theoretical and conceptual ‘resources’:
(a) Individual thematic roles as defined by Dowty (1989)
(b) The assumption that complement types and constructions have
semantic entailments, as proposed in Construction Grammar
(Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor 1988, Goldberg 1995)
(c) Contextual information and world knowledge – the implementa-
tion is based on DRT as developed by Kamp & Reyle (1993).
This framework provides a straightforward integration of contex-
tual information and world knowledge with ‘new’ information from
a given clause
2. The empirical discussion will focus on German transitive constructions
with and without a co-predicate and the two German polyvalent verbs
rollen (‘to roll’) and schlagen (‘to beat/hit/strike’)
The model to be developed concerns the conceptual-semantic interpretations
of sentences. It will not say anything new about events and truth conditions.
However, the conceptual-semantic interpretation can be used for the formu-
lation of a Reichenbach-style truth condition. Let us assume that the concept
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Ci represents the conceptual-semantic interpretation of a sentence Si, then
the truth condition for Si is:
1
Si is true ←→ ∃x.Ci*(x)
x is an event or fact in Reichenbach’s sense. A sentence Si might have more
than one possible conceptual interpretation. One source for this is the nature
of polyvalent verbs: it is mostly the subcategorization frame that determines
the way, how in a verb+constituent complex thematic roles are assigned.
Verbs without such a frame lack linking rules. Contextual factors as well as
ambiguities induced by lexical items can lead to situations where we have
a bundle of options. As a result, in computing the possible thematic inter-
pretations of Si we often do not arrive at a single concept Ci, but at a set
of equally ‘well-formed’ conceptual-semantic interpretations {Ci1 , . . . ,Cin}.
Which of these options is chosen, results from a second step of evaluation
of these ‘candidates’ with respect to plausibility, simplicity and maybe more
criteria. A discussion of the following pair of examples shall exemplify this
consideration:
(1) a. The ball is rolling
b. The books are rolling
Assume that roll has one individual thematic role to assign, that of the rolling
entity, R. In (1–a), R is linked to the subject, the ball, while in (1–b) this
cannot be the correct linking, because books cannot roll. The interpretation
we arrive at for (1–b) is that the books are located on a rolling entity, e.g., a
cart. So we have two options for the conceptual-semantic interpretation that,
for now, I represent with sets of predicate logic expressions:
(2) a. {roll(ball)}
b. {on(books, cart), roll(cart)}
The mechanism to be developed must be able to derive both kinds of in-
terpretations for intransitive clauses with roll. Thus, the structure in (2–b)
should also be an option for (1–a), and the structure in (2–a) should also be
an (albeit implausible) option for (1–b):
(3) a. (i) {roll(ball)}
(ii) {on(ball, cart), roll(cart)}
b. (i) {roll(books)}
1Within model-theoretic semantics, a version of which I will adopt here, this should be
formulated as: “Si is true if and only if there is a model x such that x is a model for Ci”:
Si is true ←→ ∃x.x |= Ci
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(ii) {on(books, cart), roll(cart)}
An evaluation mechanism has to filter out the actual interpretations (3–a.i)
and (3–b.ii). The criteria for this are simplicity for (3–a) ((3–a.ii) is a two-
membered set and (3–a.i) a one-membered set, this prefers the latter over
the former) and plausibility for (3–b) (books are unlikely to roll because of
their shape, this prefers (3–b.ii)).2
We now need a format for the representation of conceptual interpretations
of linguistic expressions and their relation to the context. One format that
has many of the features needed here is Discourse Representation Theory
(DRT) as introduced by Kamp & Reyle (1993):
1. DRT is a theory about the relation of the semantic information given
by a clause to its immediate context. For some cases of polyvalence it
is essential to make use of contextual knowledge in thematic interpre-
tation. Consider, e.g., the case of (1-b) as discussed above. Presumably,
this clause is only acceptable within a suitable context, not in an out-
of-the-blue context.
2. DRT provides a mechanism of the stepwise translation of syntactic
structures into Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs), the DRS
construction rules. There is no general restriction against the formu-
lation of construction-grammar-like DRS construction rules, e.g., for
transitive constructions, that can do some of the work for the interpre-
tation of clauses with polyvalent verbs.
3. DRT makes use of the conception of ‘event’ in a way that is very close
to the Reichenbachian intuition in that it treats whole clauses as pred-
icates of events, on a par with event nominalizations.
4. Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994a, b) deal with the task of integrating
lexical knowledge into DRSs. Though I do not agree with some details
of their proposal, the overall treatment and formalization is something
that we can build on.
5. An important conceptual issue is that DRS lays much emphasis on
interpretation. DRSs are more than just a representation of truth con-
ditions. DRSs also show, how new information is integrated into a given
discourse. As we saw in the discussion of (1-b), information given in the
2This is reminiscent of an optimality theoretic model. The criteria must be ranked
hierarchically: The more complex model only ‘wins’ if it is more plausible: plausibility 
simplicity.
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preceding discourse of a clause can be important for the assignment of
thematic roles. In this sense, the linking of thematic roles is an inter-
pretive task. The elaborated structure of DRSs and the mechanisms of
discourse interpretation will be helpful in its formalization.
6. The format of DRSs allows to distinguish between three different parts
of lexical-semantic information: i) the introduction of individuals rep-
resenting the thematic roles of the verb by discourse referents ; ii) the
predicative part of a verb constituting the event, and iii) certain prereq-
uisites and selectional restrictions for the individuals can be integrated
as ordinary DRS conditions.
The next section will introduce the core concepts of DRT and discuss
the DRT implementation of thematic interpretation outlined in Kamp &
Roßdeutscher (1994b).
2.1 Verbs, Thematic Roles and DRT
A Discourse Representation Structure “ . . . consists of two components:
(i) a set of discourse referents, called the universe of the DRS, which will
always be displayed at the top of the diagram; and
(ii) a set of DRS-conditions, typically displayed below the universe” (Kamp
& Reyle 1993, 63)
Thus, sentence (4) has the DRS (5) (example taken from Kamp & Reyle
1993, 60ff):






The initial DRS, however, is an empty discourse with the syntactic structure
of the sentence added:
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The nodes labelled ‘PN’ are already more than syntactic labels. They denote
the NP type ‘proper noun’. Other NP types are ‘pronoun’ (PRO), ‘definite
description’ (DD) and ‘indefinite description’ (ID). Each of these NP types
has its own DRS construction rule. The construction rule for proper nouns
is given in (7) (Kamp & Reyle 1993, 121):
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The application of this rule introduces discourse referents and conditions and
yields a reduction of the syntactic tree.3 (7) is transformed into (8):
3ConK is the set of conditions in the DRS K; γ is the configuration that triggers the
application of the rule; γ is the treated condition that contains γ as subtree.
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The next thing to do is transforming the verb and its VP into their DRS
correlates. Kamp and Reyle formulate this together with the construction
rules that translate temporal and aspectual features. I will ignore those and
only quote the passages dealing with the verb here:
(i) Introduction of a new discourse referent for the described even-
tuality
[. . . ]
(v) Introduction of a DRS-condition e: γ which specifies the
“type” of the described eventuality.
(Kamp & Reyle 1993, 514f)
It should also be added that the triggering configuration for this construc-
tion rule – an S that contains the VP and discourse referents in place of the
nominal constituents, just as in (8) – is erased, as soon as this ‘construction
rule’ is applied.






e: x owns y
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This treatment is rather superficial with respect to the problem of thematic
role assignment. Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b) study in more detail how
the lexical information of a verb enters a DRS. We will turn to this proposal
in section 2.1.1. Syntactic trees inside of DRSs are reducible conditions : “A
reducible condition is one containing at least one triggering configuration for
some construction rule.” (Kamp & Reyle 1993, 87). A reducible condition can
be seen as syntactic information that is not yet translated into the DRS. A
translation is completed, if there are no more reducible conditions, which in
other words means that ‘all syntactic information is interpreted’. The general
form of the DRS Construction Algorithm is (10) (Kamp & Reyle 1993, 87):
(10)
DRS-Construction Algorithm
Input: a discourse D = S1, . . . , Si, Si+1, . . . , Sn
the empty DRS K0
Keep repeating for i = 1, . . ., n:
(i) add the syntactic analysis [Si] of (the next) sentence
Si to the conditions of Ki−1; call this DRS Ki*. Go to
(ii)
(ii) Input: a set of reducible conditions of Ki*
Keep on applying construction principles to each re-
ducible condition of Ki* until a DRS Ki is obtained
that only contains irreducible conditions. Go to (i).
2.1.1 DRSs and the Lexicon
An account of the integration of lexical information into DRSs, including
thematic role assignment, was offered by Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b).
They develop their own proposal for the format of lexical entries, but their
background assumptions are uncontroversial. A simple lexical entry of a verb
consists of a syntactic and a semantic part. The German verb heilen (‘to












4Kamp and Roßdeutscher assume that all instances of HEILEN involve two “Theme”
roles, which represent the body part that healed (Theme1)and the ailment or disease it
healed of (Theme2).
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The first line in (12) contains syntactic information, and the second semantic
information: “The syntactic component is to be read in the following way:
The verb in question, heilen, occurs on the left. It is followed by the different
argument phrases which are syntactically realized by the verb and which cor-
respond to arguments of the corresponding concept. In the present instance
there is one such argument. Syntactically it is realized with nominative case,
indicated here by the case index [Nom]. The denotatum of this phrase plays
the thematic role of Theme1; this role is mentioned directly underneath, in
the tier reserved for the semantic component.” (Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994b,
110)
Kamp and Roßdeutscher observe several phenomena that complicate lex-
ical entries. One such complication arises with optional arguments, like the















Round brackets around a theta role in the first line of the lexical entry in-








Another important factor are selectional restrictions for arguments of the
verb. As already noted, intransitive uses of ‘heilen’ require a body part as
subject. The ‘second theme’ has to be an ailment or disease. This contrasts
with the German verb ‘gesunden’ that requires an organism as subject and





















5In the original lexical entry the highest theta role is written “d〈θ1,Nom〉”, where
the ‘d’ indicates that this role is the ‘designated argument’ that is to become subject, is
suppressed in passivization etc. I am omitting this ‘d’ for ease of reading here.
6The asterisk marks semantic unacceptability here.
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Kamp and Roßdeutscher assume that ‘genesen’ and ‘heilen’ are not different
in their meaning. Both use the template HEILEN in the semantic part of
their lexical entry. The difference lies only in the selectional restrictions they
impose on their arguments. Such restrictions are necessary independently,







The respective selectional restrictions are encoded in the semantic part of
the lexicon:
(18) e: HEILEN(yth1, zth2) Theme1 Theme2
SEL RESTR SEL RESTR
organism ailment
or body part or disease
But the exclusions of body parts for gesunden and organisms for heilen are
represented not as restrictions on the concept, i.e. not as semantic restric-
tions, but as idiosyncrasies that belong to the syntactic component of the
respective lexical entry (cf. Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994b, 112f):7
(19) heilen {〈θ1, Nom〉}
*organism(i)
e: HEILEN(yth1, zth2) Theme1 Theme2
SEL RESTR SEL RESTR
organism ailment
or body part or disease
(20) gesunden {〈θ1, Nom〉}
*body part(i)
e: HEILEN(yth1, zth2) Theme1 Theme2
SEL RESTR SEL RESTR
organism ailment
or body part or disease
7The (i) signals that the restriction is idiosyncratic in nature.
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This treatment implies that ‘gesunden’ and ‘heilen’ mean the same, and
that their different selectional properties are more or less arbitrary and have
nothing to do with the meaning of these words. Such a position need not
necessarily be taken. It is as well possible to consider the different selectional
restrictions as parts of the semantic component.
The motivation for entries as in (19) and (20) is conceptual: HEILEN
is assumed to be an abstract, essentially non-linguistic, semantic concept.
Words are related to such concepts. I am sceptical whether it is really nec-
essary and helpful to assume that a theory of word meaning depends on
a theory of non-linguistic meaning. But this is a minor issue here. Kamp
and Roßdeutscher make a difference between conceptually motivated selec-
tional restrictions, like those that exclude wardrobes as possible subjects of
intransitive heilen and gesunden, and idiosyncratic or ‘syntactic’ selectional
restrictions, like those that exclude body parts as possible subjects of gesun-
den and organisms as possible subjects of intransitive heilen. As long as a
theory of non-linguistic concepts is not developed, we are not forced to as-
sume two different types of selectional restrictions. I will assume only one
type of selectional restrictions which is encoded in the semantic part of lexi-
cal entries. Remember that polyvalent verbs under the treatment developed
here do not have a subcategorization frame and thus have no syntactic infor-
mation at all in their lexical entry (apart from morphosyntactic information
that concerns the syntactic category ‘V’ in general; i.e., no lexeme specific
information is added).
But before turning to polyvalent verbs let us see how Kamp and Roßdeu-
tscher translate lexical information into a DRS. According to Kamp & Reyle
(1993) a DRS like (21) would not contain any reducible conditions:8





In Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b), the condition “x heilen” can and thus has
to be reduced by replacing it with the conceptual-semantic part of the lexical
8The discourse referent n (from ‘now’) stands for the utterance time, the condition ‘e
< n’ (to be read as ‘the event e took place before utterance time’) represents the DRS
translation of the past tense feature.
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entry of ‘heilen’. This lexical entry is represented in a schematic DRS as in






The discourse referents are typed in bold face to indicate that they have the
status of schematic discourse referents. The thematic roles are represented
as functions from eventualities to the entities involved in these eventualities.
While the use of the term ‘Theme’ indicates that the conception of univer-
sal thematic roles is used, the subscripts of these labels indicate that they
can only be understood in relation to the given verb, and thus are closer to
individual thematic roles in this respect. Apart from this, it is not clear to
me that the two conditions containing the thematic roles are really neces-
sary. Why should the information about the thematic roles of the discourse
referents not already follow from the condition ‘HEILEN(y,z)’?
The schematic DRS (22) replaces the occurence of the verb in (21). The
schematic discourse referents, however, are only introduced, if they are not
identified with a discourse referent in the old DRS. Thus, e is identified with
e, and y is identified with x, while z has to be added as schematic discourse
referent (Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994b, 122):9
9Kamp and Roßdeutscher claim that schematic discourse referents do not have the
status of ordinary discourse referents. This shall be manifested by the fact that schematic
discourse referents are not available as antecedents for pronominal anaphora (Kamp &
Roßdeutscher 1994b, 123):
(i) Der Fuß heilte schließlich. Es hatte den Patienten aber monatelang geplagt.
‘Finally the foot healed. It had troubled the patient for month’
Kamp and Roßdeutscher propose that the pronoun ‘es’ cannot refer to the ailment which
had been affecting the foot. I am not convinced that the generalization is correct. Consider
the following example:
(ii) John hat wieder geheiratet. Sie ist sehr nett.
‘John has married again. She is very nice’
Here, it seems to me totally clear that Sie refers to the schematic dioscourse referent of
John’s new wife which was introduced by the verb heiraten. It might be the case that most
schematic discourse referents are not available as antecedents, but excluding this option
in general is an overgeneralization. This is, however a minor problem for our discussion,
because I will not be concerned with anaphora resolution.
89
CHAPTER 2 2.1 Verbs, Thematic Roles and DRT
(23)






What has to be shown next, is how we come to identify, e.g., the discourse ref-
erent x with the schematic discourse referent y, rather than with z. This is ex-
plained by Kamp and Roßdeutscher with reference to the process of sentence
parsing. Let us consider the following example (Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994b,
149ff):
(24) Der Arzt heilte Peter von der Grippe
The doctor cured Peter of the flu
Kamp and Roßdeutscher assume that the parser computes the ArgSet of
a sentence as one component of its output, “in the form of a set of pairs,
each consisting of (i) the NP or PP in question, and (ii) its generalized case
information (for an NP this is its case, for a PP it is its preposition + the
case of the NP governed by it).” The ArgSet of (24) is the following three
element list:
(25) {〈der Arzt, Nom〉, 〈Peter, Acc〉, 〈von der Grippe, von + Dat〉}
The lexical entry for transitive ‘heilen’10 has two variants (the PP in (24) is
optional) (Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994b, 151, only the syntactic component
of the lexical entry is mentioned here):
(26) a. heilen {〈θ1, Nom〉, 〈θ2, Acc〉, 〈θ3, von + Dat〉}
Agent Theme1 Theme2
b. heilen {〈θ1, Nom〉, 〈θ2, Acc〉 }
Agent Theme1 Theme2
Each of these entries has a set ObArg of ‘semantically obligatory arguments’
and a set GrArg of ‘grammatically realized arguments’. GrArg is a subset
of ObArg, because it contains only those members of ObArg that are gram-
matically realized:
10Note that Kamp and Roßdeutscher chose a strategy where polyvalent behaviour is
encoded by a set of lexical entries for the same verb heilen.
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(27) ad (26–a):
ObArg = {〈Agent,Nom〉, 〈Theme1, Acc〉, 〈Theme2, von+Dat〉}
GrArg = {〈Agent,Nom〉, 〈Theme1, Acc〉, 〈Theme2, von+Dat〉}
(28) ad (26-b):
ObArg = {〈Agent,Nom〉, 〈Theme1, Acc〉, 〈Theme2, NIL〉}
GrArg = {〈Agent,Nom〉, 〈Theme1, Acc〉}
Kamp and Roßdeutscher say the following about the procedure of finding the
right lexical entry:
[. . . ] To verify that its parse is lexically possible the parser must
choose an entry for the verb and establish that the [sentence’s,
RV] ArgSet it has computed matches this entry’s GrArg. It is clear
that such a match exists for the ArgSet [(25)] and the GrArg of
the entry represented under [(27) ]. [. . . ] (Kamp & Roßdeutscher
1994b, 151)
The parser then uses this lexical entry to establish the assignment of
thematic roles.
Such a procedure is possible for verbs that have subcategorization frames
– ‘semi-idioms’, as I called them. In order to account for polyvalent verbs we
need another strategy.
2.2 Polyvalent Verbs in DRSs – First Steps
What happens, when we try to construct a DRS for a clause with a polyvalent
verb? Let us start with a simple example:
(29) The ball is rolling
The initial DRS we start with contains only the syntactic representation of
the clause to be translated:
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The temporal and aspectual features of the verb shall be ignored here and
subsequently. The first step in our translation concerns the definite noun
phrase which is translated by the DRS construction rule for definite descrip-
tions, CR.DD. It has the following form (Kamp & Reyle 1993, 254):11
11Remember that the variables γ and γ stand for the substructure γ of the processed
structure γ, where γ is the ‘triggering configuration’ for the application of the DRS con-
struction rule.
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in UK: new discourse referent u
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u for DET N
the
This rule reduces the NP part of the structure in (30). It thereby introduces
a discourse referent, say, x, and a condition of the form ‘the ball(x)’.12 It also
replaces the triggering configuration with the discourse referent. The DRS
we arrive at looks like this:
12Kamp and Reyle note that this account for definite noun phrases is not really satisfac-
tory. A proper account, they say, should have to provide additional processing principles
corresponding to the different types of use of definite descriptions, which reduce conditions
like ‘the N(x)’ further.
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The residue of the tree is the triggering configuration for the reduction of an
S. But now we have a problem: we have no instruction about how to link
schematic discourse referents with ordinary ones, because there is no subcat-
egorization information in the lexical entry of the verb roll (by assumption).
Let us assume the following lexical entry for roll, in the format introduced
by Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b):
(33) e: ROLL(yth) Theme
SEL RESTR
rollable






As already clarified in the discussion above, I consider selectional restrictions
to be semantic information. They will become important for the determina-
tion of the correct interpretation, as will be shown below. So I assume that
selectional restrictions are part of a schematic DRS and enter DRSs via the
13I am leaving out the condition that denotes the universal thematic role label, as I
consider this information as unnecessary, and even redundant (as soon as we know that
ROLL(x), we know that x has a thematic role that satisfies the criteria of classifying it as
Theme).
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construction rule.
The next step according to the construction rule described in section
2.1.1 is the integration of the schematic DRS of roll into the DRS that we
already derived. This yields the elimination of the remaining piece of the
syntactic tree. It thereby introduces a discourse referent for the event, e, and
the schematic discourse referent e. While e is introduced by the clause itself






Kamp & Reyle (1993) and Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b) do not give detailed
proposals about the status of event variables and when they are introduced.
The treatment that I prefer here is the one proposed by Reichenbach (1947),
as discussed in detail in section 1.2. Thus, the variable e stands for an event
or fact in Reichenbach’s sense. In (35), it is not determined, in which universe
the schematic event variable of the verb is to be introduced. It could be either
the universe of the main DRS (36–a) or the universe of e (36–b):
(36) a.











(36–a) would treat schematic event variables like schematic variables of in-
dividuals. Kamp & Roßdeutscher’s (1994b) treatment of verbs expressing
so-called ‘causal complexes’ treats schematic event variables as in (36–b).
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However, the reasons for this choice are not given. For the present purposes,
a treatment as in (36–b) is also the better choice. Remember that we assume
here that the verb does not totally determine the meaning of the clause,
but that, nonetheless, the meaning of the verb is part of the meaning of the
clause, i.e. e is a part of e. Inserting e in the universe of the main DRS
would imply that an event e existed independently of e, which is not what
we want – a part of some x cannot exist independently of x. (36–b) does not
have this implication. However, a fully satisfactory account of the semantic
relation between e and e must be based on an ontology of events which is a
project much too ambitious to be given here.14 For the present discussion, I
will assume that such an event semantics can be given and that it formulates
the relation of e and e as a part-to-whole relation.
Another issue that needs clarification is the positioning of the selectional
restriction ‘rollable(y)’ outside of the DRS boxes of e and e. The motivation
for this is that we want the content of the DRS box of e to say what the
event referred to by the clause is about. A clause containing the verb roll
is about the rolling of some y. The rollability of y is a necessary condition
of its rolling that is presupposed, rather than being asserted by the clause.
Inserting selectional restrictions into the main DRS is one way of expressing
this difference. It requires that selectional restrictions can be differentiated
from the ‘real’ predicates in the schematic DRS of a lexical entry, which is the
case in the discussed method of formulating lexical entries. A more detailed
discussion of the treatment of presupposed material will follow below.
The schematic event variable e need not necessarily be only a part of
e. In simple cases, the content of e can be identical with that of e. In this
situation can e and e be unified and e can totally disappear.15
Likewise, it does not automatically follow that the schematic discourse
referent y is identified with the discourse referent x in (36). This would only
14It could perhaps be based on Bach (1986) and similar work.
15The variables e and e may not be unified, whenever the verb does not introduce all
predicates given in a clause. For example, causative uses of rollen could be represented
with the same lexical entry for rollen as above, but now e and e differ:
(i) Mary rolled the ball
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follow if the verb’s lexical entry contained a subcategorization frame that
enforced that. We assume that this is not the case for roll.
That we can unify discourse referents, but do not have to, is not untypical
for DRT. This also occurs, for example, in anaphora resolution, where the
referent of an anaphoric expression has to be identified with a previously
introduced discourse referent, but it is not determined, how this referent is
chosen.16
Let us make the following assumptions about the integration of the
schematic DRS: a verbal schematic DRS e is introduced inside the DRS of
e, which represents the interpretation of the clause. The two event variables
can be unified, but do not have to. The other schematic discourse referents
may be identified with discourse referents within the clause, but again they
do not have to. We introduce the conditions given by the schematic DRS
inside the DRS of e (or e, in case of unification). Let us assume that e and e
are unified in (36). This yields at least two possibilities that differ in whether











There is something strange in the DRS (37–b) that makes it very unlikely to
represent a possible interpretation, namely: we do not know more about the
discourse referent x than that it is a ball. If we were to paraphrase (37–b)
we would come up with a statement like “Something is rolling and the ball
is around there”. The problem about (37–b) is that nothing in this structure
points to this oddity.
I have not addressed yet an important fact about subcategorization that
might be relevant here: Subcategorization frames use case information to
encode thematic relations. Under the perspective of subcategorization, it is
reasonable to assume that case information does not enter a DRS, because
it would only be a reduplication of thematic information. But polyvalent
verbs do not have subcategorization frames, and so it is an open question,
how case information is ‘reduced’. Let us assume that in these cases the case
information enters the DRS on a par with the schematic DRS and that it is
contained inside the DRS box of e. The structures in (37) have to be modified
16An optimality theoretic solution of this problem is proposed in Hendricks & de Hoop
(1999).
97
CHAPTER 2 2.2 Polyvalent Verbs in DRSs – First Steps















Conditions of the form 〈CASE〉(x) are reducible conditions. But they can-
not be reduced in the usual way as triggers for DRS construction. Intu-
itively speaking, what we want is a condition that regulates the elimination
of NOM(x) in (38). This condition is met in (38–a), but not in (38–b).
A comparison of the two structures makes the difference quite obvious
that might allow the elimination of NOM(x): The box of the event e contains
a condition that says something about x in (38–a), but not in (38–b). So one
formulation of the desired rule could be that 〈CASE 〉(u) can be eliminated
from an event box, if it contains another condition that has u as its argument.
The problem with this kind of strategy is that any predicate logic formula φ
can be paraphrased in the form φ(x).17 This formula might be semantically
empty, but the proposed rule is only a syntactic one, so this does not count.18
The criterion for the reduction of conditions of the form 〈CASE〉(x) thus
has to be a semantic one. The first thing that might come to one’s mind, are
perhaps thematic roles. We could include thematic role pedicates in the box
of the event e, like, e.g., ‘theme(x)’ in (38–a). We then could classify a set of
predicates representing the universal thematic roles and state the following
rule: “A predicate of the form 〈CASE〉(x) can be eliminated from a DRS box
of an event e iff this box contains a condition of the form f(x), such that f is an
element of the set of universal thematic roles.” However, I already showed in
chapter 1.2 that universal thematic role labels are conceptually problematic
and for this reason undesirable. It might perhaps work better with individual
role labels, but this still excludes certain thematic interpretations. It can
happen that a constituent receives a thematic interpretation that is only
partly determined by the verb. In principle, thematic interpretations can be
‘derived’ in the course of interpretation.
For these reasons I will not rely on thematic role labels, but exploit a claim
that was also made in the first chapter, namely, that complement types are
17Thanks to Wolfgang Sternefeld for pointing this out to me.
18One could think of a filtering mechanism that excludes such semantically empty pred-
ications from the set of relevant conditions. But this would seriously complicate the defi-
nition of the logical inventory. We had better avoid this strategy.
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not semantically neutral. The different types of complement clauses, case-
marked DPs and PPs all occur under certain semantic circumstances and
the complement type may influence the thematic interpretation of a verbal
complement. For structural cases like nominative and accusative, this seman-
tic contribution might be rather weak. My proposal for nominative, that will
be explored and more deeply motivated in the next sections, is that nomi-
native (and likewise accusative case) in German assumes total involvedness.











e −→ totally involved(u)
If the claim that complement types have semantic import is correct, then
rules like this have to be stated for all case forms, subordinate clause types
and prepositional complements.19
In order to eliminate NOM(x) from the DRS in (38–a) we now have to
prove totally involved(x). How can we do that? Suppose the DRS contains
the following meaning postulate:
(40) ∀x.ROLL(x)→ totally involved(x)
Then we could infer from the premise in (40) and the condition ‘ROLL(x)’
given in (38-a) that totally involved(x) holds, by modus ponens.
The last problem to be solved is how to make a postulate like (40) en-
ter the DRS. I am assuming that such postulates are part of general world
knowledge, and I furthermore assume that world knowledge is included in
any DRS. Linguistic communication never takes place in a literally empty
context. The least thing that we have is our knowledge about the world and
our knowledge about lexical items and how to use them to refer to what we
19For PPs this appears to be rather natural, because this would only mean that we have
a semantic lexical entry for lexical prepositions.
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know about the world. I will only represent those world knowledge postulates
that are relevant for the inferences I am looking for. I further assume that
world knowledge postulates need not be inserted in the outermost box of a










We now have two conditions inside the box of e from which we can infer, by
modus ponens, that ‘totally involved(x)’ holds:
(42) ∀y.ROLL(y)→ totally involved(y)
ROLL(x)
... totally involved(x)
This inference allows to add ‘totally involved(x)’ to the DRS box of e in
(41). ‘Nominative elimination’ can take place and (42) is transformed into






This DRS has no more reducible conditions and thus serves as one possible
interpretation of the clause under examination. And we arrived there with the
help of certain inferences, but without the use of subcategorization frames.
It might be impossible to reduce the DRS in (38-b) in the same way.
This would leave the condition NOM(x) in the DRS, and this in turn can be
seen as an incompleted DRS construction. I assume that such a DRS does
not count as a possible interpretation. Under other circumstances a structure
like (38-b) can be more successful. One example in case is the following:
20Kamp & Reyle (1993) propose an own DRS-style representation of universal entail-
ments. However, they also show that it is equivalent to standard formulae of predicate
logic. I am using the latter for ease of representation.
100
CHAPTER 2 2.2 Polyvalent Verbs in DRSs – First Steps
(44) The books are rolling
This example might appear a bit strange, but it might be uttered by a person
who put some books on a cart that suddenly starts to roll away. Let us assume
this possibility, only for the sake of the example.
Let us assume that the basic processes of DRS translation have already
applied and we derived two DRSs parallel to (38), but now with the addition



















For our purposes, contextual knowledge can be treated like world knowledge.
This means that terms of contextual knowledge can be introduced anywhere
as DRS conditions.21 The structure (45-a) can be reduced in the same way
as before. Because the books are rolling, they are totally involved and this
satisfies the reduction condition for ‘nom(x)’. After this reduction the trans-
lation is completed. But the DRS contains the conditions ‘rollable(x)’ and
‘the books(x)’. This is contradictory, strictly speaking. Books usually do not
have the shape to be able to roll. So here we have a well-formed DRS that is
unlikely to represent the correct interpretation for independent reasons.
Structure (45-b) can do better under these circumstances. As an alter-
native to the subject of the clause, ‘the books’, the discourse referent rep-
resenting the cart could be unified with the schematic discourse referent z.
This yields the following DRS:
21Discourse referents that stem from the preceding discourse are necessary for the in-
terpretation of pronominal drop phenomena. German has optional topic-drop, especially
in answers, as in the following dialogue:
(i) A: Was hat Mariai gestern gemacht?
B: ∅i Hat ein Buch gelesen
(A: What did Maria do yesterday?
B: Read a book)
B’s answer can only be interpreted correctly in the context of A’s question.
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A cart is a rollable entity, so in this respect, (46) performs better than (45–a).
But the problem with (38-b) was that the condition ‘nom(x)’ was irreducible.
We have to show that this does not happen with (46). It does not, and the
reason is that it is now possible to infer ‘totally involved(x)’, though in a
quite indirect way. Assume that the following two propositions are part of
world knowledge:
 ∀x,y.(on(x,y) ∧ roll(y)) → move(x)
(“For all x and y, if x is on y and y is rolling, then x is moving”)
 ∀x.move(x) → totally involved(x)
(“for all x and y, if x is moving, then x is totally involved”)









∀x,y.(on(x,y) ∧ roll(y)) → move(x)
∀x.move(x) → totally involved(x)
rollable(y)
Now it is possible to infer ‘totally involved(x)’. We know that x is on y and
that y is rolling. From this follows that x is moving, according to the first
of the two world knowledge postulates. From the second postulates follows
that x is totally involved, because it is moving. ‘NOM(x)’ can be erased. So
we arrive at:
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∀x,y.(on(x,y) ∧ roll(y)) → move(x)
∀x.move(x) → totally involved(x)
rollable(y)
One problem has not been discussed yet. It concerns the application con-
ditions for the rule of nominative reduction. Up to now, it is possible, in
principle, that a world or contextual knowldege condition could satisfy the
condition of total involvedness for a constituent alone. Thus, the condition
‘on(x,y)’ might already be sufficient to eliminate the condition ‘nom(x)’, be-
cause if x is on y, the whole of x is on y, so this might already count as
total involvedness. We surely do not want this, because in this case we might
have a third interpretive option, where the books are on the cart, but not
the cart is rolling, but something else, perhaps a ball. It is clear that this
is an impossible interpretation for the clause ‘the books are rolling’. How-
ever, the condition ‘nom(x)’ could still be reduced, and the DRS would be
well-formed.
In order to avoid this, I want to distinguish between the regular conditions
of a DRS, and those conditions that are introduced only via contextual or
world knowledge.
(49) Regular DRS conditions are DRS conditions that are introduced
by DRS construction rules or (at least partly) inferred from them.
Inferences that introduce regular DRS conditions could be assisted by world
and contextual knowledge conditions, and this is their main purpose, but
conditions that are introduced directly from world or contextual knowledge
or inferred only from such conditions, do not count as regular DRS conditions.
In order to distinguish the two types of DRS conditions, I will put non-regular
conditions in angled brackets. The structure in (48) then looks like this:
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〈 ∀x,y.(on(x,y) ∧ roll(y)) → move(x) 〉
〈 ∀x.move(x) → totally involved(x) 〉
rollable(y)
The conditions ‘move(x)’ and ‘totally involved(x)’ are regular conditions, be-
cause they are inferred from a regular condition, ‘ROLL(y)’. They also have
non-regular conditions in their inference path, but not only, and this is what












e −→ totally involved(u) and
totally involved(u) is a regular DRS condition
With the convention of the angled bracket notation for non-regular conditions
in mind, and given a DRS that contains all regular DRS conditions that can
be derived, the formulation of this rule can be simplified:
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A DRS box of an event e, containing the con-







Let us briefly consider an interpretation that was mentioned above, and has
to be excluded in general. The following DRS represents an impossible inter-
pretation for ‘the books are rolling’:
(53)







〈 ∀x,y.(on(x,y) ∧ roll(y)) → move(x) 〉
〈 ∀x.move(x) → totally involved(x) 〉
rollable(y)
The problem with this DRS was that we might not be able to exclude that the
condition ‘on(x,y)’ entails ‘totally involved(x)’, and thus get a well-formed
DRS insofar as it contains no irreducible conditions. We solved this problem
by distinguishing regular and non-regular DRS conditions. But there might
also be a deeper reason for excluding interpretations of this kind. What the
DRS in (53) says is that a ball is rolling and that the books are on a cart.
The natural intuition about this DRS is that it cannot be the interpretation
for ‘the books are rolling’, because it does not tell us what the books and
the rolling are having to do with each other. It in fact says that they have
nothing to do with each other, and this seems counterintuitive. If this is a
general fact about sentences, then there might exist a general restriction for
possible interpretations, something like a ‘connectedness’ requirement. The
DRS serving as semantic representation for a clause has to contain conditions
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that connect the expressions occuring in the clause. Such a restriction might
become even more important for clauses with more than one predicative
expression, like resultative constructions:
(54) Martha wiped the slate clean
An interpretation where the two predicates in (54–a) introduce individuals
that are not connected would be something like “Martha wiped (something
else) and the slate was or became clean – where the latter has no causal
or other connection to the former”. This appears to be an impossible in-
terpretation. The only interpretation of this sentence is a ‘connected’ one,
paraphrasable as “Martha made the slate clean by wiping it”. Even with two
one-place predicates the resultative has a ‘connected’ interpretation, as in:
(55) The audience laughed the actor off the stage
The interpretation of (55) is not “The audience laughed and the actor went
off the stage”, but rather “The audience made the actor leave the stage
by laughing”. The typical interpretation of resultatives is that the action of
the entity denoted by the subject is a cause for the action (or whatever) of
the entity denoted by the direct object. So even here we have a connection
between the two predicates and between the two individuals – connections,
however, that are obviously established by the construction, not by one of
the predicates.22
Similar observations can be made with any other type of constructions.
It seems to be an indisputable finding that interpretations of sentences are
‘connected’ structures in the sense discussed here.23 So I will assume this as
an acceptability criterion for interpretations of sentences, but will not postu-
late it as an independent rule, but rather let it follow from the mechanisms of
DRS construction and interpretation.24 Our problem here is already partly
solved in the formulation of the reducibility conditions for case information.
By refering to a regular DRS condition triggering deletion of ‘nom(u)’ in (52),
the need for a connection between the discourse referent ‘u’ and the predica-
tive expressions of the clause, first of all the verb – these are represented by
the ‘regular’ DRS conditions –, is established.
22I will discuss the details of the formulation of DRS construction rules for constructions
in the next section. Here I only state the need for such rules, and assume that they can
be formulated.
23Of course, the conjuncts of coordinated sentences have to be treated as single sentences
of their own w.r.t. connectedness.
24We will later return in some detail to this problem. It is much more complicated than
it might seem.
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Let me focus a bit on some theoretical consequences. The main feature of
the proposed analysis that distinguishes it from traditional accounts of the-
matic interpretation is the just illustrated possibility to, so to speak, ‘create’
thematic roles during the interpretation process. The traditional view only
deals with the thematic roles provided by verbs and other predicates within
the clause. For this reason they lack plasticity and can hardly account for
data like (44), repeated here, in an insightful way:
(56) The books are rolling
More traditional approaches would treat this sentence on a par with
(57) The cart is rolling
In both cases, the subject is supposed to be the complement assigned the role
theme, the sole role the verb ‘roll’ assigns under traditional assumptions.
This level of analysis neither tells us what is actually going on with the books
in (56), nor does it tell us what the rolling entity is in the described event.25
25Problems that at first glance might appear similar to the contrast between (56) and
(57) have been discussed as instances of polysemy by Pustejovsky ( 1991a, 1995). His
standard example is
(i) Mary began a novel
This can mean that Mary began either the reading or the writing of a novel. In Puste-
jovsky’s view, this polysemy is located on the complement noun novel in (i). Roughly
speaking, this theory claims that novel is polysemous and has at least the meanings ‘novel’,
‘reading a novel’ and ‘writing a novel’. If we applied this kind of reasoning to our prob-
lem with the rolling books we would have to claim that books is polysemous between the
meanings ‘books’ and ‘cart with books on it’. Such a polysemy might be construable ‘on
the fly’ during discourse. The problem seems to me that while in (i) we really talk about
reading/writing a novel I doubt that we talk about the cart in (56). Consider some even
clearer examples illustrating the same problem:
(ii) a. Mary flew to Paris
b. John drove to Denver
In (ii–a) what is communicated is that Mary moved to Paris, by flying, but it is unim-
portant whether she took a plane or a helicopter, likewise, what is said in (ii–b) is that
John moved to Denver, not his car or the train he took. There is nonetheless the problem
that Mary cannot fly by herself, neither can John drive by himself, but this is only a
problem for a theory that requires that the subject denotes the flying or driving entity.
On the other hand, most theories of thematic interpretation are based on individual the-
matic roles (because the standard assumption is that universal roles are sets of individual
roles). Once again the only solution at hand for such approaches seems to be positing two
different lexical entries for, ‘fly’ as in (ii–a) and as in ‘The plane flew to Paris’ – which
is yet another kind of polysemy solution, again clearly quite ad hoc. Note that it would
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Once we switch to individual roles, however, the problem surfaces: ‘roll’ is
not a verb of transportation, and books cannot roll. The solution requires
inferential mechanisms and a processual view on thematic interpretation.
It is important that we used general world knowledge and contextual
information to infer the role of the individual introduced by ‘the books’ (we
made use of the proposition: “if books are on a cart and the cart is moving,
then the books are moving, too”). Use of world knowledge and contextual
information is one important feature that differentiates this system from
earlier theories of thematic interpretation.
In the subsequent sections, I will turn to some applications which will lead
to further refinements of the approach. The discussion will focus on transitive
constructions.
2.3 Transitive Constructions
A fairly big amount of polyvalence and argument structure alternation phe-
nomena involve transitive constructions:26 The causative alternation is the
alternation between a non-causative intransitive construction and a causa-
tive transitive construction; the locative alternation is an alternation be-
tween two different transitive constructions; the partitive alternation is an
alternation between a transitive construction and a ‘nominative + partitive’
construction; resultative constructions are transitive constructions, passive
constructions are derived from transitive constructions etc.
The standard case of a transitive construction in German is a two-place
verb with a nominative subject and an accusative object, as in:
(58) Hans küßt Maria
‘H. kisses M.’
Let us assume that the verb küssen has two individual thematic roles,
‘kisser’ and ‘kissed’. All transitive clauses with küssen have the subject
linked to kisser and the object to kissed. The traditional subcategoriza-
not be enough to simply posit an underspecified individual role for the subject. The in-
terpretation of (ii–a) has to contain information about the flying entity, even with ‘Mary’
as subject (the sentence would be false, if Mary went to Paris by train), it only need not
be encoded in the subject position. So the role of the flying entity is not underspecified.
Note also that the flying entity can be added in an adjunct phrase, as in:
(iii) Mary flew to Paris with a Zeppelin.
26I use the term ‘transitive construction’ for constructions with an accusative or direct
object.
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tion model for verbs states this as a lexeme-specific linking rule. This is also
an option in the model proposed here. But transitive constructions are also
possible with verbs that have more variation in the realization of their argu-
ments, and my strategy for these verbs is to assume that their behaviour re-
sults from more general principles of complement-argument correspondence.
These principles for transitive constructions have to be explored here.
The general idea is that these principles are semantic. One semantic im-
plication of structural cases is the holism effect that we already made use
of. It will be discussed more broadly in the next section. The notion of ‘per-
spective’ has been associated with the structural cases in earlier work by
Charles Fillmore. I will discuss it and show that it can be quite useful for our
purposes. Another implication that is very often associated with transitive
constructions is causative interpretation. It will also be discussed below.
2.3.1 Transitivity and Thematic Hierarchies
A generalization that has been proposed by Baker (1988) and which was used
by Grimshaw (1990) and others, is the assumption that thematic roles are
hierarchically ordered and that the hierarchy of roles has to match the hier-
archy of cases – a correspondence principle between semantic/conceptual re-
lations and case relations. There are two versions of thematic hierarchies un-
der discussion. Baker’s Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH,
Baker 1988) uses the weaker one. It claims that the linking behavior of verbs
is constant. Whenever we use a certain verb, we link its arguments in the
same way. This is a postulation of a lexeme specific thematic hierarchy.
Grimshaw (1990) argues for a universal thematic hierarchy. She uses a
limited and rather small set of universal thematic roles. All thematic roles
of all verbs are taken from the rather small set of universal thematic roles.
The weaker version of the UTAH, henceforth ‘weak UTAH’, does not have
such a conceptual burden. It can rely solely on individual thematic roles. A
hierarchy of these roles nonetheless has to be part of the lexical entry of the
verb. Grimshaw’s list of universal roles with their ranking is the following
(Grimshaw 1990, 8):
(Agent (Experiencer (Goal/Source/Location (Theme))))
Most characteristic is the prominence of Agent and Experiencer over
the other roles. That Theme is the lowest role, and especially lower than
the Goal/Source/Location role, follows more from Grimshaw’s linking the-
ory, I suspect, than from conceptual reasoning: Linking starts, according to
Grimshaw, with the lowest role and the ‘lowest’ case, which is assumed to be
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the direct object. As Theme is a role that is typically linked to direct objects,
the thematic hierarchy has to be designed this way. Direct objects usually
are the constituents that are syntactically closest to the verb. However, what
it means to be conceptually low or high or close, is far from clear, and we do
not get explications of this from the proponents of thematic hierarchies. The
assumption of a universal thematic hierarchy is a working hypothesis that
has not much independent justification.27
It seems to be a commonplace especially in Cognitive Grammar (Lan-
gacker (1987) and subsequent literature inspired by him) that the concepts
represented by words have a strong correlation to the concepts of perception.
But this, again, is only a working hypothesis and we can be sure that it is
not everything that needs to be said about concepts. The ‘perceptualist re-
ductionism’, as I may call it here, in its simplest form says nothing about the
intentional side of language. How, for example, can the difference between
‘hear’ and ‘listen’ be accounted for with solely perceptual categories?
Furthermore, the lexicon of a natural language is also a product of the
communication processes within the speech community. How can we be sure
that these social factors are less important than individual-psychological and
mental aspects? In fact, we can not be sure, and this is, why I am sceptic
about solely perceptual justifications for universal thematic roles.
An empirical counter-argument against perceptualist reductionism and
universal role hierarchies might be the difference between the verbs ‘buy’
and ‘sell’. The event described by “x bought y from z” could be identical to
the event described by “z sold y to x”. But this in turn would mean that the
participants x, y, and z do the same things in both events. If universal roles
were the only possible thematic roles, and if their ranking was crucial for
the linking between roles and grammatical functions, it should be impossible
to have different linking patterns for ‘buy’ and ‘sell’, because they have the
same set of thematic roles.
The latter, however, could be denied.28 Let us start with the individ-
ual role labels. We can assume that both verbs have roles for a ‘buyer’, a
‘seller’ and a ‘good’. But if we follow Parsons (1995) and assume that
the buyer is the agent of the buying and the seller the agent of the selling,
and if we further prefer to keep universal thematic roles, we have to assume
that both buyer and seller are agents. This is already in conflict with Parsons’
approach, because he claims that a single verb can only have one agent – Par-
sons’ solution was the invention of a different notion of ‘event’, as discussed
in section 1.2.2.
27Perhaps with the exception of the dominant status of the Agent role.
28As Parsons (1995) does, cf. section 1.2.
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Consider an alternative strong UTAH theory that allows for more than
one agent. How would it prevent linking the wrong agents? How would it
ensure that one agent is interpreted as buyer and the other as the seller,
if it is only the universal theta role label that is ‘visible’ to the linking mech-
anism? The problem seems impossible to solve.
Weak UTAH theories have no problem here, because they can define
hierarchies lexeme specifically. It is no contradiction under the weak UTAH
that with ‘buy’ buyer is ‘higher’ than seller, while with ‘sell’ it is the
other way around.
The position of Parsons (1995) at first sight seems to be somewhat in be-
tween of all that. Though he uses the universal labels agent, patient, theme,
goal etc., it is the verb that defines what the agent is. So in fact we can-
not speak of agents as such, but only of agent-of-‘buying’, agent-of-‘selling’,
agent-of-‘eating’ and so on. The universal labels are used to indicate linking
properties: agent-of-V is linked to subject, theme/patient-of-V is linked to
direct object etc. As the determination of agent-hood varies from verb to
verb, this conception can be seen as a notational variant of weak UTAH.
The results should be equivalent. Parsons only encodes verb-specific linking
patterns with universal thematic role labels, but there is nothing universal
in this approach.29
Another problem that should be kept in mind is that semantics is, among
other things, about relations between linguistic expressions, and we would
prefer a theory that provides us with a basis for the following deduction:
∀x, y, z[buy(x, y, z)←→ sell(z, y, x)]
An extremely weak UTAH theory would lead to a very atomic lexicon that
provided no basis for this. What is needed seems to be something that is in
between of the two positions. The theory proposed here uses only individual
roles, and replaces universal role labels with cases and other complement
types and their semantic implications. The linking of a role to a certain case
form can then be seen as resulting from a match of the semantic implications
of the role and the semantic implications of the case form. The following
sections will present some motivation and evidence for semantic implications
of the structural cases and how they will be implemented in the proposed
DRT model.
2.3.2 Transitivity and Perspective
Charles Fillmore’s paper “The Case for Case Reopened” (Fillmore 1977) is
a revision of his theory of cases, or better: ‘deep cases’, proposed in Fillmore
29Cf. the more detailed discussion in section 1.2.
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(1968). The notion of a deep case system only makes sense under the assump-
tion of a ‘deep’ or ‘underlying’ level of syntactic structure, deep structure,
which was also assumed to be the interface level for semantic interpretation.
Fillmore’s ‘deep case system’ can be seen as an early version of a thematic
roles system. To take an example, consider the following active/passive sen-
tence pair:
(59) a. Mary saw John
b. John was seen by Mary
These two sentences have two different surface subjects (i.e. ‘Mary’ in (59–a),
and ‘John’ in (59–b), while they both have ‘Mary’ as the ‘agent’. In the
generative syntax of the late 1960s the deep structure of a clause represents an
early stage in its derivation that holds prior to the application of the passive
transformation. At this stage the two clauses in (59) are identical, likewise
the ‘deep objects’. The notions ‘deep subject’ and ‘deep object’ are, however,
problematic for other reasons (though they are probably indispensable, see
for discussion Anderson 1971, Lasnik 1988, and Steinbach & Vogel 1994), but
we need not go into this here.
According to Fillmore (1977) deep cases are not ordered by a hierarchy
of thematic roles, but by what he calls a perspective. Fillmore claims that
meanings of lexical items are relativized to scenes. What a scene exactly is,
is not that clear, the notion might be understood as equivalent to ‘event’
or ‘situation’ in other semantic systems.30 One example for a scene given
by Fillmore is the ‘commercial event’. It is the event, situation or scene
that is referred to when we use verbs like ‘buy’, ‘sell’, ‘cost’ etc. Fillmore
sometimes also speaks of a scene as the background for a clause.
The assumption that buy and sell refer to the same scene helps to draw
the connection between the two verbs. The semantic difference, however, lies
not in the scene they refer to, but rather in the perspective they offer on that
scene or event. In Fillmore’s words (Fillmore 1977, 72ff):
[. . . ] In the usage that I suggest, any verb identifying any par-
ticular aspect of the commercial event will constrain us to bring
one or more of the entities in the event into perspective, the
manifestation of this choice for English being the selection of
grammatical functions corresponding to the notions of underly-
ing subject and direct object. For example, if I wish to take the
perspective of the seller and the goods, I will use the verb sell.
Should I wish to take the perspective of the buyer and the money,
30In subsequent work, Fillmore replaced the term ‘scene’ with the term ‘frame’.
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I will use the verb spend. [. . . ]
[. . . ] the speaker is required to construct a sentence in which
one of the two or three entities that have been put into perspec-
tive becomes the subject: and, maybe, one becomes the direct
object. The new question for the theory of cases is this: What do
we need to know about the various participant roles in a situation
in order to know which of these roles or which combinations of
them can be put into perspective, and then, for those which have
been put into perspective, which is to become the subject and
which is to become the direct object?
The connection with the notion of scenes can be stated this
way. The study of semantics is the study of the cognitive scenes
that are created or activated by utterances. Whenever a speaker
uses any of the verbs related to the commercial event, for exam-
ple, the entire scene of the commercial event is brought into play
– is “activated” – but the particular word chosen imposes on this
scene a particular perspective. [. . . ]
[. . . ] Any particular verb or other predicating word assumes,
in each use, a given perspective. [. . . ]
[. . . ] whenever we understand a linguistic expression of what-
ever sort, we have simultaneously a background scene and a per-
spective on that scene. Thus, in our examples about buying and
selling, the choice of any particular expression from the repertory
of expressions that activate the commercial event scene brings to
mind the whole scene – the whole commercial event situation –
but presents in the foreground – in perspective – only a particular
aspect or section of that scene. [. . . ]
It is Fillmore’s merit that he introduced the conception of perspectivity
into the case theoretic discussion. But though the paper is about twenty
years old by the time of this writing, ‘perspective’ has been used very rarely
in linguistic explanations. This holds especially of the discourse I am dealing
with here, the discussion about thematic roles, subcategorization and linking
within generative syntax (the situation might be different in theories and
research of lexical fields).
In the ‘mainstream’ of generative syntax, the view formulated in Chom-
sky’s (1981) influential “Lectures on Government and Binding” is still dom-
inant. There the conception of thematic roles and linking is the traditional
one with the usual universal thematic roles. The difference between the verbs
‘buy’ and ‘sell’ in approaches of this kind is expressed by different subcate-
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gorization frames for the two verbs, but the thematic roles are the same; and
thematic roles are all this conception of grammar uses for thematic interpreta-
tion. Not only those linguists who worked within the Chomskian mainstream
took over this view, but also many others who work within alternatives to
the Chomskian program, most prominently among them perhaps LFG and
HPSG.31
One problem certainly is that Fillmore introduced ‘perspective’ quite in-
formally: it might not be easy to integrate it into what I developed here thus
far. The reason why I nevertheless will try to do so is that I am convinced
that Fillmore’s argument is basically correct and brings us one step forward.
2.3.3 How Perspective can be Integrated into DRSs
The interpretation of the term ‘perspective’ that I will assume here is the
following: when we describe an event linguistically we do not just tell what
kind of event it was and who participated, but we also put structure into
our description, we put some participants into the foreground, others into
the background. Lexical items can sometimes only be distinguished by the
perspectives they offer. The perspective might not be truth conditionally
relevant, but it is essential for the way we encode content linguistically.
Fillmore’s original proposal is that the perspective divides the partici-
pants in a scene into two subsets: those that are in perspective, and the
others. Furthermore, the participants in perspective are also ranked. If x and
y are brought into perspective by a verb, then the perspective goes either
from x to y or vice versa. This means that the higher one is subject and
the lower one direct object. There cannot be more than two participants in
perspective.
This conception of perspective can be integrated into the DRT based
theory of thematic interpretation I am advocating. As perspective orders the
discourse referents of a DRS, we shall view it as a strict partial order on
the concept’s set of discourse referents. The perspective of a concept then
is a subset of the discourse referents. In a transitive clause with nominative
and accusative we just have an ordered pair. But consider a sentence with
an ECM-construction like the German ‘Accusativus cum Infinitivo’ (AcI)
construction:
31It is interesting that Jackendoff (1990b), in addition to verb specific linking rules
introduced a so-called ‘action tier’ that is especially designed to deal with transitive con-
structions and express their meta-lexical regularities. This ‘action tier’ can be seen as a
kind of hidden implementation of ‘perspective’. The same holds for the ‘aspectual tier’ of
Tenny (1989, 1994) used also by Grimshaw (1990).
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‘Maria saw the children paint pictures’
In this case the perspective contains three discourse referents. Sentences with
only a subject and no direct object have only one element included in their
perspective. We need a way to indicate the perspective in the DRS. A direct
way to do that is the introduction of a special DRS condition, expressing the
perspective as a property of the event introduced by the respective clause,
as in the following example:
(61) John brought the child to school






per: x  y
The introduction of perspective is an enrichment of the structure of concep-
tual representations that I assume.
2.3.4 The Relation Between the Perspectives of
Verbs and Clauses
The focus of the discussion was thus far the introduction of a perspective via
the structural cases. However, we also discussed perspective as a property
of single lexical items as in the ‘buy/sell’ case analyzed by Fillmore. But
we have not addressed yet the question how these kinds of perspective are
related, especially: what happens to the perspective of the verb, when its
schematic DRS is integrated into the clause?
I will indicate the perspective of schematic DRSs with underlining. Let
us take a look at the schematic DRS of the verb bring again:
(62)
e x y z
e:
BRING(x,y,z)
per: x  y
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To get used to the problem that needs to be solved, consider the following
pair of an active and a passive clause:
(63) a. Eve bought the book from Harry
b. The book was bought from Harry by Eve
If we assume that the perspective of a schematic DRS enters the DRS of the
clause in the same way as its other conditions, we get the following two DRS
representations for the two clauses (leaving out further details about the case
information for now) – the assumption that buy has the perspective agent 
theme follows the argumentation in Fillmore (1977):
(64) ad (63–a): ad (63–b):






per: x  y
per: x  y







per: x  y
Though the same verb is used, the perspectives of active and passive clauses
with this verb are different. Assuming that per and per had to match exactly
would exclude passive and many other modes of morpho-syntactic realization
of the verb and its arguments. So this restriction would be too strong.
On the other hand, this does not mean that the relation between the two
perspectives is unconstrained. There is one theoretically possible option that
does not seem to be realized in the natural languages throughout the world.
This is the possibility of a reversal of the verb’s perspective. Thus, if a verb
contains a perspective ‘per: x  y’, there does not seem to be a language in
the world that has a mode of morphosyntactic realization of verbs such that
the perspective of a clause with the respective verb would be ‘per: y  x’.
We might formulate this as a well-formedness constraint on DRSs:
(65) Restriction on the Perspectives of DRSs
A DRS of an event that contains perspectives with contradictory
rankings of discourse referents is ill-formed.
Though the concepts of ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ differ in per, they can be identical in
per, e.g., when we use passive voice:
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(66) a. The book was bought from Harry by Eve
b. The book was sold to Eve by Harry
(67) ad (66–a): ad (66–b):







per: x  y







per: z  y
This follows also from Fillmore’s account of perspective, as long as verb
perspective and sentence perspective are not considered as perspectives ‘of
a different type’, and thus uncomparable. But note that this also depends
on a neutral analysis of the passive by-phrase. As soon as this phrase gets
a special status, which it does in some theories of passive, this status might
be reflected in the DRS and might thereby create a perspectival difference
between the two clauses. I will not discuss this problem here, however, as
passive is not the kind of diathesis that belongs to the phenomena grouped
under the term ‘polyvalence’.
We will now turn to some empirical issues and discuss transitive construc-
tions with the polyvalent German verbs rollen (‘roll’) and schlagen(‘beat’).
We will see very soon that we need a more elaborated semantic account of
accusative and nominative case. The effects of these cases are not always
reducible to perspective.
2.3.5 ‘Pure’ Transitive Constructions32
Schlagen might be easier than rollen, because it is semantically a two-place
verb, and transitive constructions are also two-place. So one might guess
that in the simplest use of schlagen there is a homomorphic correspondence
between semantic and syntactic arity. This is an illusion, as we will see. But
let me start with a formulation of the concept of schlagen. I assume that
the concept German speakers have in mind when they use the word schlagen
is a scene where a.o. one entity (I call it ‘M’ for ‘moving’) moves towards
another entity (I call it ‘S’ for ‘still standing’) with a certain speed, and with
32By ‘pure’ transitive constructions I mean German clauses of the form:
NP-nom+Verb+NP-acc, without further constituents.
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a final contact that actually is the event of schlagen, usually accompanied
by a characteristic sound. We have a scenario consisting of two parts, that
together form the concept of schlagen:




A simplified version of the concept of schlagen might look like this (leaving
out perspective for the moment):
(69)






The condition ‘e′ > e’ says that e′ precedes e. This might be an incomplete
and informal notation, but it contains all we need here. The perspective has
not been added yet. Whether there is one or not, is also an empirical issue.
One method to find out whether schlagen contains a perspective or not is
to look out for transitive clauses with the two roles realized as subject and

















die Wand / das Kind / den Esel











d. *Die Wand / das Kind / der Esel







The examples in (70-c+d) look worse than the first ones, though they are
all unacceptable under literal interpretations. It seems totally impossible to
realize S as subject and M as accusative object. This might be a hint that
the schematic DRS in (69) contains the perspective ‘x  y’.
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I will assume that this is the case. The sentences in (70-a+b) are accept-
able under a sort of ‘fairy-tale’ interpretation, if the stone and the stick are
assumed to be animate conscious beings. Transitive sentences with schlagen











But here the child cannot be identified with the moving entity M. Rather,
M has to be the child’s hand or some instrument. So this is not the case we
are looking for yet. As noted above, we may have some empirical reason to
assume that schlagen has a perspective from the individual with role M to
the individual with role S. But this does not seem to be enough to justify a
transitive construction. Else the sentences in (70) would be fine.
What is wrong with these sentences? The use of a transitive construction
with a polyvalent verb seems to imply more than just a certain perspective.
How can this ‘more’ be described?
First of all, let me emphasize that we are not looking for the semantics
of transitive constructions as such. As developed in the first chapter of this
thesis, I only expect such generalizations to work with verbs that are not of
a semi-idiomatic character. The systematicity is assumed to hold with verbs
that vary in the way their arguments are realized – the underlying assumption
being that in these cases the variations follow more general regularities. Verbs
that only occur in transitive constructions may conform to these regularities.
But they could as likely be semi-idioms.33
That cases and/or constructions have their own characterizable semantic
properties, is not at all a new proposal. There has been much debate about
this, and I will discuss some proposals about transitive constructions and
especially accusative case that focus on different aspects that all might be
relevant here. The property of transitive constructions that is responsible for
the oddity of the examples in (71) is that subjects and direct objects have
‘holistic readings’. This will be the issue of the next section.
33I assume something like a blocking mechanism. We have a system of general inter-
pretation rules that usually apply, but are blocked by a verb with a lexical entry that
specifies the interpretation and argument linking. This is parallel to verb inflection rules.
Most English verbs are inflected regularly, the participle and the past tense forms are built
by adding -ed to the stem, as in walk, walk-ed, walk-ed. This rule need not be specified for
all verbs. It is assumed to be a general rule holding of all verbs. Only the exceptions to
this rule have to be fixed in individual lexical entries, as for go, went, gone.
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2.3.6 The Holism Effect
The effect to be discussed here can be traced back at least to Anderson
(1971). This paper is a reaction to Fillmore’s (1968) ‘The Case For Case’.
The debate was about the following contrasts with locative alternation verbs:
(72) a. John smeared paint on the wall
b. John smeared the wall with paint
(73) a. Bees are swarming in the garden
b. The garden swarms with bees
Anderson’s observation was that the two sentences in (72) and (73) differ
not just in their surface structure, but also in their meanings. The latter in a
systematic way: the entities represented by the direct object in (72–b) and by
the subject in (73–b) are considered as totally affected by the action, while
this is not the case, when the same arguments are realized as prepositional
phrases, as in the respective a.-sentences.
In the event referred to by (72–a) only part of the wall gets smeared,
while the preferred reading for (72–b) is that the wall gets smeared as a
whole. Likewise, in (73–a) part of the garden swarms with bees, while it is
the whole garden in the event referred to by (73–b).
Anderson refers to these two readings as ‘holistic’ and ‘partitive’. His
claim is that the holistic reading corresponds with the syntactic position of
subject and direct object, while the partitive reading corresponds with the
realization as prepositional phrase.
There is, however, one objection to make that shows that this empirical
generalization is not quite correct. The crucial example is (72–b). Accord-
ing to the generalization, the paint gets a holistic reading in (72–a), and a
partitive one in (72–b). The use of an indefinite mass term makes it hard to
decide this here, so I replace ‘paint’ with ‘the paint’:
(74) a. John smeared the paint on the wall
b. John smeared the wall with the paint
It is clear that the whole paint gets on the wall in (74–a), but is (74–b) really
different in this respect? It is not. The whole paint could get on the wall in
(74–b), too. So we have two additional insights:
i. The holistic reading is not exclusive for the structural cases
ii. The partitive reading does not have to occur with all prepositions
I conclude that partitive readings are invoked by specific prepositions like
‘in’, ‘on’, ‘at’ etc., thus, these readings are genuine lexical properties. Holistic
120
CHAPTER 2 2.3 Transitive Constructions
readings can be seen as a kind of default: unless an indicator of partitivity
(i.e. a specific preposition) is used, an individual is considered to be involved
as a whole. This is on the one hand independent of the use of specific case
forms. On the other hand, it follows from this that individuals introduced
by nominative and accusative complements are involved as a whole. And
this can be part of our DRS translation rules for the structural cases. I have
already introduced this rule in the introductory parts of this chapter, the




A DRS box of an event e, containing the con-







Remember that the basic idea was that case information enters the DRS,
but has to be eliminated to yield a well-formed DRS. One condition for this
elimination to apply is total involvedness. I.e., a DRS is only well-formed if
the discourse referent referred to by a nominative marked constituent has
what Anderson (1971) called a ‘holistic reading’. This must be entailed by
the other conditions of the DRS.
The parallel situation holds for accusative case or direct objects, respec-
tively:
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A DRS box of an event e, containing the con-







How can this help to solve the problems we have with (70)? As a starting
point, let us assume that the individual role of schlagen that I called S does
not entail total involvement, but only partial involvement. We may add the
condition ‘partially involved(y)’ to the schematic DRS of schlagen in (69):
(77)







As a conceptual justification for this assumption might serve the fact that
the kind of involvement for the touched entity in a schlagen event is similar
to relations expressed by the partial prepositions ‘on’ and ‘at’. When three-
dimensional objects contact, it is only one side, e.g., their front sides that
contact, but then necessarily other sides, e.g., their back sides, do not contact.
The movement of M, however, holds of M as a whole, so while S is only
partially involved, M is totally involved. So (77) can again be modified:
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(78)








Total involvedness is crucial for nominative and accusative elimination, as
defined in (75) and (76). If the schematic discourse referent of the role M,
x in (78), is unified with the discourse referent introduced by the subject
or the direct object of the clause, then nominative or accusative elimination
can occur and we might yield a well-formed DRS. The same is not possible
for the role S and its schematic discourse referent y, because this role does
not entail total involvedness. The prediction that follows from this is that
transitive constructions with schlagen are odd, if subject and direct object
directly realise the individual roles M and S. This explains the oddity of the
examples in (70).34
We see that a lexically specified perspective alone does not license a transi-
tive construction. Total involvedness is needed in addition. Total involvedness
is more crucial than perspective. Remember that the only restriction induced
by a lexically specified perspective is that the perspective of the DRS of the
clause may not contradict the perspectival hierarchy given by the schematic
34Terms like ‘totally involved’ are explications of conceptual knowledge about actions
referred to by the verb schlagen. This might look like an ad hoc method, but lexical
knowledge is often arbitrary. The guidance that we have is the quest for consistency, and
our commonsense intuition about what a verb means. On the other hand, commonsense
reasoning and knowledge about the world might be a better method than the inven-
tion of conceptual categories like universal thematic roles and conceptual primes. World
knowledge is accessible and transparent, it is shared by the speech community. But the
conceptual categories ‘invented’ by linguists are quite opaque. We do not know for sure
that they exist, and in doing linguistic analyses we would not only have to account for the
data, but also prove thereby the existence of the conceptual categories and, even more,
find out their exact definitions. I cannot see how one can do all of this and at the same
time avoid circularity in defining conceptual categories. Ladusaw & Dowty (1988) show for
a different empirical area – the control properties of infinitival purpose clauses, infinitival
relative clauses and inifinitival embedded questions – how an explanation formulated in
terms of universal thematic roles can be replaced by an account based on commonsense
reasoning. They also show that the latter account is empirically superior to the thematic
role account.
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DRS of the verb. Thus, it is possible that the lexical perspective is completely
ignored in a clause. The restriction on total involvedness has to be obeyed.
There are, however, well-formed transitive constructions with schlagen
that at first sight seem to realise both M and S as structural cases, contra-
dicting what we just said. It is crucial for such examples, whether subject






































The examples in (79) vary in the animacy of subject and object. Only (79–a),
the example with two animate NPs, is well-formed. At first sight, one might
assume that Maria has role M and the dog role S in the event described
by (79–a). But if we had to be precise, we would speak of body parts. It is
presumably Maria’s hand, or even some instrument, that has role M, and it
is not the whole dog, but only a body part of it, that receives the hit – this
reflects the partial involvedness of role S.
An intentionally acting being is not required in subject position in general,
but only in the transitive construction, cf. the well-formedness of the following















‘Marias hand hit against the head of the dog’
The total involvedness of M licenses its linking to the subject position. (79-a)











‘Marias hand hit the dog’
This clause would be acceptable under a kind of fairy-tale reading, where the
hand is conceived as an animate intentional being. This intentional being is
the intentional performer or causer of the action. This interpretation seems
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necessary, but only for the sake of the object, not the subject itself.
The first thing we can say is the following: The interpretive difference
between (79-a) and the other sentences on the side of the subject is that
the individual introduced by the subject does not receive any role of the
schlagen-scheme. Rather, this individual performs or causes the action. The
individual carrying role M is presumably Maria’s hand or some instrument,
both of which are not included in the DRS of the clause yet.
Let us now have a look at the direct object. The difference between (79-a)
and (79-b) seems to be more subtle. But it obviously seems to play a role
whether the individual carrying role S is able to experience the whack, and
recognize that it was performed by someone. Such a whack can be interpreted
as an interaction that is more than just the physical action: it is a kind of
social interaction, an act of punishment. A punished individual, however, is
punished as a whole, and it does not matter that the whack only was against
one part of his/her body. So in this situation the individual with role S can
be considered as totally involved in the sense described above.



































The child hit the dog on its head
The only difference between the two clauses is the case of the object. In (82–a)
the object has accusative, and in (82–b) dative. There is a subtle interpretive
difference: while (82–a) implies that the child intentionally hit the dog, (82–b)
can be true of a situation, where the child hit the dog by accident. (82–a)
describes an action that is directed against the dog, an act of punishment, for
example. This act of punishment is directed against the dog as a whole. Thus,
the dog is totally involved, not by the schlagen action as such, but because
the child intends to punish it by performing this action. Let us assume a
world knowledge condition that formulates this, in the following way: “if z
(intentionally) performs SCHLAG(x,y) and z and y are both animate, then
z performs a violent act, in short an act of punishment, against y”:
(83) ∀x,y,z.PERFORM(z,SCHLAG(x,y)) ∧ animate(z) ∧ animate(y) −→
PUNISH(z,y)
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The predicate ‘PERFORM’ stands for intentional and volitional causation. I
use ‘PUNISH’ as a cover term for any intentionally aggressive act against a
living being. The following world knowledge condition is needed in addition
to derive total involvedness of the punished individual:
(84) ∀x,y.PUNISH(x,y) −→ totally involved(y)
Let us now try to derive the DRS for (79-a), repeated here:
(85) Maria schlug den Hund
‘M.-nom beat the dog-acc’








The DRS translation of (85) is straightforward, given the rules we have es-
tablished thus far: subject and object introduce their referents and case con-
ditions, we add some entailments about animacy that can be inferred and
which are needed. The perspective is also straightforward. The verb intro-
duces its schematic DRS into the conditions set of the event variable of the
clause:
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(87)
















As pointed out above, we need to interpret Maria as the intentional performer
of the action in order to get an interpretation of total involvedness for the ac-
cusative object ‘den Hund’ and reduce ‘acc(y)’. This condition cannot stem
from the verb itself, rather, it must stem from the transitive construction.
Let us assume the performer interpretation as an interpretative option, thus,
the following DRS translation rule for transitive clauses is optional :35
35I assume that the NP nodes have already been reduced by the respective DRS con-
struction rules proposed by Kamp & Reyle (1993) – with the exception of case information.
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(88)
Performer Interpretation of subjects of transitive clauses
Triggering
configuration

















Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
for the verb α
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u), acc(v)
per: u  v
schematic DRS e of the verb α
PERFORM(u,e)
Substitute in γ: e for [V α ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
This rule should be embedded in the general DRS construction rules for the
several noun types and the verb. The only crucial addition is the optional
introduction of the condition ‘perform(u,e)’. Suppose that we did apply this
construction rule and added the condition, and also the two world knowledge
postulates discussed above. We then yield the following DRS:
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(89)

















〈∀x,y,z.PERFORM(x,SCHLAG(x,y)) ∧ animate(z) ∧
animate(y) −→ PUNISH(z,y) 〉
〈∀x,y.PUNISH(x,y) −→ totally involved(y) 〉
Performing an action entails total involvedness, so ‘nom(x)’ can be erased.
Further world knowledge reasoning lets us interpret Maria’s hand as a plau-
sible ‘instrument’ of the hitting, and the dog as its target, and we make the
appropriate variable unifications:
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(90)

















〈 ∀x,y,z.PERFORM(x,SCHLAG(x,y)) ∧ animate(z) ∧
animate(y) −→ PUNISH(z,y) 〉
〈 ∀x,y.PUNISH(x,y) −→ totally involved(y) 〉
The event box now entails that x is performing a SCHLAG action that has
y as its target. As both x and y are animate the conditions of the first world
knowledge postulate at the bottom of the DRS box are fulfilled and we thus
can conclude that x is punishing y, which in turn entails that y is totally in-
volved, as given in the second world knowledge postulate. This now allows us
to erase ‘acc(y)’ from the DRS and we thus end up with only non-reducible
conditions. Leaving out the conditions representing selectional restrictions
and world knowledge, we arrive at the following DRS that represents the
interpretation we wanted to derive:
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(91)








We see that the intended interpretation can be derived by the given mech-
anism. There might be other interpretations that are also derivable. This
is no danger, as long as the above interpretation can be shown to be the
most plausible or optimal one, given an independently formulated evaluation
method that is not the topic of our discussion here. The crucial additional
assumption that was necessary to derive (91) was the introduction of a con-
struction specific DRS construction rule. (88) is a DRS implementation of a
construction grammar type interpretation rule. A causative interpretation is
a kind of default interpretation for transitive clauses, whenever we have no
lexical information of the verb available to assign thematic roles. This obser-
vation has been made by many researchers from very different frameworks.
I will make use of the according generalizations, which will be elaborated in
more detail in the next section.
2.3.7 Transitivization and Causativization
One type of data that interest us in this section are transitive alternations
with a special class of intransitive verbs, often called ‘ergative’ or ‘unac-
cusative’ verbs (cf. e.g Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995). The following verbs
can be used intransitively and transitively, where the subject of the intran-
sitive clause becomes the object of the transitive clause:
(92) a. The window broke
The bell rang
The ice melted
b. John broke the window
Mary rang the bell
Petula melted the ice
In these alternations, the transitive versions always receive a causative in-
terpretation. This is a very robust generalization that holds of all verbs of
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this kind in English, and in German, too. This might justify a general con-
struction specific rule specifying that transitive variants of intransitive verbs
receive a causative interpretation. On the other hand, not all transitive con-
structions are causative constructions, so we would also be well-advised to
make our rule not too general. The relevant situation where this interpreta-
tion shows up most regularly is, it seems, a situation where we have to infer
a thematic interpretation for the subject, because there is no thematic role
left over for it by the predicates of the clause.
Assume that all verbs in (92) have only one individual thematic role: the
breaking, ringing or melting entity. If this role is already linked to the direct
object, we have no role left for the subject, and must infer its thematic in-
terpretation. The use of a general rule like the assumed ‘causativization rule’
can be restricted to situations like these: If we have a transitive construction
with a one-place action verb the single role of which is linked to direct object,
then the subject is interpreted as the causer of the action. In the last section,
I introduced the rule (88) for the ‘performer interpretation’ of the subject.
The application of this rule is optional.
The optionality of the insertion of ‘perform(u,e)’ might already serve
our purpose. The causative interpretation can apply, but it need not nec-
essarily do so. However, it’s application can only be avoided if there is an
alternative way to get a thematic interpretation for the subject. This alter-
native might block the application of (88). There are two scenarios we can
think of:
i. the verb has a subcategorization frame and fixes the thematic role of the
subject in its lexical entry
ii. the verb has enough thematic roles left over for the subject, and one of
them is fine
Given that one of these situations holds and we nonetheless introduced
‘perform(u,e)’, there are again two possibilities:
i. ‘perform(u,e)’ contradicts the thematic role information already given
for the subject, we get an ill-formed DRS, but this does not matter,
because the insertion of the condition is not obligatory, there is a well-
formed alternative DRS without this condition
ii. the DRS is well-formed even with this additional condition, although it
would also be well-formed without it.
In the latter case ‘perform(u,e)’ would either be redundant, because it
is already entailed by the subject theta role, which means that the two DRSs
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are notational variants – everything else being equal –, or it would be true
additional information. Only in the second situation has the DRS with the
additional condition a chance of representing the optimal interpretation of the
clause. But nonetheless, this DRS is still more complex than the DRS without
the condition, and thus would only be preferred over the simpler one under
specific (contextual) circumstances. This seems to be an acceptable result.
The details of the evaluation of alternative interpretations have to be worked
out, but we can be sure that contradiction, complexity and redundancy are
core criteria for preferring one DRS over another.
As it stands, (92) seems to imply that any intransitive verb can be
causativized. However, the rule is less productive, and there are differences
between languages, as the following comparison between English and German
shows:
(93) a. John walked the dog
b. The officer marched the soldiers
c. Anne jumped the horse
d. *The clown laughed the audience
e. *Yoko crawled John
(94) a. *John lief den Hund
b. *Der Offizier marschierte die Soldaten
c. *Anne sprang das Pferd
d. *Der Clown lachte das Publikum
e. *Yoko kroch John
One explanation could be that English speakers consider an action already
as caused by a person x, if it was only ordered qua authority by x, while Ger-
man speakers think about causation more physically. The causer has to be
the ‘real’ force of the action, not just the one who ordered it. One way to rep-
resent this difference could be that for the German verbs ‘lachen’, ‘kriechen’,
‘marschieren’ and similar verbs that describe ‘self-enforced actions’ – i.e.
actions the performer of which is also necessarily their force – it is impossi-
ble to integrate them into a causative construction as causee, for example:
∀x, y[(x = KRIECHEN(y)) −→ ¬∃z(CAUSE(z, x))]
This assumes a narrow, physical conception of CAUSE. The English CAUSE
however, as used in the transitive clauses above, seems to be a broader one
that includes being ordered by an authority. Such differences should be al-
lowed. There is no need to assume that the meanings of linguistic elements
are universal, not even the meanings of cases or constructions. An alternative
version could assume a universal physical conception for CAUSE and broaden
the English rule for the transitive constructions, such that the subject could
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be the causer or the ‘orderer’.
It could also be the case that the well-formed examples in (93) are in-
stances of conventionalization. Consider that John can walk the dog, but
he cannot run the dog, likewise the officer can march the soldiers, but he
cannot crawl them. If this were the case, then English and German could be
seen as not very different in this respect, and the ‘exceptions’ in (93) would
be treated as idiomatic expressions that fall out of the scope of the theory
anyway.
(93) captures the cases we have been dealing with up to now. It is a
good starting point. The phenomenon of causativization nonetheless has a
broader range and the rule might need some additions to include a broader
range of data. One such addition might be required for inanimate subjects. A
performer was conceived as a volitional and sentient performer, but neither













Wind can cause a rolling, though neither volitionally, nor with sentience. So
another condition that could optionally be added to the DRS of a transi-
tive construction might be something like ‘CAUSE(u,e)’, where CAUSE is
understood in a very neutral sense.
The next step of generalization is not to limit the application of the rule
to sentences with only one predicate. Resultative constructions also receive
a causative interpretation. But they contain involve two predicates, a verb
and a resultative co-predicate, mostly a prepositional phrase or an adjective.
This co-predicate usually predicates over the direct object. So it does not











we again get a causative interpretation. But here it is important to observe
that in addition to the causative relation between subject and verb, there is
a causative relation between verb and co-predicate. There are many compli-
cations to consider in constructions with co-predicates, I will examine them
in the next section in detail.
The accusative object also requires closer inspection. It is easy to find
examples, where the object needs a thematic role by some inferential mech-
anism, either because of the absence of thematic information, or because we
have to choose between several possibilities. The latter is especially frequent
in the case of schlagen. We already saw that transitive constructions with
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schlagen are well-formed with two animate subjects, as in:
(97) Das Kind schlug den Hund
However, the only thematic role of schlagen that can be linked to the dog,
is the role of the still-standing entity, S, not the role of the moving entity,
M. Why is this so, and how can we account for it? Likewise, the verb rollen
varies in the assignment of its only thematic role, the rolling entity R, in



























All of this requires explanation and elaboration. Let us first have a look
at (97). Why can this clause not have the interpretation that the dog was
beaten or hit against some x by the child? Why, on the other hand, is the
interpretation possible that the child beats the dog with some x? What makes
the crucial difference between these two readings?
One obvious difference between the two readings is that under the valid
interpretation (‘dog’=S) we get an interpretation for the missing individual
M, or, at least, we have a rather small range of possibilities: M is either
the child’s hand, or some instrument that the child holds in her hand. In
the other case, where the dog is interpreted as M, we have no such hints, S
could be nearly anything. Without a narrower description of the situational
context, this individual is totally unspecified.
I assume that this lack of narrower specifications for the missing individ-
ual is the crucial point here. About the missing S under the M-interpretation
for the dog we know nearly nothing, about the missing M under the S-
interpretation for the dog we have a default interpretation, and a quite spe-
cific description for alternatives. Either it is the child’s hand, or an instrument
like a stick or something similar. For the ‘M=the child’s hand’ interpretation,
it is even unusual to mention the hand explicitly in the clause. The following
clause seems slightly strange, because it contains redundant information:
(99) ?Das Kind schlug den Hund mit seiner Hand
‘The child-nom beat the dog-acc with its hand’
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Though it need not necessarily be the hand that the child beats with, the
latter is so likely that explicit mention of the hand seems superfluous. If this
is lexical knowledge, it is not of the usual kind, because it does not determine
a certain value, but only its probability. The deduction rule could look like
this:
(100) ∀xyz [ (CAUSE(x, SCHLAGEN(y,z)) ∧ animate(x) ∧ animate(y))
−→ hand of(y,x) ]
Note that this should be considered a default rule. If we have no other infor-
mation, then y is the hand of x. The hand is the most likely interpretation,
but not the only one possible. Be this as it may. Something like (100) must
be part of our conceptual knowledge of schlagen.
But maybe this rule itself is already derived from something underlying.
The hand is likely to be M, but because of another conceptual considera-
tion. This consideration could be about the ways in which someone can be
the causer of a beat/whack. Of course, there might be infinitely many ways
of causing a whack. But the CAUSE we use in our inference rules here is
obviously of a more specific kind, not only in the example discussed here.
Consider a clause like ‘Mary rolled the ball’. The interpretation is that Mary
caused the rolling of the ball, but this causation is very direct, unmediated.
That the causation scheme used in conceptual interpretation very often is
direct causation, not any causation, has been observed by various researchers,
cf. for example Wunderlich (1992, 1997).
I will use the predicate ‘d-CAUSE’ for direct causation henceforth. When-
ever I made use of CAUSE before, this term has to be considered as identical
with d-CAUSE. Especially in the interpretation of transitive constructions,
it seems to be not only causation, but rather d -causation that is relevant.
There is a difference between causation of a beat/whack in general, and
its direct causation. Though a beat can be caused in arbitrarily many ways,
its direct causation by a person is only possible if that person uses her hand.
Either she holds something in her hand that she beats with, or it is the hand
itself that performs role M of the concept of schlagen. So I will replace rule
(100) with the following:
(101) ∀xyz [ (d-CAUSE(x, schlagen(y,z)) ∧ animate(x) ∧ animate(y))
−→ (hand of(y,x) ∨ in hand of(y,x)) ]
That the hand is the default interpretation, might result from the fact that
the hand is always there: when we have a person that is assumed to d-
CAUSE the beat, we also have her hand. But we do not necessarily have
an instrument. This explains the fact illustrated in (100). It might even be
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possible that rule (101) is explainable by a further conceptual constraint that
describes the role that hands play for primates. But we might as well stop
here, because (101) is detailed enough to fulfil its task in the explanation of
the discussed phenomenon.
The reasoning that we use to explain how the accusative object in (97)
receives the role S and how role M is assigned has already been introduced
above. Are there situations, in which the role of the subject is fixed and the
role of the object has to be inferred?
The answer is ‘yes’ and some examples in case with rollen have already
been given in (98). They are repeated here for convenience:
(102) a. Maria rollte einen Braten
‘M. rolled a roast’ = “M. collared a roast”
b. Der Ball rollte eine acht
‘The ball rolled an eight’
Which roles do we assign to the roast and the eight? In the case of the roast
we can speak of creation. Before the rolling we only have a piece of meat,
afterwards we have a collared roast. At least, this is the interpretation for
the German example. I do not know whether this is the case for the given
English translation. The role of the eight in (102) is that it is ‘performed’ by
the ball. The word acht may describe a specific kind of motion path. These
interpretations might be combinable under the term ‘creation’. If creation of
something means causing its existence and if an action exists only when it is
performed, or the kind of motion path introduced by ‘eight’ exists only when
it is passed along, then we might say that performing an action or describing
an eight in a motion path means ‘creating’ it. If this sounds too mysterious,
we could as well write down different rules for different ontological types (i.e.
‘actions’, ‘paths’ and ‘things’).
Again, this creative interpretation is optional. It can be added to the
other optional conditions in our DRS construction rule that by now turns
into a rule for the transitive construction. Let me sum up what we have:
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(103)
DRS construction rule for transitive constructions
Triggering
configuration

















Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
for the verb α
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u),acc(v)
per: u  v





Substitute in γ: e for [V α ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
The interpretations of the two accusative objects in (102) follow directly from
(103). The eight is being ‘created’ by the rolling ball, and the roast is being
created by Maria. What is missing in the second case is the rolling entity. It
is neither the roast nor Maria. Rather, it is the meat that is to become the
roast by virtue of Maria’s ‘rolling’ it. How do we arrive there? Again, this
is an instance of general conceptual reasoning. We know that roasts do not
come into being by themselves, rather they are created. From the causative
interpretation of the subject according to (103) it already follows that Maria
causes that the roast ‘comes into being’. Furthermore, it is part of our general
knowledge, how roasts come into being. One way is to ‘roll’ meat yielding a
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collared roast. So this leads to an acceptable conceptual interpretation.
Other interpretations might be possible with a different rolling entity.
Such a concept would be less optimal than the one developed before, because
it has at least one more individual. An entity in question could be something
that Maria uses in order to create the roast. E.g., something she rolls over
the meat. While this does not seem to be very reasonable in the case of a









The instrument Maria uses is a rolling pin. Again, the rolling is conceived as
part of the creation of the dough. But the boundary between creation and











In this second case we assume that the dough already exists, and is only being
transformed. The separable prefix aus serves as a secondary predicate that
gives us a thematic interpretation for the direct object, the addition of the
condition ‘create(e,v)’ would yield a contradiction: an event of creation of
x presupposes non-existence of x before the event, the particle ‘aus’ expresses
a change of state here, which presupposes a different state before the event
and thereby existence.36
The creation interpretation for direct objects without a thematic role
asigned by the verb is quite frequent. When we have a direct object the
thematic interpretation of which is not clear, we have two strategies: First,






strings-acc (i.e. ‘It’s pouring’)
Here the noun describes the shape of the rain coming down. The other strat-
egy is a default interpretation that I circumscribed as ‘come into being’. No
third alternative seems possible. Consider again sentence (102-b). What else
could happen to the eight besides that it is the action being performed or
path being followed? It could be the creation of an eight, if ‘eight’ is under-
stood as a special kind of a street, but if the eight already existed, what could
happen to it by the rolling then, if we exclude everything that might be deriv-
able from the concept of rolling? It seems impossible to figure out anything.
36How secondary predicates combine with verbs will be discussed in the next section.
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Everything more specific than the predication of mere creation requires ad-
ditional information as would be given, e.g., by a secondary predicate. This
will be the topic of the next section.
2.4 Transitive Constructions with two Pred-
icates
The addition of a secondary or co-predicate can have a crucial effect on the
acceptability of a clause. In the discussion of pure transitive clauses with
schlagen we noticed that the following examples are odd:
(107) a. *Der Stein schlug das Fenster
‘the stone-nom hit the window-acc’
b. *Der Stock schlug die Wand
‘the stick-nom hit the wall-acc’
c. *Das Kind schlug den Stock
‘the child-nom hit the stick-acc’
d. *Maria schlug den Hammer
‘M.-nom hit the stick-acc
These examples are fine with an appropriate co-predicate:
(108) a. Der Stein schlug das Fenster kaputt
‘the stone-nom hit the window-acc’ broken
b. Der Stock schlug die Wand kaputt
‘the stick-nom hit the wall-acc broken’
c. Das Kind schlug den Stock entzwei
‘the child-nom hit the stick-acc in two’
d. Maria schlug den Hammer entzwei
‘M.-nom hit the hammer-acc in two’
The co-predicates obviously neutralize the problems that occurred with these
sentences before. How they do so has to be examined here.
But it first has to be discussed how co-predicates enter the clausal DRS,
what their morpho-syntactic status is and how they relate to the matrix verb.
2.4.1 Morpho-syntactic specifics of co-predicates
Constituents that feature as co-predicates of verbs have some interesting
morpho-syntactic properties they do not have under a different use. A stan-
dard example of a co-predicate is the predicative element that accompanies
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copula verbs like sein (‘be’), werden (‘become’) and bleiben (‘remain’). Each
of the four major lexical categories can be combined with the copula. Con-
sider first nouns. Nouns that are combined with a copula might have inherent
case, as in:
(109) Das Buch ist Peters / dem Peter
‘the book is P.-gen / det P.-dat
“The book is Peter’s”
The noun can also receive case by agreement with the subject:
(110) a. Der liebe Gott ist ein guter Mann
‘the dear god-nom is a good man-nom’
b. Sie ließ den lieben Gott einen guten Mann sein
‘She-nom let the dear god-acc a good man-acc be’
Both cases are intriguingly interesting, but for different reasons. The possi-
bility of co-predicates with inherent case shows first that there is a semantic
difference between inherent and structural cases. The latter are nominative
and accusative in German. When we use an accusative marked co-predicate















The co-predicate function obviously divides case forms of noun phrases into
two classes. A reasonable explanation is that the co-predicate noun cannot be
assigned case. It thus either has to be already case marked (i.e. with inherent
case), or it receives case via agreement with the subject. There is no other
construction in the grammar of German, where a bare noun phrase receives
its case via agreement with another noun (one lexicalized exception is the
preposition ‘als’, cf. footnote 37 below).
Adjectives in a sense show the opposite behavior: while they normally
agree with their head nouns when used as nominal modifiers, they do not















However, this behavior of adjectives only parallels their adverbial use. The
lack of morphological marking might be the reason why we can also use
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particles as co-predicates which cannot occur as nominal modifiers because of














TV set ≈ ‘the on TV’
Particles rarely ever occur as adverbs.37 An interesting fact to note about
prepositional phrases is that directional PPs can occur as arguments and
co-predicates, but not as modifiers. Though directionals cannot be used with
the above mentioned copulas (because these are all static verbs), they can

















“Maria let the dog into the garden”




















“Maria was out to play”
The zu-infinitive in (115–a) is especially interesting here. It also has an ad-
nominal correspondent. In this case, however, the present participle is used:













“I like the TV most, when it’s turned off”
It is not clear, whether this is an adverbial use, but depictives can be distinguished syntacti-














































“the book that has to be read”
The zu-infinitive also has to lack its accusative object (in addition to the
always lacking subject) in order to be interpretable as a predicate. In the
ordinary uses of these infinitives the conditions on argument omission are
the same as for normal clauses (with the exception of the subject, of course).
But this might just be a semantic fact, not a morpho-syntactic one. Though
it looks like a parallel to passive, one can doubt that this is just a passivized
infinitive, because the passive version should look like ‘gelesen zu werden’
(like ‘to be read’), which is odd for a co-predicate, because there is no omitted
accusative object within the infinitive. So this infinitive is a very special entity
that again occurs only as co-predicate, though, of course, in its participial
version also as adnominal modifier.
To sum up, we have some good reasons to assume that co-predicate
constitutes a syntactic function38 of its own in German. The following ta-
ble lists (only!) the differences for the discussed lexical categories between
‘ordinary’ uses, uses as co-predicates, and uses as adverbial modifiers:
Category Ordinary Use Co-predicate Use Adverbial Use
noun phrase structural case by structural case by impossible
(structural case) government agreement
adjective agreement no agreement no agreement
particle cannot occur can occur only depictive
prepositional positional positional positional
phrase directional directional
zu-infinitival participial infinitival impossible
noun modifier
38I use the term ‘syntactic function’ without being very clear about what it is supposed
to mean. A syntactic function might be understood as a specific syntactic position with
specific properties. A comparable phenomenon might be the topic marker in, e.g., Japanese
and Korean, where a nominal constituent, originally marked with structural case (not, e.g.,
with the dative), has the topic marker instead of the case marker, when it is sentence-
initial.
However, an important fact about co-predicates seems to me that there can occur only one
co-predicate per sentence, not only with copula verbs, but also in resultative constructions.













For a more detailed discussion of the morpho-syntactic specifics of co-predication see Stein-
bach & Vogel (1994, chapter 3).
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I will leave the topic at this informal descriptive stage. For our discussion is
important that co-predicates can be identified as such in a syntactic structure.
They have specific morpho-syntactic properties. We do not need four or even
more different rules for the DRS translation of the diverse lexical categories’
co-predicates into the sentential concept, but rather can speak about co-
predicates in general.
2.4.2 The Interaction of Co-predicate Meaning and
Verb Meaning in Resultative Constructions
A standard case of co-predication is the so-called resultative construction,
where we have a subject, a direct object, a verb and a co-predicate, as in:39
(117) The audience laughed the actor off the stage
Both predicates in this example are one-place predicates. However, which
predicate chooses which noun phrase as its argument, does not seem to be
arbitrary. The audience is the sole argument of LAUGH, and the actor is the
sole argument of OFF THE STAGE. The reverse assignment is impossible.
Furthermore, we also have a causative interpretation: the laughing causes the
actor’s leaving the stage.
This causative interpretation can neither stem from the meaning of
LAUGH, nor from the meaning of OFF THE STAGE. It seems that the
rule for the DRS translation of transitive constructions (103) can be applied
here. Let us have a look at it again:
39The term ‘resultative construction’ was originally only used for constructions with
adjectival co-predicates, as in John hammered the metal flat. The adjective flat is said
to describe the result of the hammering action. But if this is the crucial property of
resultatives, then the same can be said for a locative resultative as in (117), because
the PP off the stage describes the direction of the actor’s motion that results from the
audience’s laughing.
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(118)
DRS construction rule for transitive constructions
Triggering
configuration

















Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
for the verb α
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u),acc(v)
per: u  v





Substitute in γ: e for [V α ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
The semantically interesting conditions are the optional ones at the bottom
of the rule. There seems no reason, at first sight, to exclude one of the three
conditions for the translation of transitive constructions with co-predicates.
But some further conditions are missing that deal with the interpretation of
co-predicates. Four extensions are necessary:
(119) • The triggering configuration has to be adjusted for transitive
constructions with co-predicates. This is straightforward and
not problematic.
• A rule must be added that requires the introduction of the
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schematic DRS of the co-predicate. We need a theory of the
schematic DRSs of co-predicates
• A condition has to be added to the event box of the clause that
formulates the causative relation between the action described
by the verb and the result described by the co-predicate.
• A rule has to be added that guarantees that the direct ob-
ject serves as the ‘external argument’ or ‘subject’ of the co-
predicate. This is not unproblematic.

























The precise structure depends on the assumptions about the syntax of these
constructions, but as this is of less importance here, I am using a simple
and more or less surface-oriented representation. ‘COP’ stands for the co-
predicate, and ‘α’ and ‘β’ stand for the lexical expressions used as verb and
co-predicate.
As we are now dealing with the schematic DRSs of both the verb and
the co-predicate, we have to distinguish them. The following rules have to be
added:
(121) Introduce into the universe of e:
schematic discourse referent e1 for the verb α
schematic discourse referent e2 for the co-predicate β
Introduce into the conditions set of e:
schematic DRS e1 of the Verb α
schematic DRS e2 of the co-predicate β
A further condition to be added establishes the causative relation between
the action expressed by the verb and the result expressed by the co-predicate:
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(122) Introduce into the conditions set of e:
CAUSE(e1,e2)
This is the crucial semantic property of resultative constructions. Note, that
this does not necessarily entail that there also is a causative relation be-
tween subject and direct object, because the linking of especially the verb’s
arguments can vary.
One might wonder, whether ‘CAUSE’ can be replaced by the more spe-
cific term ‘d-CAUSE’ introduced earlier. I used d-CAUSE as a relation of
direct causation between an individual and a property of an(other) individ-
ual. There is a consensus among philosophers, psychologists and linguists
that the conception of causation that we have ‘in our minds’ actually is a
relation between two states of affairs. What I introduced as d-CAUSE has to
be interpreted as an abbreviation for a relation I want to call D-CAUSE:40
(123) ∀ x,p [d-CAUSE(x,p)←→ ∃ f(D-CAUSE(f(x),p))]
The d-CAUSE relation was used as a default for the interpretation of subjects
of transitive action sentences that do not have a thematic role assigned by









What (123) says about this clause is that there has to be a property f that
holds of Maria and that this causes the rolling of the ball. What could f be?
Presumably, it has to be the action that causes the rolling of the ball. But if
this action causes the rolling of the ball, then it somehow must be related to
the ball. E.g., Maria could be pushing the ball. So we could perhaps also use
the following formula for the relation between d-CAUSE and D-CAUSE:
(125) ∀x, g[d-CAUSE(x,g(y)) ←→ ∃ f(D-CAUSE(f(x,y),g(y)))]
The individual x does something (or is in relation) f to the individual y,
and as a result y has property g. This still is an abbreviation, but it is a bit
more explicit than the previous versions of causation. However, we have to be
40D-CAUSE can be seen as a special case of CAUSE: every D-CAUSE relation is a
CAUSE relation, but only the direct CAUSE relations are D-CAUSE relations. There
is some evidence from psychlinguistic and general cognition research that the difference
between direct and indirect causation is crucial for the early development of cognition.
Events of direct causation can be detected at extremely early stages of childhood. It might
even be the case that the concept of direct causation is innate. See Verfaillie & Daems
(1996) for a broader discussion.
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careful. If g is EXIST, i.e. if the result of x’s action is the creation of y, then x
cannot literally have done something to y, because y did not exist at the time
when f was performed. So the proposition in (125) is only one interpretation
or explication of (123). It is reasonable for results like ROLL(y); but (125)
does not replace (123). (125) can be seen as resulting from a world knowledge
rule that could roughly look like this:
(126) ∀ x,y[d-CAUSE(x,ROLL(y))←→ ∃ f(D-CAUSE(f(x,y),ROLL(y)))]
However, especially for results that express a change of some individual y,
it seems very likely that x must have done something to y in order to cause
that change of y. Most resultatives express such causations of changes, and
hence the following world knowledge rule is very likely to be applicable:
(127) ∀x,y,g[d-CAUSE(x,g(y)) ∧ CHANGE (g) ←→
∃f(D-CAUSE(f(x,y),g(y)))]
The label CHANGE stands for the set of those properties that describe a
change of an individual.
The D-CAUSE relation together with (127) describes quite closely the
interpretation of resultatives and the relation between matrix verb and co-
predicate. We might only need to identify f with the verb and g with the co-
predicate. But how do examples fit into this picture where the direct object
is only argument of the co-predicate, not of the verb, as in the previously
discussed (128):
(128) The audience laughed the actor off the stage
Assume that the following is true here:
(129) CAUSE(LAUGH(audience),OFF THE STAGE(actor))
There are, in principle, two ways of interpreting LAUGH here: i) the audience
laughed about something, and this made the actor leave the stage; ii) the
audience laughed about the actor, and this made the actor leave the stage.
Clearly, it is the second interpretation that we apply to (128), not the first
one. The actor would not have left the stage, if the audience’s laughing was
not somehow related to him. This can be captured by assuming that LAUGH
has a second argument, the ‘trigger’ of the laughing:41
41The condition trigger(y) is redundant in this DRS. It is only inserted for the sake of
explicitness.
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The two interpretations of (129) relate to the following two different DRSs:
(131) a.























As unification is optional in general, both of these structures are admissible.
The preference for the structure (131–b) might suggest that there is a pre-
sumably pragmatic preference for unification. (131–b) is more informative
than (131–a), because (131–b) provides us with a trigger for the laughing,
while (131–a) only says that the audience laughed about something.
If this line of reasoning is on the right track, then we might add ‘d-
CAUSE(u,e2)’ as another obligatory condition for the DRS translation of
resultative constructions. I will keep the issue undecided here.
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We have not yet discussed, what the schematic DRS of a co-predicate




But two-place predicates like prepositional phrases pose the problem of iden-
tifying the external argument, consider the schematic DRS of the preposition




If we used this structure for the DRS translation of (128), then we would
have (at least) two possible interpretations, one of which is the natural inter-
pretation where the actor gets off the stage, and the other is the ‘nonsensical’
interpretation that the stage gets off the actor. This way of linking roles and
grammatical functions is in general impossible for prepositional phrases. It
can be avoided by the assumption that the thematic role of the location is
linked qua subcategorization frame to the syntactic complement position of
the head of the PP. This is a natural and uncontroversial way of dealing with
this problem, cf. Bierwisch (1988) for one proposal in this direction. The
‘external argument’ is the real problem, because it is ‘external’, its linking
can or at least should not be fixed. The tool that I will use to indicate the
external argument is the perspective. In the case of the schematic DRSs of







To guarantee the correct linking pattern, we need an additional DRS trans-
lation rule:42
42It might be possible to formulate a more general rule that holds of all co-predicates.
Instead of explicitly mentioning the accusative or direct object, it might make sense to
speak of the complement marked with structural case that is the closest c-commander of
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(135) Unify: The single element of per(e2) with v.
This completes the discussion of the tasks listed in (119). The following rule
sums everything up. What we did, was enriching the translation rule for
transitive constructions, such that it covers transitive constructions with a
co-predicate:
the co-predicate in the syntactic structure. This would conform to established theories of
predication such as by Williams (1980) or Bowers (1993).
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(136)




























Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e : schematic discourse referents
e1 and e2
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u),acc(v)
per: u  v
schematic DRS e1 of α






Unify: The single element of per(e2) with v.
Substitute in γ: e1 for [V α ]
e2 for [COP β ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
Not all constituents that look like co-predicates structurally, act (only) as
co-predicates. Consider the following examples:
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Both clauses have a resultative interpretation. The result of the described
events is that nail and hammer, respectively, are located in the wall. In
(137–b) the wall is also an argument of SCHLAGEN. It serves as the indi-
vidual with the role of the still-standing entity S. Consider now the causative
relations in (137–b). What exactly causes the placement of the hammer in
the wall? Is it the fact that the hammer serves as the moving entity M, or is
it Maria’s action?
The problem that this points at, is that we would not want to say that
the hitting event causes something that it entails. If an event e1 consists of
two subevents e2 and e3, then the two subevents are entailed by e1, but we















The natural interpretation of this clause is that Maria is the ‘d-CAUSER’
of the hitting, that the hammer is the moving entity M of the hitting, and
that the wall is the still-standing target S of the hitting. The meaning of
HIT itself already entails that M moves against S. So here the preposition
against might not give us additional semantic information. This contrasts
with the preposition in in (137–b). The hammer not only moves against the
wall, but stays in the wall, after the hitting event is over. This is additional
information that is contributed by the preposition. So for (137–b) we can
say that the hitting causes the IN relation, i.e. it makes sense that we apply
(136) in the ordinary way. But in (138) the situation is different, because the
movement against the wall is already entailed by the meaning of HIT:43
(139) ∀x,y.HIT(x,y) −→ AGAINST(x,y)
In the case of (138) it does not make sense to apply the translation rule for
transitive constructions with co-predicates, although we have the appropriate
triggering configuration. I conclude from this that the application of the
whole rule (136) itself is optional.
A way of excluding it could be assuming a world knowledge rule like the
following:
43AGAINST is here an abbreviation for ‘move against’.
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(140) ∀e1e2[(e1 −→ e2) −→ ¬CAUSE(e1, e2)]
The co-occurrence of entailment and causation would then yield an inconsis-
tent, hence ill-formed DRS, that would be ruled out by the system. Because
the entailment is usually introduced by the lexical meaning of predicates like
‘SCHLAGEN’, the causative interpretation would always be blocked in such
a situation. Two further sources of avoiding the causative interpretation are:
i) the DRS with the condition ‘CAUSE(e1,e2)’ is larger than the DRS with-
out that condition; ii) the DRS without that condition has less discourse
referents, because it interprets the whole event e2 as entailed by e1, which
means that the set of discourse referents used in e2 has to be a subset of the
set of discourse referents used in e1.
44
For instances where (136) does not apply we need a DRS translation rule
for co-predicates. Let us keep it simple:
(141)
DRS construction rule for co-predicates
Triggering
configuration
γ ⊆ γ ∈ ConK :
COP
α
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: schematic DRS e of the
co-predicate α
Substitute in γ: e for [COP α ]
As (136) is optional, (141) cannot be obligatory either. On the other hand, the
co-predicate has to be translated, so one or the other rule has to be applied.45
But we have a couple of options and thus a couple of possible interpretations
44Another way of seeing the problem might be to assume that ‘CAUSE(e1,e2)’ is re-
dundant, if ‘e1 −→ e2’ holds. The CAUSE relation might be considered to be trivially
reflexive, any event causes itself (and anything that it entails): ‘∀ e[CAUSE(e,e)]’. As this
is more a philosophical, than a linguistic issue, I will not discuss it any further.
45Remember that reducible DRSs are ill-formed, as proposed by Kamp & Reyle (1993).
The fact that we have several ways of reducing a DRS, does not make a difference in this
respect.
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for a clause like (138). But this is expexcted in the approach proposed here.
What has to be guaranteed, is, first, that the desired interpretation is among
the set of possible interpretations and, second, in some way the most plausible
or optimal one. The latter task is not the central issue here, but the first one















Let us assume that (136) is not applied here, but the DRS translation rule
for transitive constructions, and in addition the rule for co-predicates, (141).
The latter rule only requires the introduction of the schematic DRS of the co-
predicate, the PP gegen die Wand. The rule for the DRS translation of tran-
sitive constructions obligatorily requires the introduction of the schematic
DRS of the verb, the introduction of the case conditions and the nomacc
perspective. The optional conditions will be considered later. This yields the
following DRS:
(143)








per: x  y
e1:
SCHLAGEN(u,v)




An important part of the interpretation we want to arrive at can be derived
from this simply by unification. We unify the schematic discourse referents
u and w with y, and v with z. For the thematic interpretation of the subject
Maria we make use of one of the optional rules of the DRS translation rule
for transitive constructions and insert ‘PERFORM(x,e1)’ into the DRS box
of e:
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(144)
















The above DRS is well-formed, if there are no contradictory perspectives,
and if ‘NOM(x)’ and ‘ACC(y)’ can be reduced, i.e. if x and y are ‘totally
involved’. y is the first argument of SCHLAGEN, and this entails total in-
volvedness, as discussed earlier. Let us assume that being the first argument
of the ‘d-CAUSE’ relation also entails total involvedness – if something causes
something else, then it does so as a whole. This means that both ‘NOM(x)’
and ‘ACC(y)’ can be removed. Another question is whether the perspec-
tives of clause and verb conflict. This is also not the case, the clause has
the perspective ‘x  y’, and the only conflicting perspective would be ‘y 
x’. Neither the verb nor the co-predicate have this perspective. So the DRS
above is well-formed, and can be derived in the given system.
As already said, a couple of other possible interpretations can also be
derived. Many of these options might be usable for different examples with
the same structural properties. Remember the different linking relations in













































































It is obvious that the two individual thematic roles of SCHLAGEN are linked
differently in these examples, although we have the same syntactic construc-
tion throughout. The individual role of the moving entity of SCHLAGEN
is linked to the direct object in (145–b), to the subject in (145–d,e) and
left implicit in (145–a,c). The target role of SCHLAGEN is linked to the
direct object in (145–a,d), and to the PP in (145–b,c,e). So some variation
is required, in order to account for the data. The optionality of unification
gurantees that these linking options are ‘derivable’. Some of these options
are excluded by world knowledge: a hole can neither move, nor can it serve
as a target for hitting. Likewise, only people with extraordinary power would
be able to hit a wall against something else.
On the other hand, there might be some ‘derivable’ interpretations of
(142) that can never occur, and are not yet excluded. One such example is























The interpretation represented here is a kind of conjunction: ‘The ball is
rolling and Maria is going away somehow’. The two subevents are not ‘con-
nected’, i.e. they have nothing to do with each other. It seems that such
interpretations are possible in general only in explicit coordination struc-
tures. I discussed this kind of problem earlier in this chapter on page 105.
There I proposed that connectedness is supposed to follow from the system,
and need not be stated as an independent rule. It might, however, be un-
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avoidable to posit the connectedness requirement at least as an ‘optimality
criterion’ for the evaluation of different possible candidates. A perhaps even
harder example has already been discussed several times:
(147) The audience laughed the actor off the stage
Why is the interpretation ‘the audience laughed and the actor left the stage,
where laughing and leaving have nothing to do with each other’ impossible?
I suspected earlier that the latter interpretation has the weakness of not
telling us the ‘trigger’ of the laughing. Another reason could be that this
is an interpretation that treats laughing and leaving as two non-connected
subevents.
This might point to a principal problem. The DRS construction rules
used here introduce the event variable ‘e’ as semantic correspondent of the
clause – this comes close to Reichenbach’s (1947) original intention, discussed
in section 1.2. We furthermore have the schematic event variables ‘e1’ and
‘e2’ of verb and co-predicate. These are sub-events of the event variable
representing the whole clause. What is the relation between ‘e’ on the one
hand and its sub-events ‘e1’ and ‘e2’ on the other hand? Because ‘e1’ and
‘e2’ are sub-events, the most natural assumption is a part-whole relation.
The part-whole relation ruled out here, is one, where the sub-events simply
add up to yield ‘e’:
(148) e = e1 ∧ e2
The solution of the problem lies in the event notion used here. What we
want to assume is that events are indivisible. They might have identifiable
parts, but these parts are connected with other parts, and these connections
between the parts are crucial for the whole event. A simple coordination
structure as in (148) does not represent a connection in this sense. (148) only
states that e1 and e2 are contained in e, but not, how they are related. A
conjunction, in this sense, is a non-relation. To put it another way, there is no
event like e in (148): if e is only the coordination of two other independent
events, then e is no event, because it is not atomic; rather, e is a set of
events.46
46There is a parallel problem with nouns like body or family. Although there are iden-
tifiable body-parts, a body is not identical to the set of its parts. Likewise, a family can
be considered as a set of people, but also as an institution: when we say that the family is
eating, we might express the fact that each member of the family is eating, but when we
say that the family decided to buy a new house, we cannot really say that each member of
the family made the decision individually. What is important here is that such differences
would not stop us from representing all nouns alike in the syntax of DRSs. Whether a
noun stands for a set of individuals or represents an indivisible individual is a matter of its
158
CHAPTER 2 2.4 Transitive Constructions with two Predicates
The question is, whether we want to represent this insight in our struc-
tures or whether we keep it as a meta constraint. I tend to take the latter





















In principle, there are two ways of conceptualizing the DRS in (149): i) there
is a single event of x hitting against y; ii) there are two events, where a. x
hits y, and b. x moves against y. According to the first interpretation, e2 in
(149) is redundant, because ‘SCHLAG(x,y)’ entails ‘GEGEN(x,y)’, and thus,
e1 → e2. So the DRS in (149) is equivalent to (i.e., has the same models as)
the same DRS without e2.
The second interpretation is the problematic one. I suspect that, whenever
we have more than one predicate in a clause, be it a co-predicate or a modifier
or another verb, we get into this kind of conceptual ambiguity that does not
seem to have anything to do with the way we interpret clauses. For this reason
I tend to restrict the domain of the clause’s event variable e to indivisible
events:
(150) Events are indivisible
The domain of the event variable e is the set of indivisible events.
The problematic ‘non-connected’ interpretations are now ruled out in general.
The two predicates in (149) describe different aspects of the same atomic
event, not two different events. If a DRS describes an ‘event’ that cannot be
interpreted as atomic, then it cannot have a model, which means that it can
never be true. Let us assume that such DRSs are excluded in general.
Consider (147) again. The following DRS is construed analogous to (149),
i.e., without the rule translating resultative constructions (i.e. omitting a
causal relation between laughing and leaving):
conceptual interpretation. This interpretation is not yet encoded in the DRSs used here.
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(151) The audience laughed the actor off the stage






per: x  y
e1: LAUGH(x)
e2: OFF(y,z)
This DRS tells us that the laughing of the audience and the actor’s leaving
the stage are two aspects of the same atomic event, but we do not know, how
these two aspects combine. Without additional information, we have the
laughing and the leaving as two different events. The additional information
is given by the DRS translation rule for transitive clauses with co-prediates,
(136). The condition ‘CAUSE(e1,e2)’ can be added. Now the two sub-events
are connected and we interpret e as an indivisible event:
(152)










The application of (136) also solves another problem: without rule (136), it
is possible to construe a DRS with the reverse argument linking, yielding
an interpretation like ‘the actor laughed the audience off the stage’. This is
excluded, because (136) also determines that the ‘external argument’ of the
preposition is linked to the direct or accusative object. This also excludes
many conceivable DRS translations for the clauses in question.
There are constructions that cannot be interpreted as resultative con-
structions, without getting absurd results, although they have the structure
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of resultatives. Examples in case can be construed with schlagen and other















































Though I assume that the directional PPs in these examples are not sub-
categorized (i.e. required as morpho-syntactic entities) by the verb, they still
get their thematic interpretation from the verb, i.e. the noun inside the PP
stands for the target of the hitting. And here the interpretation is definitely
not that the direct object becomes located at the place indicated by the PP.
Such an interpretation would be complete nonsense (‘Hans moves into his
face’ etc.). This shows that the classification of (136) as an optional rule is
empirically justified.
The details of the interpretation of clauses like (153) without the direc-
tional PP has been discussed in connection with the structure (90) on page
129. The analysis of these clauses that we can give now is in some respects
more detailed. Maria is the ‘PERFORMER’ of the hitting action in (153–a),
the target of the hitting is not the dog as such, but a body-part of it, ex-
pressed by the PP. The dog, however, is still interpreted as being punished
by Maria. This is introduced by a world knowledge rule, which was originally
given in (83), repeated in (154):
(154) ∀x,y,z.PERFORM(z,SCHLAG(x,y)) ∧ animate(z) ∧ animate(y)
−→ PUNISH(z,y)
This rule requires slight modification to deal with (153). The body-part is
now explicitly mentioned:
(155) ∀w,x,y,z.PERFORM(w,SCHLAG(x,y)) ∧ ANIMATE(w) ∧ BODY-
PART(y,z) ∧ ANIMATE(z) −→ PUNISH(w,z)
Being punished entails total involvedness, and so the accusative case is ‘jus-
tified’. An interesting fact about the data in (154) is that the ‘punishment’
reading is obligatory, when the object occurs in accusative case, but not,
when it occurs in dative case, as in:
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Here, Maria might have hit the dog accidentally. This reading is excluded
with accusative case.
I want to close this section with a brief review of the examples I started
with. The problem I wanted to discuss was the difference between the fol-





















































































I noted earlier that the crucial ‘defect’ of the clauses in (157) is that the
constraint on the conceptual interpretation of accusative objects requires a
relation for the individual denoted by this constituent that entails its ‘total
involvedness’. I stipulated that the individual role of the target of the hit-
ting is not of this kind, and as there is no other role in sight the clauses in
(157) are odd. Things change with the addition of a co-predicate under the
resultative interpretation. Entities that are broken or cut in two, are broken
as a whole, so it is very reasonable that these predications imply total in-
volvedness, and thus the requirement for the conceptual interpretation of the
accusative objects is fulfilled.
Another problem occurs with the examples (157–c,d) and (158–c,d). In
these clauses, only one of the two individual roles of SCHLAGEN is realized
as a constituent, while the other is left implicit. If the accusative object is
interpreted as the still-standing target S, then we have a reasonable interpre-
tation for the missing individual (i.e. a hand or some instrument), but if it is
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the moving entity M, then S could be nearly everything. But still, however,
(158–c,d) are fine with such an interpretation. Problems like these, and the
rules governing the possibility of implicit arguments in general will be the
topic of the next section.
2.5 Syntactic and Semantic arguments
2.5.1 Implicit Arguments
Implicit arguments are a frequent topic in the debate about argument struc-
ture and the linking problem. Very often the fact that some verbs allow
implicit arguments while others do not has also been used as an argument
in favor of subcategorization rules in the lexical entries of verbs. For exam-
ple, Jackendoff (1990b, 1993) claims that the following difference between
the verbs supply and provide cannot be attributed to their lexical conceptual
structure, which he assumes to be equivalent (cf. Jackendoff 1990b, 177, 255):
(159) a. Bill supplied/provided the students with some books
b. Bill supplied/*provided the students
Another example given by Jackendoff is the pair empty/rid (Jackendoff
1990b, 177, 255):
(160) a. Bill emptied/rid the room of insects
b. Bill emptied/*rid the room
The equivalent German examples are:
(161) a. Bill versorgte/versah die Studierenden mit einigen Büchern
b. Bill versorgte/*versah die Studierenden
(162) a. Bill leerte/befreite das Zimmer von Insekten
b. Bill leerte/*befreite das Zimmer
An often discussed example is the verb eat. It is quite easy to use it without
a direct object, while this is not the case with, e.g., swallow :
(163) a. Sally was eating/*swallowing
b. Sally war am essen/*verschlucken
The standard ‘explanation’ of these differences is to assume, e.g., for supply
and provide that the subcategorization frame of provide entails an obligatory
of -PP, while that of supply entails an optional one. This is not really an
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explanation in the sense that we understand the phenomenon. Rather, it is
just a mode of rephrasing the empirical facts in a model.
I want to suggest that the phenomena can be understood more deeply, if
we take a closer look at the examples, and if we examine more seriously the
circumstances that allow implicit arguments.
The solution I propose focuses on the notion of informativity : Some verbs
provide us with a better guess for missing arguments than others, and some-
times these guesses are sufficient to fulfil the needs of the current discourse.
To explain this more closely consider the following data:
(164) a. A: “What are you doing?”
B: “I’m eating”
b. A: “What are you eating?”
#B: “I’m eating”
While the use of an implicit argument is fine in B’s first answer, it is
not in the second, because it is too uninformative. My claim is that the
oddity of B’s answer in (164–b) is of the same kind as the oddity of (159-b)
with provide, (160-b) with rid and (163-a) with swallow, and the respective
German examples. In these cases the verbs do not provide us with enough
information about the missing argument, even in an ‘out-of-the-blue’ context.
So the phenomenon has to be traced back to a difference in lexical knowl-
edge. For eat and swallow this can be paraphrased as follows:
 if x swallows y then y fulfils the physical requirements required for
being swallowed
 if x eats y then y fulfils the physical requirements required for being
eaten, and y is some food for x
Nails, for example can be swallowed by human beings, but they are not
considered as food for human beings. When inferring possible interpretations
of an implicit y with eat, nails therefore are not taken into account, while they
would be in the case of swallow. Thus, the set of possible y’s for eat is much
smaller than that for swallow. The smaller the set of alternatives, however,
the more we actually know about the probable value of a variable. This is
where I think that informativity comes into play. The concept of eat is more
informative about its ‘second’ argument than the concept of swallow. This
lexical conceptual difference is represented in the selectional restrictions for
the verbal arguments in question. The lexical entries in the format proposed
by Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b) look like this:
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(165) e: SWALLOW(xag,yth) Agent Theme
SEL RESTR SEL RESTR
animate swallowable
(166) e: EAT(xag,yth) Agent Theme
SEL RESTR SEL RESTR
animate eatable
food for xag
If we assume that the physical requirements for being swallowed or eaten are
the same, then the set of possible ‘themes’ yth for eat is much smaller than
that for swallow, because of the second restriction in (166).
A full elaboration of my claim would require a reasonable theory of
what informativity is, how the ‘threshold’ between informative and non-
informative sentences within a context can be computed, a.o. It is impos-
sible for me to do so here, so I restrict myself to this proposal of a lexical
conceptual basis such a theory could use.47
A good empirical test for the existence of the discussed specific selectional
restrictions is trying to construct clauses with redundant elements:
(167) a. #Mary is eating food
b. #Mary is eating something that can be eaten
c. Mary is swallowing food
d. #Mary is swallowing something that can be swallowed
The only non-redundant direct object here is food in (167–c). That it is
food that Mary is swallowing is ‘new’ information, because it also could be
something else. This is predicted by the above lexical entries.
When we take a look at the other examples, we always find differences
between the verbs that can be compared to the difference between eat and
swallow :
The object of empty, for example, has to be a container, while the object
of rid can be nearly any physical entity. Likewise, the referent of the of -PP
of empty refers to the stuff or the things that are usually contained by the
object. The referent of the of -PP of rid, on the other hand, can again be
nearly anything.
The same observation can be made with supply and provide: When x is
being supplied by someone else, x is supplied with things that she needs. No
47Note that under this treatment of implicit arguments it makes no sense to speak of
the possibility of implicit arguments as such, but only relativized to a specific context. The
traditional notion of implicit arguments only covers arguments that can be omitted in a
so-called ‘zero’ or ‘out-of-the-blue’ context.
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such restriction comes with provide.
The pattern is quite constant across the data. The overall ratio is:
(168) Conjecture on Implicit Arguments
The more we already know about an individual from the concept it
appears in, the easier can it be left implicit.
This may also help to solve the puzzle I introduced in the closing paragraphs













If the co-predicate is omitted, the sentence is odd. My standard explanation
for such cases was that the accusative object has to be ‘totally involved’. This
is not fulfilled if the object is linked to the role of the still standing target S
in the concept of schlagen. However, here it is very likely that the stick has
the role of the moving entity M. This role entails total involvement, so the
sentence should be well-formed even without the co-predicate – but it is not.
The reason can again be found in the omitted argument. If the stick is M
and we leave out the co-predicate, then S could be nearly any physical entity.
But with the addition of the co-predicate entzwei things change. Now S can
no longer be anything, but must be such solid and big that a stick can break
in two, if hit against it. We observe the same effect as above: under certain
contextual conditions this information is specific enough.
This line of reasoning proposes that the odd variant of (169) might be
acceptable under some circumstances. And indeed, if we know that the child
always hits with a stick against the garden doors of the neighbors, a clause
like
(170) Das Kind schlug wieder seinen Stock
‘the child beat again its stick’
might not be that bad.48 It is, however, quite clear that context does not
legitimate the omission of arguments in the same way as lexical knowledge
does. Consider the following dialogs:
48However, the variant
i. Das Kind schlug wieder mit seinem Stock
‘the child beat again with its stick’
is much better, even in-out-of-the-blue contexts. This might be an effect of the ‘deper-
spectivization’ of the stick. It is much easier to get a habitual interpretation here. Such
readings in general are more liberal about the use of implicit arguments.
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(171) a. A: Was hast du mit dem Brot gemacht?
‘What did you do with the bread?’
B: Gegessen.
‘Eaten’
b. A: Was hast du mit dem Brot gemacht?
‘What did you do with the bread?’
#B: Habe Gegessen.
‘Have Eaten’
Although neither of the dialogues mentions any of the arguments of eat ex-
plicitly, B’s answers in these sentences have different interpretations. While
in (171–a) the interpretation is: “I have eaten the bread”, that of (171–b)
is: “I have eaten (some food)”, which sounds somewhat strange here. So, in
(171–b) we have an implicit argument interpretation, while in (171–a), the
arguments are all taken from the preceding question. The difference between
the two clauses is the presence of a fully inflected auxiliary in (171–b). This
turns the answer into a clause. Only topic drop is allowed in German clauses,
and as we have no subject present, the subject is interpreted to be dropped,
and can be taken from the preceding discourse. With respect to the other
arguments of the verb, however, the clause is opaque. If an argument from
the preceding discourse has to be an individual in the concept of the current
clause, it has to be referred to by pronominal elements.49
While the lexical knowledge about eat allows for an implicit argument in
(171–b), the contextual knowledge has no effect there, contrary to the answer
in (171–a), which is not a full clause. This is one phenomenon that has to be
kept in mind when comparing the influence of contextual information with
that of lexical and world knowledge. The latter operates quite unrestricted
within clauses, the former licenses topic drop, but not much more.
49Note that in section 2.2 on page 101, I discussed the necessity to introduce individuals
from context even for the interpretation of ‘fully specified’ clauses. The example was ‘the
books are rolling’, and the problem was that we had to introduce a vehicle into the DRS
that serves as the rolling individual (because books cannot roll). That situation is slightly
different from the one above. First of all, the verb does not provide us with an alternative
rolling individual, or a sufficiently small set of candidates. Second, the vehicle can only be
introduced under the condition that it stands in some relation to the books (i.e. that the
books are lying on the vehicle.), and that this has immediate consequences for the books
(i.e. that they are moving). In the above case the only commonality between ‘you’ and ‘the
bread’ is that they are mentioned in the same clause. But there is no sufficient conceptual
connection that would allow for the same kind of inference as in the case of ‘the books are
rolling’.
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2.5.2 Is Conflation of Individuals possible?
Let me now briefly address the phenomenon of ‘conceptual shift’ that was
important in the first chapter in the discussion of two-level semantics (section
1.1.3). There I mentioned the phenomenon that the verb schlagen can be used



















Does this mean that schlagen changes its arity under conceptual shift? Con-





































A broom can be considered as a thing that produces a beating or slamming
sound, when it hits against something solid. However, this noun cannot be
used intransitively with schlagen. The reason becomes quite obvious, when
we compare (173–b) and (173–c): in (173–c) we have both a moving entity
M (i.e. the broom) and a still-standing target S (i.e. the wall), in (173–b) we
only have the former, not the latter. In the case of the door in (173–a) we can
infer S from our knowledge about doors: if the door is M then S is either the
door frame or the wall surrounding the door. If the door is S, however, we
get no idea about M, so this interpretation is predicted to be quite unlikely
– which is correct for (173–a).
These observations suggest that even under conceptual shift the standard
schematic DRS of SCHLAGEN remains ‘active’. Let us turn now to (172-c).
How does the bell fulfil these constraints? A bell can be seen as a kind of
‘machine’ that has the functions described by the concept of SCHLAGEN
built into it. The clapper of the bell is M and the bell’s side is S.
If this is the correct interpretation then we have a very interesting sit-
uation: the individual introduced by the subject die Glocke (‘the bell’) is
linked to neither of the two roles of SCHLAGEN. Rather, the two parts of
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the bell are. The two individual roles of SCHLAGEN are conflated into the
one individual introduced by the subject of the clause.
The possibility of such a situation calls traditional approaches to thematic
interpretation into question. If a verb has two or three individual roles to
‘assign’, it is not necessary to have the same number of verbal complements
in the clause to ‘link’ all these roles. Two (or more) individual roles of the
verb might be clustered together within one individual introduced by a verbal
complement.
I know of no theory of thematic interpretation that discusses such a possi-
bility. The complements that function syntactically as arguments of the verb
are always mapped as atomic entities into semantic representations and have
to be assigned exactly one thematic role by the verb. And, vice versa, the
entities that can be assigned thematic roles are those represented by a verbal
complement, or implicit arguments (which also are atomic entities).
The problem discussed above can be seen as a kind of metonymic relation:
a property predicated of an individual in fact only holds of a part of that
individual. The only difference with the above examples is that the property
in question is a two-place relation that holds of two parts of an individual.
Metonymic relations with monadic predicates are quite common, and well-







Strictly speaking, it is not the car itself that is rolling, but only a part of it,
i.e., its wheels. In this case of metonymic relation, the semantic and syntactic
arity of the verb still are equal. But as we saw in the case of (172), this need
not necessarily be the case. As soon as we have a semantically multi-place
predicate, we get different options for its syntactic arity. The most important
consequence of this insight is that the syntactic arity of a predicate cannot be
predicted from its semantic arity. Thematic interpretation and linking cannot
be modeled as an incremental process of ‘stepwise saturation of the verb’s
open slots with constituents’. Instead, whether in a clause a verb’s roles
are ‘assigned’ is a matter of interpretation and has to be decided case-wise.
It cannot be decided only by counting the verbal complements. Thematic
interpretation has to be seen as an inferential interpretative process on the
clause as a whole.
The treatment I am proposing is of this kind and can deal with these
data. Let us first take a look at the simpler example (174). We start with
a DRS that contains the discourse referent introduced by the car, and with
the conditions introduced by the predicate rollen. A car as such cannot roll,
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except in an accident, when it ‘rolls’ down a slope, overturning – but as long
as we do not have evidence for this interpretation, we consider it as unlikely.
So, thus far we do not have a satisfactory conceptual interpretation. However,
our (world) knowledge about cars tells us that they all have wheels, and that
these can roll, and their rolling causes that the car is moving:
(175) ∀x.CAR(x) −→ ∃y.WHEELS OF(y,x) ∧ (ROLL(y) −→
MOVE(x))
This is part of our world knowledge and thus can be a condition of our DRS.
If we further add the discourse referent of the wheels into that DRS and make
the appropriate unifications, we get the result that conforms to the desired
interpretation. The car is ‘totally involved’, because it is moving, when its
wheels are rolling. So the condition for nominative case reduction is also met.








Things change only slightly when we turn to (172-c). We have different world
knowledge rules, but that is all. The most important rule is that if the clapper
of a bell performs a strike against the side of the same bell, then that bell
rings:
(177) ∀x,y,z.bell(x) ∧ clapper of(y,x) ∧ side of(z,x) −→
CAUSE(SCHLAG(y,z),RING(x))
This legitimates the following DRS as a possible interpretation of (172-c), in
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In the final section I will briefly address the opposite problem: Can a single
individual be referred to by more than one constituent? The answer will again
be ‘yes’, but only under certain assumptions.
2.5.3 Is Splitting of Individuals Possible?
The phenomenon I will address concerns plural or ‘collective’ individuals.

























(179–a) has one verbal complement, and (179–b) has two. But do their DRSs
have different numbers of discourse referents? Both sentences have the inter-
pretation that Maria and Peter went to the cinema together, and thus, should
be treated as synonymous.50 The question, how many individuals have to ap-
pear in the DRSs of the two clauses, might be answerable in different ways.
But it is very likely that it is answered for both sentences in the same way. If
the DRS has only one individual, then (179–b) is a case where one semantic
individual is split into two constituents; if the DRS contains two individu-
als, then (179–a) is another case of ‘conflated individuals’, as discussed in the
previous section. I will not decide this question for the concrete case of (179),
but will try to search for similar but clearer cases that have to be seen as
having only one individual. The clearest cases I could find were with predi-
cates like ‘doubles’, ‘trio’, ‘band’, which all are semantic one-place predicates
of plural individuals, in combination with a copula verb. The alternation
between a plural subject and a (possibly singular) subject plus a mit-PP –
50I am leaving aside the issue of different perspectives here. If there is a difference
between the two clauses, then with respect to information structure and topicality. In
(179–a) we talk about both Maria and Peter, while in (179–b) our primary interest is in
Maria. (179–b) is a better answer to the question “What did Maria do?” than (179–a).
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Levin (1993) calls it “reciprocal alternation” – can again be observed with
these predicates:
































































































































The predicate ‘trio’, for example, is semantically one-place, but requires that
its argument is a collective individual consisting of three members. These
data show, to my mind, that the phenomenon that two distinct constituents
together introduce one semantic individual really exists.
A slightly more complicated class of predicates with collective individu-
als are reciprocal predicates. These predicates describe properties of a group
where, e.g., in a two-membered group each member has the same relation to





































































I will consider reciprocal predicates as semantically one-place again, attribut-
ing all the specifics of the reciprocal interpretation to the semantics of the
predicate, and how it treats collective individuals. On a deeper level, however,
it is impossible that the ‘simple’ predicates the reciprocal predicates are built
of are one-place, precisely because of the reciprocity. Reciprocal predicates
have the following general structure:
If a reciprocal predicate is based on a two-place relation f(x, y)
and is said to hold of a set of individuals A consisting of the
individuals a and b, then the reciprocal predicate frec(A) entails
the relations f(a, b) and f(b, a).
Being based on a semantically two-place predicate is the minimum for a
reciprocal predicate. If a predicate holds of a plural individual, but is based on
a one-place predicate g, then we only get either a distributive interpretation
g(x) for each member of the plural individual, or a collective interpretation,
where g holds only of the group as a whole. Typical examples for the latter
are the above discussed ‘doubles’, ‘trio’ and ‘band’.
Consider example (181–f): schlagen, as we know, is a two-place verb,
and even if we assumed for the moment that the schlagen with the ‘punish’
interpretation used here is a lexeme of its own that requires an agent and
a patient, we could not simply link the two thematic roles of the verb to
the two introduced individuals (i.e. Maria and Peter). This would yield only
‘SCHLAGEN(m,p)’ or ‘SCHLAGEN(p,m)’, but not both, as required. Thus,
in order to get the correct conceptual interpretation we may first have to
‘compose’ the collective individual out of the two constituents, and then
‘apply’ the verb twice, such that both relations are included in the DRS of
the clause.
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The rules that are necessary can be bound in a quite construction specific
manner to the occurrence of the typical morpho-syntax of reciprocal predi-
cates (at least in German), and of course to the involved lexical items. The
rule should be formulated as another (perhaps optional) DRS construction
rule. The reconstruction of subject and mit-PP into one collective individual
has to be attributed to the DRS translation of the preposition mit. This is
also possible.51
I will not show in detail here, how this interpretation works. But it is
clear that in the case of reciprocal predicates again the traditional view on
thematic interpretation faces fundamental problems. The whole set of verbal
complements has to be ‘rearranged’ conceptually, not only once, but twice!
First we produce a collective individual out of two constituents, then we
produce two ‘opposite’ concepts/relations out of one. The whole issue of
theta role ‘assignment’ is in this case the result of these quite complicated
processes. It cannot be resolved at the so-called ‘syntax-semantics interface’.
2.6 Summary
The major task of this chapter was the elaboration of a theory of thematic in-
terpretation that covers the linking variability of polyvalent verbs – under the
premise that the polyvalent behavior is an effect of the conceptual-semantic
specifics of these verbs and of natural language expressions in general, and
that polyvalence is not (or better mostly not) an indicator of polysemy: for
each different ‘valence’ of the same verb we do not assume that we are deal-
ing with a different lexeme. Rather, I assume that we are dealing with the
same lexeme in all instances of polyvalence – as long as this can be justified
semantically. Cases of polyvalence have to be differentiated from cases of true
polysemy.
This premise has consequences for the developed theory. Consider the
verb roll in the following two clauses:
(182) a. The ball was rolling
b. Mary was rolling the ball
Traditional approaches consider roll to be a manner-of-motion verb in
(182–a) and a causation-of-motion verb in (182–b). Under my perspective,
it can only be either of the first or of the the second kind in both cases.
The minimal assumption is that it is only a manner-of-motion verb, and that
51The respective rule should not replace the PP by a discourse referent of its own, but
rather let it ‘add up’ to another discourse referent.
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the ‘additional’ causative interpretation is an effect of the construction the
verb appears in. Sofar, the developed theory can be seen as a version of con-
struction grammer. Goldberg (1995) developed such a construction grammar
account of argument structure.
A theoretical consequence of this assumption is that verbs have to be
considered as only partially determining the meaning of the clause. The the-
matic interpretation of a verbal complement may not only be determined by
the verb, but also by other elements within the clause. The thematic role of
a noun might be more complex than the roles provided by the verb.
As the semantics of the verb is assumed to be constant despite its polyva-
lent behavior, we might find situations, where the actual value of a semantic
argument of the verb cannot be found ‘within the clause’, so to speak, but
has to be inferred, as a so-called ‘implicit argument’.
I showed that implicit arguments are not the only phenomenon where
inference plays a role in thematic interpretation. In addition to verb mean-
ing and ‘construction meaning’, the meaning of the noun in the argument
position has to be considered, too. A hammer can be hit into a wall, but a
hole can only be created by hitting something else against a wall. Nonethe-
less, the clause ‘John hit a hole into the wall’ is well-formed. But its linking
pattern is different from that of ‘John hit a hammer into the wall’. Verb
and construction are equal in both clauses, the only difference is the lexeme
occuring in the direct object position. Hence, it must be this lexeme that
triggers the alternate linking pattern. This empirical finding has three major
consequences for the design of the developed theory:
 The theory has to allow several possible linking patterns for the same
construction with the same verb.
 The actual linking pattern is the ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ one, evaluated by
an inferential mechanism of comparing the possible options.
 This inferential mechanism takes all available information into account,
not only the meaning of the verb (including its selectional restrictions)
and the construction, but also the meanings of the complements to be
assigned thematic roles, contextual information and world knowledge.
I showed in section 2.5.2 that an individual introduced by a verbal com-
plement sometimes has to be ‘split’ into two conceptual individuals, or that
two introduced individuals have to be ‘conflated’ into one individual, in or-
der to determine the correct assignment of thematic roles. This phenomenon
raises fundamental questions about the relation between ‘syntactic’ and se-
mantic arguments, syntactic and semantic arity of predicates. It points once
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again toward a theory that sees the relation between syntactic and semantic
arguments as much more indirect, mediated not simply by a correspondence
function, but by an inferential mechanism that establishes this correspon-
dence ‘on the fly’, during the process of semantic interpretation.
I showed in chapter 1 that sometimes quite subtle properties of the in-
volved lexical items can play an important role in explaining phenomena
of polyvalence. Discourse Representation Theory, as developed by Kamp &
Reyle (1993) provides a format that can deal with these subtleties in princi-
ple. I used the format of Discourse Representatoin Structures to develop the
theory. But the solution of the given task requires certain extensions of the
standard picture of DRT.
The first ‘extension’ that I made was the necessary assumption that world
knowledge propositions and contextual information are part of any DRS.
I assumed that they can be put anywhere in a DRS. On the other hand,
the respective DRS conditions have to be separated from ‘ordinary’ DRS
conditions, and so I introduced the notion of regular DRS conditions for those
conditions that are introduced by the linguistic material, or inferred from the
latter. I represented ‘non-regular DRS conditions’ (i.e. world knowlege and
contextual information) inside angled brackets:
(183) p regular DRS condition
〈q〉 non-regular DRS condition
The reason for this distinction lies in the problem that, although thematic
interpretation is an inferential process, it is important that we do not use any
propositions in this inferential process, but make use of those propositions
introduced by the construction and lexical items of the clause that is currently
interpreted.
There might be alternative ways of representing this difference. We might
make use of the ‘placement’ options that we have in DRT. Usually, the inner-
most box stands for the interpretation of the actually processed clause, while
the outer boxes represent information given by the preceding discourse. We
might restrict the placement of world knowledge and contextual information
to the outer boxes, and then replace the notion of ‘regular’ DRS conditions
with a restriction that talks about conditions within the same box. But as I
am a bit uncertain, how strictly the placement of conditions is governed in
DRT, and whether it can be restricted in the intended way, I feel save with
the solution that I made use of. I admit that it does not look very elegant.
The central point is that regular conditions can be derived from other
regular conditions in connection with non-regular conditions. Thus, the fol-
lowing situation is possible:
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q is a regular DRS condition inferred from one regular and one non-regular
DRS condition. It is impossible to derive a regular DRS condition only from
non-regular ones. But I also consider the ‘generation’ of non-regular condi-
tions from regular ones as odd:52








〈 r → q〉
r
... 〈q〉
〈 r → q〉
r
... q
With respect to the representation of lexical knowledge, I adopt the account
of Kamp & Roßdeutscher (1994b), with some modifications. One modification
is that I consider selectional restrictions as genuinely semantic, while for
Kamp and Roßdeutscher they can be either semantic or syntactic (as a kind
of subcategorization restriction). Furthermore, I treat selectional restrictions
as prerequisites of the interpretation of a clause, not as part of it. Their
influence on the interpretation is comparable to that of world knowledge and
contextual information. Therefore, they are located in a DRS outer than the
DRS of the currently interpreted clause. Take the following simple schematic
DRS for rollen:
52There is one logical problem that has to be taken care of. It concerns addition of
redundant material. Given that ‘p → q’, and p is a non-regular condition, we can derive
q, but only as a non-regular DRS condition. But, if ‘p → q’, then necessarily ‘(p ∧ r) →
q’. If r is a regular DRS condition, then the above reasoning suggests that now q can be
introduced as a regular DRS condition. But this would allow any condition to be classified
as regular DRS condition, and, thus, make the notion of regular DRS condition unusable.
It must be guaranteed that only the necessary premises of a deduction count. E.g., in
order for the following deduction to justify introduction of r as regular DRS condition, the










When the schematic DRS is inserted into a clause, the selectional restric-
tion is placed outside of the box of the event variable e standing for the













Alternatively, these selectional restrictions might also be treated as non-
regular DRSs, and then be inserted freely.53
The use of the event variable that I am making is much closer to Rei-
chenbach (1947) than to Davidson (1967b), let alone Parsons (1990). The
introduction of schematic discourse referents for events also allows for a Rei-
chenbachian treatment in DRT. The crucial difference would be the use of
adverbials. As I see it, (188–a) would correspond to a Davidsonian treatment,
and (188–b) to a Reichenbachian:









53The upper boundary is, of course, the DRS that contains in its universe the discourse
referents used by the selectional restriction.
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After unification of e with e and x with x there is no difference between the
two structures, but this unification is not always allowed, as argued in the
last sections. As soon as we have two separate independent schematic event
variables, we can no longer identify the ‘regular’ event variable e with one of
the schematic event variables.
Another important issue with respect to the event notion and the event
variable was the requirement that simple events have to be atomic (150):
(189) Events are indivisible
The domain of the event variable e is the set of indivisible events.
This is a requirement for the interpretation of DRSs, rather than their con-
struction. As far as I can see, it points toward an unsolved problem in the
discussion and use of the event notion in semantic representations. (189) is
necessary to exclude certain ‘absurd’ interpretations. But these have to be
excluded explicitly in any conceptual-semantic theory. (189) has a rather
ontological status.
A modification that is also important for the developed theory is the use
of perspective, as introduced by Fillmore (1977). Fillmore himself already uses
perspective as property both of clauses and of lexical items. This is done here
in a very similar way. The perspective of a clause are the grammatical func-
tions subject and direct object, with an ordering of subject higher than direct
object. The perspective might contain only a subset of the complements, it
does not necessarily impose a total ordering. The perspective of verbs and
co-predicates works very similar. The restriction for possible interpretations
that builds on the perspective was given in (65):
(190) Restriction on the Perspectives of DRSs
A DRS of an event that contains perspectives with contradictory
rankings of discourse referents is ill-formed.
A contradiction between perspectives occurs in a situation like the following:
the schematic DRS of the verb imposes a perspective ‘x  y’, and the gram-
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matical functions of the clause yield the perspective ‘y  x’. I assume that
schlagen/hit has a perspective that involves both of its semantic arguments
(i.e. the moving entity M and the still-standing target S, where per: M 
S). The (only) reading that is excluded by (190) is one, where M is linked to
the direct object, and S to the subject. This is the only plausible reading for
(191), but the contradictory perspectives still make (191) odd:
(191) ??The wall hits the stick
With respect to (191), (190) works like a subcategorization rule, but it is
much more liberal. To give a simple example, there is no problem with (191)
in a passive construction:
(192) The wall was hit by the stick
Because only the subject is part of the clause’s perspective, it imposes no
ranking of discourse referents, and so no contradictory rankings can occur.54
Because I assume that polyvalent verbs have no subcategorization frames,
I have to show how case information disappears from a DRS. I assume that
this follows from semantic criteria. The rules for nominative and accusative
have been given in (75) and (76), respectively:
54A clause like
(i) The wall hit with the stick
is still excluded, but by a different restriction that requires total involvedness for the
subject. Some German verbs allow goal subjects, if total involvedness is given:
(ii) Der Tisch lag voll Papier
The table lay full of paper
Total involvedness for the subject in (192) would have to be stipulated by a theory of the
passive, however.
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A DRS box of an event e, containing the con-










A DRS box of an event e, containing the con-







These are the two cases that are central for transitive constructions, on which
I focussed in the empirical discussion of this chapter. The construction spe-
cific DRS construction rule for transitive constructions was given in (118):
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(195)
DRS construction rule for transitive constructions
Triggering
configuration

















Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
for the verb α
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u),acc(v)
per: u  v





Substitute in γ: e for [V α ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
A crucial point is the optional nature of this rule. It is optional in itself
and also contains further optional rules. As a consequence of this, we yield a
set of possible/derivable semantic interpretations for clauses, not only one.
The actual interpretation must be among this ‘candidate set’, but has to be
chosen in a second step of evaluation. I will say something more about this
second step below.
I also discussed transitive constructions with an additional co-predicate.
The DRS construction rule is given in (196). (197) is the DRS construction
rule for co-predicates alone (cf. (136) and (141), respectively):
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(196)




























Introduce into the universe
of the main DRS: new discourse referent e
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referents
e1 and e2
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: nom(u),acc(v)
per: u  v
schematic DRS e1 of α






Unify: The single element of per(e2) with v.
Substitute in γ: e1 for [V α ]
e2 for [COP β ]
u for [NP u ]
v for [NP v ]
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(197)
DRS construction rule for co-predicates
Triggering
configuration
γ ⊆ γ ∈ ConK :
COP
α
Introduce into the universe
of e: schematic discourse referent e
Introduce into the con-
ditions set of e: schematic DRS e of the
co-predicate α
Substitute in γ: e for [COP α ]
The developed construction specific DRS construction rules are optional in
their application, and contain further options. The result is a set of ‘candidate
interpretations’ that compete for the ‘optimal interpretation’. This is another
departure from standard DRT, I guess. But on the other hand, optimality
theoretic treatments of semantic problems have currently been developed by
different researchers, and these are not at all incompatible to DRT.55
It seems to me that there are four criteria that are of central importance
for the procedure of evaluating the candidate interpretations:
(198) i. Possibility: optimal interpretations must be world knowledge
consistent.
ii. Plausibility: optimal interpretations must be context consis-
tent.
iii. Minimal Structure: optimal interpretations contain as few
discourse referents/DRS conditions as possible.
iv. Maximal information: optimal interpretations contain as
few schematic discourse referents as possible – but as many
ordinary discourse referents and DRS conditions as possible.
The first two criteria are quite straightforward. Possibility is an absolute cri-
terion. An interpretation is either possible or not. Plausibility on the other
hand is gradient. Two candidate interpretations might be equally possible,
but one might be more plausible than the other. The last two criteria are
55See for example Hendricks & de Hoop (1999) and Blutner (1999).
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quite interesting. They are strongly reminiscent of the ‘Q-Principle’ and the
‘I-Principle’ of Atlas & Levinson (1981) or Horn (1984) (who calls Atlas and
Levinson’s ‘I-Principle’ ‘R-Principle’). A very interesting ‘bi-directional’ op-
timality theoretic implementation of these two principles has been proposed
by Blutner (1999).
Optimality theoretic accounts of semantic issues provide the machinery
that is needed here: a framework for semantic interpretation that is based on
an evaluation of a set of alternative interpretations for a given string. But
the application of OT ‘machinery’ to the problem discussed here is a project
of its own.
This completes the summary of the rules and constraints for the concep-
tual interpretation of natural language sentences and lexemes developed in
this chapter. The previous section also discussed the phenomenon of implicit
arguments and how it should be addressed in principle, as well as problems
connected with ‘mismatches’ in the syntactic and conceptual-semantic ari-
ties.
I refer the reader to the concluding remarks for a more general, but brief,
discussion of what has been done here.
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One important result of this thesis is that once we try to elaborate a the-
ory of thematic interpretation that takes into account the ‘assignment’ of
the concrete thematic roles provided by individual lexical items, we cannot
avoid viewing thematic role ‘assignment’ as much more indirect than usually
assumed. It is often mediated by additional interpretative inferences, and
these inferential processes often use ‘non-local’ information: to calculate the
role of one complement we have to take into account the semantic properties
of other complements. As soon as one is willing to accept this, it is quite
easy to see why the phenomenon of polyvalence exists and that it poses a
problem for common lexicalist theories of grammar, because polyvalent verbs
apparently refuse to do what these theories consider to be their job: rigidly
determining the clause’s morpho-syntactic surface and conceptual-semantic,
especially thematic interpretation. In order to cope with polyvalence, the role
of lexical items in grammar has to be relativised.
If the view on thematic interpretation that I proposed here were carried
over to the contemporary mainstream in generative syntax, as formulated
by Chomsky (1995), then this approach would lose a quite frequently used
tool in explaining word order regularities: the assumption that there are
two syntactic positions for a verbal complement, a VP-internal ‘thematic’
or ‘theta position’, and a VP-external case position. As we cannot speak
of lexically predetermined thematic roles connected with a fixed syntactic
position in the model proposed here – because thematic interpretation is
part of the general semantic interpretation processes applying on a syntactic
structure, not before or within its syntactic derivation –, there is no longer
any justification for syntactic ‘theta positions’ – at least in connection with
polyvalent verbs.
This consequence seems a welcome progress to me. First, because the
mostly used ‘universal’ theta roles have no real independent justification,
as discussed in chapter 1.2, and second because the assumption of theta
positions leads to mixing-up syntactic and semantic features within one and




The position that inferential processes play a certain role in thematic
interpretation is not genuinely new, though. There are some predecessors,
one of which is David E. Rumelhart (Rumelhart 1979). His point of view
is shared by McClelland & Kawamoto (1986) who summarize it as follows
(McClelland & Kawamoto 1986, 316):
[. . . ] A sentence assembles some words in a particular order, and
each provides a set of clues that constrains the characteristics of
the scenario, each in its own way. The verb, in and of itself, may
specify a range of related scenarios and certain constraints on the
players. The nouns further restrict the scenario and further con-
strain the players. But the words themselves are no longer present
in the scenario, nor is there necessarily anything in the scenario
that corresponds to the literal meaning of the words. Thus in the
case of The doll moved, the (partially activated) Agent is not a
copy of the standard doll pattern, but a pattern appropriate for
a doll that can move under its own steam.
The crucial point, here, is that all the words work together to pro-
vide clues to the case frame representation of the sentence, and
none of the words uniquely or completely determine the represen-
tation that is assigned to any of the constituents of the underlying
scenario. [. . . ]
This appears to resemble what is meant by ‘conceptual shift’ and ‘concep-
tual specification’ in Two-Level-Semantics. Though the approaches of Mc-
Clelland and Kawamoto as well as Rumelhart still make use of universal
thematic roles, and assume that it is the verb that has to provide them, the
emphasis is laid on the interaction of the constituents in the process of each
other’s interpretation. I made one step further here, when I claimed that
even the ‘assignment ’ of thematic roles itself is subject to these interactive
interpretative processes.
The model of conceptual-semantic and thematic interpretation developed
in chapter 2 is built on well-known and well-established assumptions, but
departs from traditional treatments in important details. One major differ-
ence is that selectional restrictions play a bigger role than in earlier theories.
They are not only restricting the domain of a variable, but they also provide
information used in interpretative inferential processes. For thematic inter-
pretation, it is not only important what a verb expresses, but also what its
prerequisites are, including world knowledge and contextual information. I
make use of these prerequisites in the explanation of the varying assignments
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of individual thematic roles, like the role of the moving entity M of schlagen





























While the individual introduced by the direct object der Hammer has role M
in (199–a), the direct object cannot receive this role in (199–b). The reason
is that holes cannot move, but movability is a prerequisite for the role M.
Traditional accounts that make use of selectional restrictions and fixed linking
rules would predict for such a scernario that the clause is ill-formed. But this
is not what we get. We only get a different linking pattern. Providing space for
such flexibility was the main reason for the proposal given here. I also argued
in chapter 2.5.1 that selectional restrictions and the other prerequisites play
an important role in the licensing of implicit arguments.
To account for the observed linking variability of polyvalent verbs, I do not
assume, in contrast to the standard view in generative grammar, that their
lexical entries include ‘linking devices’ that tell which thematic role has to be
linked to which grammatical function or case. The restrictions that I assume
are less rigid: roles should be assigned somehow, this increases informativity,
and a clause that lies beyond a certain threshold of informativity might be
considered ill-formed. Another restriction that looks like a linking device is
Fillmore’s (1977) notion of perspective. But its implementation given here is
much more liberal than a linking device.
Given these assumptions, argument linking can happen in many differ-
ent ways, and polyvalent behaviour is predicted. Further restrictions that
we find with polyvalent verbs follow from more general rules determining
the semantic properties of larger clausal units. The interpretation of specific
constructions – transitive, causative, resultative etc. –, as well as the seman-
tic implications of case forms and complement clause types, are determined
by independent construction specific interpretation rules. I developed such
rules for transitive constructions, with and without a co-predicate, for co-
predicates, and for the German structural cases. The application of these
general rules can be ‘blocked’ or ‘overwritten’ by verbs that do have fixed
linking rules. The claim is not that, given the evidence that some verbs (the
polyvalent verbs) have no subcategorization frames, no verb has a subcate-
gorization frame.
Instead of this, I propose that there is co-existence of default rules and
idiosyncratic rules, comparable to the coexistence of regular and irregular
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verb inflection and other similar phenomena. I introduced the term semi-
idiom for verbs with subcategorization frames. The suggestion is that these
verbs have something in common with idiomatic expressions, to a certain
degree. The following table shall illustrate the intended idiomaticity scale,
exemplified with transitive constructions. The fewer open slots there are in
the ‘subcategorization frames’ illustrated in the table in (200), the more
idiomatic the respective expression is:
(200) Idiomaticity Scale for transitive clauses
DP V DP
the early bird catches the worm proverb
kick the bucket idiom
watch semi-idiom (trans. verb)
transitive construction
An analogy between subcategorization and idiomaticity has also been drawn
in Construction Grammar (cf. Fillmore et al. 1988). That constructions as
such, as well as cases and types of complement clauses, have their own seman-
tic contributions associated with them is a genuine construction grammarian
idea. Goldberg (1995) applies these ideas to argument structure and ‘argu-
ment structure constructions’. The system proposed there is nonetheless still
deterministic with respect to argument linking. Variable linking patterns for
the same verb with the same construction are not accounted for. Goldberg’s
model provides no space for world knowledge, contextual information and
selectional restrictions to intervene in the process of thematic interpretation.
In this aspect, construction grammar is quite traditional. The same holds for
the proposal of Dowty (1991).56
The empirical discussion was mainly about the German verbs schlagen
and rollen, so the general applicability of the proposal in chapter 2 still has
to be explored. Also on the agenda are accounts of the various case forms,
prepositional argument types and complement clause types of German, all
56Dowty (1991) can be read – against the author’s intentions – as a proposal for the
semantics of transitive constructions. Dowty’s claim is that of two roles assigned by a
verb, the role with more “Proto-Agent” properties becomes subject and the role with
more “Proto-Patient” properties becomes direct object. But the relations subject=Proto-
Agent and direct object=Proto-Patient still hold in transitive clauses, where the verb
is responsible for the role of only one argument, as in resultatives or causatives with
intransitive verbs. Dowty considers only the systematic mapping from role to grammatical
function. But the mapping from grammatical functions to role seems to show the same
systematicity. On the other hand, the variable linking of the individual roles of polyvalent
verbs cannot be accounted for, because Dowty’s system predicts one linking pattern for
all occurrences of a verb.
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of which are proposed to make some semantic contributions. The nature of
these is an empirical matter yet to be explored in detail.
The proposal that argument linking with polyvalent verbs is based on
an evaluation of several interpretative options requires the formulation of a
mechanism that performs the task of choosing among the given options. Al-
though I did not work out this mechanism here, I suggested at the end of the
last chapter that it could be formulated within optimality theory. The deci-
sive criteria that choose between the candidates are possibility, plausibility,
informativity and simplicity.
I want to close with some remarks about language particularity. A basic
idea of construction grammar is that construction types are stored in the lexi-
con, i.e., they have, in analogy to the usual treatment of idioms and proverbs,
the status of lexical items. As a consequence of this, the same construction
might differ in its semantic entailments from language to language. There is
some evidence that this assumption is justified.
The first example in case is from Chinese. According to Li (1993) the










a. “Taotao chased Youyou and as a result Youyou got tired”
b. “Taotao chased Youyou and as a result Taotao got tired”









Only reading (201–a) is possible here. To express reading (201–b) in German,
we would have to use a reflexive pronoun as direct object and add the ‘chasee’













One and the same syntactic construction, the resultative construction, has
different interpretations in German and Chinese. In the system developed in
57The two prepositions have sightly different interpretations along lines discussed earlier:
mit implies total involvedness which here means that Taotao actually caught Youyou; an
on the other hand is the preposition that is often used to express partiality. Although it
also permits the reading where Taotao caught Youyou, the preferred reading seems to be
that he did not.
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chapter 2, this means that we need different DRS construction rules for tran-
sitive clauses with co-predicates for these two languages: DRS construction
rules are language particular!
Rugemalira (1994) discusses the Bantu language Runyambo that has an
affix -es/-is, which is classified as ‘causative’. Rugemalira shows that this
classification should not imply that the affix is like the Englich verb cause,
and that it has not the same effects as the causative alternation we know
from European languages. Causativization in the traditional sense is only
one of several interpretative possibilities that come along with this affix. An
exciting sample of options is the following (Rugemalira 1994, 71, notation
and glosses as given there), with the readings given below:
(204) a-ka-ri-is-á (i) abajenyi ‘guests’ (helpee)
she-PST-eat-C-FV (ii) abáana ‘children’ (causee)
(iii) endoso ‘spoon’ (instrument)
(iv) omurúru ‘greed’ (manner)
(i) ‘she ate with the guests, i.e. accompanied
the guests to dinner’
(ii) ‘she fed the children’
(iii) ‘she ate with a spoon’
(iv) ‘she ate greedily’
The causative affix allows for an additional argument that can be described
as a cause in a very broad sense – company, instrument, inner emotional
state, direct causer and maybe more. This is, in a nutshell, Rugemalira’s
point. Note that the eater role assigned by eat varies between direct object
(i,ii) and subject (iii,iv). This kind of causative construction is different from
the ones we know from European languages. Again, the only way to account
for these data seems to me to posit a language particular interpretation rule
for this construction.
Campbell (1996) studies serial verb constructions in West-African lan-
guages. These have the following general shape:
(205) NP1 — V1 — (NP2) — V2 — (NP3)
The compositional-semantic relation between the two verbs can vary. The
following examples from Kwawu differ in whether the verbs describe one
single event or the conjunction of two events (Campbell 1996, 85, notation
























‘I sold the book to Kofi’
While in (206–a) the second verb ‘eat’ stands for a second event following
the event introduced by the first verb ‘catch’, in (206–b) the second verb
seems to be conceptually ‘integrated’ with the first verb. The two verbs de-
scribe two aspects of one single event. Such a construction is not known in
modern Germanic and many other European languages. If we posited a DRS
construction rule for serial verb constructions, we would certainly not want
it to be a universal rule.
The rules proposed in chapter 2 are rules for German. English does not
seem to differ much from German in this respect. But, as should have become
clear, I do not claim that all transitive constructions in all languages ‘mean’
the same – on the contrary, what the above discussion suggests is that in the
domain of syntax-semantics correspondence there is even less universality
than in the domain of syntax as such.
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